








First published in Great Britain in 2006 by
  
Policy Press North America office: 
University of Bristol Policy Press 
1-9 Old Park Hill c/o The University of Chicago Press 
Bristol 1427 East 60th Street 
BS2 8BB Chicago, IL 60637, USA 
UK t: +1 773 702 7700 
t: +44 (0)117 954 5940 f: +1 773-702-9756 
pp-info@bristol.ac.uk sales@press.uchicago.edu 
www.policypress.co.uk www.press.uchicago.edu 
© Paul Spicker 2006
The digital PDF version of this title is available Open Access and distributed under the terms 
of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 license (http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/) which permits adaptation, alteration, reproduction and distribution 
for non-commercial use, without further permission provided the original work is attributed. 
The derivative works do not need to be licensed on the same terms. 
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data 
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 
A catalog record for this book has been requested
ISBN 978-1-86134-841-8 hardcover 
ISBN 978-1-84742-164-7 ePdf
The right of Paul Spicker to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in 
accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved: no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, 
or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, 
or otherwise without the prior permission of Policy Press.
The statements and opinions contained within this publication are solely those of the author 
and not of the University of Bristol or Policy Press. The University of Bristol and Policy 
Press disclaim responsibility for any injury to persons or property resulting from any material 
published in this publication.
Policy Press works to counter discrimination on grounds of gender, race,  
disability, age and sexuality.
Cover design by Qube Design Associates, Bristol 




Notes on the author ix
Introduction 1
Social welfare 2





Individual and social concepts of freedom 31
Arguments against liberty 34
Liberty in theory: an overview 41
two Towards a free society 43
A free society 43
Creating the conditions for liberty 50
Freedom and the welfare state 56
Part Two: Equality 63
three Equality 65
The meaning of equality 65
Inequalities 67
Arguments for inequality 71
Equality of what? 76
Equality and social justice 88
Individual and social equality 91
Equality and freedom 94
Equality in theory: an overview 97
four Towards equality 99
Policies for equality 99
Equality and redistribution 108
Approaches to equality and egalitarian policies 113
Towards an equal society 114
iv
Liberty, equality, fraternity
Part Three: Fraternity 117




Mutual responsibility and aid 127
Solidarity 130
The common good 131
Social responsibility 134
The case against solidarity 136
Solidarity and equality 138
Solidarity and freedom 140
Fraternity and solidarity in theory: an overview 142
six The inclusive society 143
Solidarity in practice 143
Promoting social solidarity 150
Solidarity and social welfare 154
The inclusive society 157
Conclusion: radical politics 159
Radical politics: three models 160
The political opposition 165
References 167
Subject index 189
Index of names 193
v
Preface
This book discusses the concepts of liberty, equality and fraternity,
and considers how they inform social policy.  The principles are chosen
partly because they traditionally stand together, partly because they
are interesting in their own right, and partly because, when they are
considered together, they offer distinctive insights into socialist and
radical thinking.
The approach is theoretical. The main principles are separated into
a range of distinct elements, which are discussed systematically and
then inter-related.  Each of the concepts is applied to practical examples,
which are intended to show how the principles relate to practice. This
kind of practical application is fundamental to work in applied theory.
The selection should help to bring the subject to life, to show how
the concepts work, and to show where the difficulties are. Any real-
life example brings in more practical and normative issues than can
comfortably be considered, and examples are necessarily dealt with
very selectively. In some cases, there are interesting examples which
raise a clutch of related issues, and these are considered in separate
sections. Even in those cases, though, the material has to be abbreviated.
The discussion of theoretical issues is partly descriptive. The book
explains a series of propositions about the core concepts, and tries to
understand the positions that different writers adopt.  The emphasis
on application to examples means that some of the descriptions and
classifications of ideas are new, but that should help to make the material
more effective as a description. Beyond description, however, the book
is also prescriptive. There are several points in the argument where I
begin with a proposition and proceed to defend it, rather than gradually
working my way to a balanced conclusion. To a large extent, those
prescriptions reflect my own values: I have tended through much of
the book to favour social and communitarian applications over
individualist ones. However, the effect of outlining broadly based, and
sometimes conflicting, concepts is to argue for awareness of different
points of view, consideration and balance.
The book brings together material from political theory and social
policy. From the perspective of political theory, the book:
• discusses key concepts;
• uses practical examples;
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• introduces new approaches to concepts, with categories based
on policy; and
• tries to develop an insight into the understanding of radical
politics.
For political theorists, much of the subject matter should be familiar
terrain. The main exception is fraternity, which has not really had the
attention it merits. However, the book was conceived as an original
contribution to the theoretical literature, and some elements are new.
In the first place, the arguments are presented within an ordered,
thematic framework. Many of the subcategories and dimensions of
the argument have been shaped by the need to address the issues in
policy. The conventional characterisations of liberty stand up well to
the test and this makes the discussion of that field less directly innovative,
even if some sections are new. By contrast, I had to extend and develop
the categorisations of both equality and fraternity to make it possible
to apply them effectively. If there is an equivalent treatment of either
topic, I have not seen it.
Second, the book draws on a rich seam of original examples, drawn
primarily from social policy. Many of the principal works of
contemporary political theory have very little relationship to social or
political issues; they are based either in purely formal reasoning or in
invented, imagined examples. Bob Goodin once launched a scathing
attack on the use of fantasy, or ‘crazy cases’, in political theory. Extreme
examples are sometimes used to point to issues that in real life become
dark, muddy and confused, but Goodin argued that the main effect of
outlandish examples was to disorient readers, and to distort our moral
perceptions.1 Some thought-experiments in the literature are
immediately identifiable as such, like the spaceship travellers in
Ackerman’s bizarre discussion of social justice.2 However, when well-
respected books maunder about ‘the right to walk on my hands’3 or
whether we can have a library in our back yard,4 I have to curb my
exasperation. It is not as if there is any shortage of examples of restricted
rights, or of problems in the public distribution of goods. The failure
of these authors to relate their work to real life, or to address the
arguments generated by the practical issues, excites the suspicion that
they are inventing examples because they do not know what the issues
really are. Ignorance of the conditions people experience, and of the
relevant arguments, is a poor basis for theoretical examination. I have




From the perspective of social policy, the book:
• considers the political and moral dimensions of social policies;
• offers a normative analysis of several policies; and
• offers an alternative mode of discourse to the analysis of the
subject.
The arguments are much less familiar in the field of social policy than
they are in political science. I first discussed issues of liberty and equality,
in a much shorter space, in Principles of social welfare.5 Although studies
in social policy have paid increasing attention to ethics and principles
in recent years, much of the literature in the subject is still bound by
conventional interpretations, particularly in terms of ideologies.6
Beyond that, the disciplinary basis of the field is increasingly influenced
by sociological interpretations, where normative analysis has
traditionally been regarded with some suspicion, and the methods
applied in moral and political philosophy are unusual. The value of
examining general principles is partly that they make it possible better
to understand the political and moral dimensions of policy, and partly
that they help the development of techniques for normative analysis;
but they are also important in their own right, and it is hard to
understand social policy adequately without them.
A personal note
George Orwell once commented that writing a book is like having a
long illness. This has been true of most of my books, given the
combination of obsessive and repetitive behaviour, waking up with
ideas in the middle of the night, and fretting over presentation. By
comparison this one has been much easier to bear, and really no worse
than a mild dose of the flu. While I have been writing this book, I
have been the director of a research unit, and have worked on a wide
range of different projects. These have included studies of police
complaints, a review of anti-poverty strategy, the safety of minority
ethnic groups, community planning, housing allocations, complexity
in benefit systems, money advice, training for homeless people, the
design of schools, benefit receipt in South Africa, educating health
professionals, participative research on poverty, and a consultation on
civil partnership registration. The chance to write about theory at my
own speed has been a refuge from highly pressurised deadlines for
applied research, while the engagement with practical projects has
fuelled my interest in the general principles.
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Thanks are due to Mark Aspinwall, Peter McLaverty and Geraldine
Wooley for comments.
Paul Spicker
The Robert Gordon University
Aberdeen, Scotland
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The discussion of liberty, equality and fraternity has been a major
influence on political thought since the time of the French Revolution.
The case can be made for a much longer historical perspective on
each – the libertarianism of religious dissenters, the egalitarianism of
the Levellers, and the fraternity of the guilds – but the effect of the
Revolution was to make these principles central to radical approaches.
The French Revolution marked the triumph of ‘the people’.  It
pronounced, in 1789, the Declaration of the rights of man and of the
citizen.7 In theoretical terms, many of the ideas were ill worked out.
For example, the revolutionaries proclaimed the rights of man, but
women were largely excluded from the process.8 In practical terms,
revolutionary zeal turned to fanaticism, and the Revolution turned
on itself.
The influence of the Revolution has played a major part in shaping
the way that people think about their society.  Two hundred years ago,
the principles of liberty, equality and fraternity were seen as radical,
challenging and iconoclastic.  In modern societies, although there are
many differences in interpretation and approach, it has become hard
to find people who do not accept the ideas to some extent.  Political
arguments from across the spectrum have come to accept at least part
of the principles on which the revolutionary arguments were based.
The ideal of a free society is generally acknowledged, even if it is not
universally respected.  Although the principle of equality is often seen
as contentious, the revolutionary argument for an open society, allowing
people to move across the boundaries of class, caste and race, is widely
accepted.  The idea of fraternity is less directly accepted, but the
principles of collective action and social responsibility are widely
recognised.  This general agreement is as true of the right wing as of
the left.  The president of France, Jacques Chirac, recently began a
speech when he described the principles of the French republic in
these terms:
It is on the basis of liberty, guaranteed by the primacy of
the law on individual interests; on equality between men
and women, equality of opportunities, rights, and duties;
on fraternity between all the French, whatever their
condition or their origin.9
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The radicals of the 18th century were talking about unrealised ideals.
In the present day, by contrast, governments produce documents with
titles like Inequalities in health10 or Pensions tomorrow: A contract between
the generations11 (the French government’s review of pensions).  The
concepts of liberty, equality and fraternity have become part of the
everyday discourse of politics, and the principles have become a routine
influence on policy in practice.  Many of the ideas around liberty,
equality and fraternity are radical, in the sense that they represent a
challenge to existing patterns of social relationships.  They are also
central to contemporary political debates, in the sense that they address
core perceptions of people and society.
Social welfare
This book focuses mainly on the relationship between these concepts
and social policy.  Social policy is a field of study concerned with
social welfare and the social services.  The main focus is not policy for
society in a general sense, but the specific patterns of provision made
for people in respect of states of dependency, such as old age, childhood,
sickness and unemployment.12 Social welfare provision depends on a
complex constellation of political, economic and legal provisions,
conventionally (if sometimes unhelpfully) described in terms of ‘welfare
states’.  The alternative idea of ‘social protection’ is increasingly used
in Europe to refer to the elements of social welfare provision, both
within and beyond the remit of the state, which offer security and
services to people in states of dependency.  This book is concerned
only with a small part of a vast subject area, although the principles
and ideals discussed in it cut across many other issues.
Almost all governments with developed economies have some sort
of system of welfare provision.  The reasons why that is true are complex;
they depend on the interplay of historical, organisational, economic,
social and cultural factors.13 It would be difficult, though, to understand
much of what happens in welfare provision without some reference
to political values – whether to those on the right who have stood for
social responsibility and religious duty, or those on the left who have
been committed to collective action and working-class movements.
The focus in this book on three principles – liberty, equality and
fraternity – is not intended to be an account of every ideal which
relates to welfare or provision.  But the principles are important in
their own right.  The circumstances of welfare offer an insight into
those concepts.  Equally, I think, the concepts open a window onto








Liberty is commonly represented in terms of ‘negative’ and ‘positive’
approaches.  Negative freedom refers mainly to freedom from restraint.
People are free if no one is interfering with them, or preventing them
from doing what they are able to do.  Positive freedom can refer to the
freedom to act, or to self-determination.  In the first sense, positive
freedom is about power; people who are unable to do things are not
free to do them.  In the second sense, positive freedom is about being
able to make decisions, and to choose.
Although the distinction is widely used, it does not make a great
deal of sense.  The negative idea of freedom seems to require only that
other people should not intervene.  Isaiah Berlin, who popularised
the concept, argued that people do not cease to be free because they
are unable to do something, but only if someone is interfering with
them.14 It is possible, if that is accepted, for people to be left in a
position where they are unable to act, but are still free.  If, for example,
there has been an earthquake, and people are physically trapped under
the rubble, they have not ceased to be free.  (This argument, or at least
one very like it, was made by Hayek.15) It follows that a rescuer from
the emergency services who tries to release survivors without obtaining
prior consent is interfering with their circumstances, and that must be
an infringement of their freedom.  This is silly, and it takes a particular
kind of academic cleverness to convince oneself that it should be
taken seriously.  Conversely, the positive idea of freedom, certainly as
it is represented by Berlin, seems to suggest that all that matters is
whether people are able to act, and not whether they are free from
constraint.  If people are being directed, but the constraint is one they
might reasonably agree to, they are still free; and people can, in
Rousseau’s notorious phrase, be ‘forced to be free’.16 This is just as
ridiculous, and it does violence to the very idea of freedom.
The ideas of negative and positive freedom have taken root because
they are, at least, partly right.  All freedom, Maccallum argues, has
three elements: it has to be freedom of a person; the person must be
free from restraint; and the person must be free to do something.17
That means that both negative and positive concepts are relevant to
any consideration of freedom.  Many writers have tried to put their
arguments in terms of negative and positive freedom, even if they do
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not quite reflect what the writers mean to say.  The following discussion
begins with those ideas, but it cannot finish with them, and other
dimensions of the arguments are considered subsequently.
Negative freedom
The private sphere
The classic statement of negative freedom is found in John Stuart
Mill’s book, On liberty.
The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple
principle....  That the only purpose for which power can
rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilised
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others....
The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is
amenable to society, is that which concerns others.  In the
part which merely concerns himself, his independence is,
of right, absolute.18
Discussions of this principle usually focus on the first half, concerning
the prevention of harm to others.19 I will return to that issue shortly,
but I want at the outset to focus on the second half, which is the core
of the idea of  ‘independence’.  De Tocqueville had written in 1835:
In everything concerning the duties citizens owe to each
other, [the individual] is subject.  In everything which only
regards himself, he remains master: he is free and has to
account for his actions only to God....  This doctrine is
universally admitted in the United States.20
The same view is still widely held there.  Mill’s understanding of
freedom depends, like this, on the idea that there are private areas of
action which only concern the individual – areas which are no one
else’s business.  Personal independence, by this account, consists of
freedom of action in the areas that are unique to the person affected.
If anything is private, one might argue, it should be the things one
does where other people are not involved.  There are not many actions
which are private in these terms.  Even in societies which value liberty,
like the developed economies of the West, there are many things we
are not allowed to do with our own bodies.21 This is especially true in
public places, where we cannot do several things we can do in private
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– like displaying ourselves, touching certain parts of our body, or having
sex.  But control over the body is not confined to the public sphere.
Apparently personal and private acts like eating, washing, going to
bed or going to the toilet are not fully ‘independent’.  They have to be
taught, as any parent can testify, and they are hemmed in by elaborate
social rules.  People learn to do things in the accepted way before they
become independent.  People who do not learn them, for example
because they have learning disabilities, can find it difficult to gain full
independence.  Adults can disregard the rules within limits, but when
they do they are likely to be shunned socially.  There are some things
we are not allowed to do to our bodies in private, like taking narcotics.
Some are governed by social rules: people are not free to have extreme
pain inflicted on them, even if they agree to it.22 And some rules are
governed by other principles: people are not in general allowed to
undertake serious self-mutilation, such as self-wounding, because even
in jurisdictions where this is not directly and explicitly illegal it will
be taken as evidence of unsound mind.  There are also dilemmas when
vulnerable people live in ways that are not socially acceptable.  For
example, some people are dirty.  In UK law, section 47 of the 1948
National Assistance Act allows for old people to be removed from
their home if they are living in ‘insanitary conditions’ and they are in
need of ‘care and attention’.  This typically means removal to hospital
for a short period, enough to allow for the person to be cleaned up.
The provision is rarely used, however.  It is much more likely that old
people will be treated under the Mental Health Acts or the incapacity
legislation as incompetent to manage their affairs, which is a much
more serious limitation of a person’s freedom.
As a description of the human condition, the widespread belief in a
private sphere is difficult to sustain.  In The concept of mind, Gilbert
Ryle criticises the idea that there is something about the way our
minds work which gives us privileged access to thoughts that no one
else can share.  We learn to express and understand ourselves, Ryle
argues, through a shared set of social processes.  We know what we
think and feel by comparing it with what we learn about ourselves
and other people.23 In a very real sense, we are social animals.  The
very idea of the private sphere is a social construction: we learn that
there are things we are allowed to do with others, things we are allowed
to do by ourselves, and things we are not allowed to do even if we are
by ourselves.  It is questionable whether people can be seen as
independent individuals, completely at liberty when they are left alone.
Many people accept that moral conduct does not extend to private




but if they breach moral codes we are still likely to feel a sense of guilt
or shame about them.  (People who fail to respond in those terms are
liable to be treated as mentally disordered.24) Privacy is not a good
enough reason to think or do whatever we please.
Non-interference
Negative freedom consists of freedom from coercion, but ‘coercion’
can be taken in more than one sense.  First, it refers to interference
and constraint by other people.  Berlin describes coercion as ‘the
deliberate interference of other human beings within the area in which
I could act’.25 Second, in its stronger sense, coercion is not just about
interference: it implies that other people are seeking to direct our
actions.  Both interpretations are important for an understanding of
negative freedom.
The presumption of non-interference has played a crucial role in
defending freedom.  For Mill, the essential conflict lies between the
individual and society.  In European liberalism, the defence of personal
independence was  stated more broadly.  Benjamin Constant extended
the principle to defend not just individuals, but groups, communities
and countries.  If there is an area in the life of each person which is
private, that means that in the affairs of two people, there would be an
area of activity which was distinctive and private to those two people.
The same applies to neighbourhoods, communities, townships, regions
and nations.26 The idea of ‘national self-determination’ is linked to
liberal thought through the view that people do not have a right to
interfere in the affairs of others.  The essential point this shares with
Mill is the idea of an independent sphere of action, an area where no
one else has the right to interfere.
In everyday life, other people constantly impinge on our freedom
of activity – in the home, in the street, in our interactions with others.
There is a constant process of negotiation and compromise of the area
where free action is possible.  The protection of freedom means that
the freedoms of each person have to be circumscribed, so that they do
not infringe the freedoms of other people.  The first part of Mill’s
‘very simple principle’ – whether or not actions cause harm to others
– is one of the tests.  But if it is not acceptable to infringe other
people’s liberty, causing harm cannot be the only test – it is also not
acceptable to infringe liberty by trying to do good.  Feinberg suggests
that the proper test is whether an activity invades the interests of another
person.27
One popular construction of freedom has it that our freedoms end
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at the point where they interfere with other people.  This is largely
right – clearly, there are points at which people’s freedoms will impinge
on other people’s, and there have to be limits on how far this is
acceptable.  But it is not wholly right, because there are many
circumstances in which we can legitimately act to restrict the actions
of others.  People in families are notorious for interfering with each
other’s freedoms: it is part of a caring relationship.  A business competitor
who puts small shopkeepers out of business is limiting their choices,
their livelihood and possibly threatening their houses (many small
businesses are financed by mortgaged property), but it is all done
according to longstanding conventions, and many people would argue
that it is a sign of freedom rather than a limitation of it.  A religious
teacher who tells people when they can eat or what position they
should sleep in is certainly limiting their choices, but freedom of
religion is one of the most fundamental rights protected in the liberal
governments of the western world.
The implication of these arguments is that, even if there is a
presumption of non-interference, there are exceptions to the general
principle.  If there is a rationale for the exceptions, it seems to be that
they take place within defined social contexts – where the character
of the relationships, and the substance of the intervention, reflects on
what is acceptable, and what is not.  One way of interpreting these
issues is the idea of ‘sphere sovereignty’, associated with Dutch
Calvinism.  Kuyper argued that there are spheres of human activity –
spheres such as government, religion, arts, family, business – where
different rules apply.28 The proper role of the church in religion is not
applicable to the role of the state in making law, and vice versa.  Even
if intervention can be justified in one area, like industrial relations, it
cannot necessarily be justified in another, like domestic arrangements.
The interference of family members in the domestic sphere, business
competitors in the field of business, or a religious leader in religious
affairs, is legitimate; but the interference of business in politics, or the
state in religion, would not be.  The idea is initially appealing, because
it seems to make it possible to maintain the principle of independence
in a private sphere in a world where people do not actually live on
desert islands.  The problem is that the boundaries between spheres
are necessarily fuzzy.  Dooyeweerd, in developing Kuyper’s ideas, argued
that although the state was limited to the regulation of inter-
relationships, this could be taken to affect issues like financial support
in families, or even issues like domestic violence.29
Another way of interpreting the exceptions is through




context they spring from.30 The argument that the actions of a person,
a group of people, or even a country, are private and individual seems
difficult to sustain in the modern world, where interdependence, not
independence, is the norm.  Communitarian critiques have mainly
been directed at the kind of abstract moral theory associated with
writers like Rawls or Nozick, and in particular at liberalism;31 moral
relativism undermines any presumption that liberty is a primary,
universal value.
Coercion by other people
The stronger sense of coercion refers to the use of power by one
person to determine the behaviour of another.  ‘By ‘coercion’, Hayek
writes,
... we mean such control of the environment or
circumstances of a person by another that, in order to avoid
greater evil, he is forced to act not according to a coherent
plan of his own but to serve the ends of another.32
This goes well beyond interference.  Coercion can happen because
there is a penalty or sanction for non-compliance: a parent who stops
a child from going out to play, an employer who stops employees
from smoking, or a landlord who insists on no pets, may be acting
coercively.  Raz suggests that there is an evaluative element in the idea
of coercion, an implication that the pattern of behaviour involved in
coercion is somehow wrong.33 But coercion is often founded in a
sense of moral conviction – a belief that the imposition of rules and
restrictions is something that the person imposing the restrictions is
not just legitimately able to do, but has a right to do.  The actions of
parents, employers and landlords are based on interpretations of their
position which, while not beyond dispute, is accepted by many people.
There may be a conflict of principles, and the freedom of some has to
be balanced against the freedom of others.  If there is a moral fault in
coercion, it rests in the idea that one person can make choices for
another.  This is an argument about freedom, rather than about the
specific nature of the action undertaken.
Coercion is often represented narrowly, simply as the imposition of
one person’s will on another.34 But coercion is not a simple dichotomy,
where people who are not forced to act are free.  People might be
constrained, pressed or shepherded, in different directions.  Whether
or not an action is coercive depends in practice on what other options
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a person has.  If someone has eligible alternative choices – that is,
good, genuine options which might realistically be chosen – denying
them one option still leaves others open to them.  As the range of
choices reduces, the effect of steering or direction becomes more
restrictive.  This means that some people are more vulnerable to
coercion than others.  Jeremy Waldron makes the case that homeless
people are not free, because they are prevented from acting by others.35
The ability to do certain personal things, like washing, sleeping or
urinating, depends on having a place where one can do them.  People
who are homeless have nowhere to do these things, and if there is no
public place they can do them in, they cannot do them without the
permission of property owners, or in public places, without falling
foul of the law.  This is not because of some oversight.  Laws against
sleeping, drinking and eating in public, Waldron notes, are often made
deliberately to curb the actions of homeless people, who do them in
public because there is nowhere they can do them in private.  Homeless
people are being coerced because they have no other choices.  If they
had other choices, and they could do what others do, these restrictions
would not be coercive.
The idea of coercion is important morally, because it has implications
for personal responsibility.  Glannon distinguishes coercion from action
under duress: people who act under duress may still have a choice, and
remain responsible for their actions, while people who are coerced do
not have a choice, and responsibility rests with the person who does
the coercion.36 I think this may be one of the reasons why coercion is
so hotly debated: writers who argue that poverty is not related to
coercion do not want to accept the moral implication that poor people
are not fully responsible for their own circumstances.  My own view
is that the distinction is fairly meaningless.  There is almost no action
which is so ‘coercive’ that it completely relieves someone of all moral
responsibility.  It makes perfectly good sense to say that people have
choices, but that those choices have been constricted because of
coercive action.  What changes is the character of the choice.
Coercion by government
One of the central roles of government is to maintain a balance between
the competing freedoms of different people.  Where liberties are in
conflict, one person’s freedom can be enhanced by limiting another’s.
Freedom can be redistributed.  The government acts as one of the




one of the main limitations on personal freedom, because it is capable
of circumscribing and limiting people’s actions.  Proudhon wrote:
To be governed is to be at every operation, at every
transaction, noted, registered, enrolled, taxed, stamped,
measured, numbered, assessed, licensed, authorized,
admonished, forbidden, reformed, corrected, punished.  It
is, under the pretence of public utility, and in the name of
the general interest, to be placed under contribution, trained,
ransomed, exploited, monopolised, extorted, squeezed,
mystified, robbed; then, at the slightest resistance, the first
word of complaint, to be repressed, fined, despised, harassed,
tracked, abused, clubbed, disarmed, choked, imprisoned,
judged, condemned, shot, deported, sacrificed, sold,
betrayed.37
From the other side of the political spectrum, the right-wing think
tanks in the US, like the Heritage Foundation and the Cato Institute,
do not avoid advocating restrictions on personal action: they are guided
by strong moral principles on issues like personal responsibility, criminal
justice and family values.  For them, however, freedom implies freedom
from restriction by the state.  The principle of negative freedom is
important in those circumstances, because it asserts the rights of
individuals to dissent, to refuse to obey, and to act differently.  In the
World Bank’s studies of poverty, poor people in developing countries
frequently identified the arbitrary actions of government in general,
and police in particular, as one of the central problems of their lives.38
The idea of negative freedom has been an important one in restricting
the role of government, and its value in that area should not be
dismissed.
Coercion by the state takes three main forms.  The first is regulation,
which is coercive because it deliberately limits the range and pattern
of acceptable activity.  Regulation is basic to government activity.
States establish the rules under which other social actors, including
individuals, groups, companies and organisations, operate.  They
establish the structures and frameworks which determine people’s
formal relationships – both at a personal level, in such things as marriage
and parental rights, and institutionally, in such structures as a limited
liability company or a charity.  The second form of coercion is the
restriction of action, taken, for example, in criminal law.  Governments
define the limits of acceptable conduct, and punish activities which
fall beyond those limits.  Third, there is mandatory activity, where
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people are required to do things they would not otherwise do, under
pain of penalty.  Examples are military service or paying tax.
Compliance with government authority is not simply a matter of
bowing to pressure, or even of obedience to authority.  People obey
laws for all kinds of reasons: they may accept that the laws are legitimate,
but equally they may well approve of the course of action, and choose
to follow it voluntarily.  At times, compulsion in the provision of
social welfare has been introduced, not simply to impose rules on
people, but to shore up practices which people have undertaken
voluntarily.  The systems of social insurance in Denmark, Sweden and
Finland were voluntary for much of their history, becoming formally
compulsory only in the 1990s after government intervened to regulate
the financial balance of the funds.39 At other times, compulsion has
been used to ensure the extension to the disadvantaged minority of
the privileges enjoyed by the majority –  principally by compelling
employers to extend terms to low-paid employees which were part of
contracts of employment for others.  This is true of the extension of
health care or social insurance pensions in continental Europe,40 or
the development of minimum wages.  In both cases, it may look after
the event as if government has forced people into participation in
welfare schemes, but the first example is primarily regulatory, and the
second is concerned with protecting the interests of one group relative
to another.  In a complex policy environment, it is difficult to reduce
the actions of government simply to the issue of whether or not some
compulsion has been used.
The value of negative freedom
Many writers, and politicians, have found the idea of negative freedom
compelling.  Berlin presents the idea as the true, legitimate
understanding of the idea of freedom, linked with the rights of the
individual.  Hayek finds it so convincing that he can see no alternative.
There are objections to make to their position, but before I move on
to those objections, it is worth emphasising the value of the concept,
and the reasons why it exerts such a strong influence in liberal thought.
The first, core issue is that the idea is designed to be used defensively.
It protects the security and integrity of each person as an individual
(and, if Constant’s argument is accepted, the security and integrity of
communities and nations).  It sets limits beyond which other people
should not go, and in particular the limits of government action.




tyranny, with a correspondingly beneficial influence on the rights and
choices of individuals.
The second key argument is that negative freedom is fundamental.
Freedom guarantees protection to people who wish to make choices,
to pursue their ends, to make contact with other people, and so forth.
People’s vulnerability to coercion has the potential to undermine their
position.  Without freedom, Hart suggests, no other rights are possible.41
Both of these positions are concerned with protecting people from
external interference.  The third argument is more than a defensive
position: it is based in a positive, moral stance.  It depends on the idea
that, in Mill’s phrase, ‘the individual is sovereign’.42 People should be
independent; they have the right to decide for themselves; each person
is the best judge of what is good for them; and the way to maximise
the welfare of everyone is to allow each individual to make his or her
own choice.  I will examine some of the assumptions behind these
arguments in the course of the book, but for the moment it is enough
to acknowledge that the link between negative freedom and the
concept of the sovereign individual has been central to the acceptance
of the idea by the liberals of the political right.
The problem with negative freedom is not the moral force of the
idea, or the strength of the feeling behind it.  It is that as the idea is
framed, it offers a very limited understanding of freedom.  There are
three main objections.  The first is that the defence of freedom, and
resistance to government, is often a veil for the defence of privilege.
Defending freedom and resisting government are important, but at
the same time, government can also play an important part in protecting
freedoms, and resistance to government has often been used as a defence
of exploitative economic relationships.  This is most visible in the
complaints made by property holders about their freedom to use their
property as they see fit, even if others suffer, or the assertion by business
owners of their ‘freedom to manage’.  Liberty is not licence, and there
is nothing in the idea of freedom which guarantees it at the expense
of the freedom of others who are weaker and more vulnerable.
The second objection is that negative freedom is not enough; people
also need choices.  People who are hungry, homeless or destitute do
not have the choices that other people have.   One of the key arguments
for negative freedom is that it enables people to have choices, and to
exercise them.  Negative freedom is necessary for choice, but it is not
sufficient.  As the idea is formulated, people do not cease to be free
because they cannot do something.  If freedom is, as some writers
suggest, a supreme value, a value with absolute priority over others,
then conditions which prevent it being exercised – like famine – are
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basic.  ‘Freedom from hunger’ is a powerful slogan, but it is not one
which has any purchase or meaning in a strictly negative interpretation
of freedom.
The third objection, which is closely related to the second, is that
people’s capacity to act should matter.  People lose freedom when
circumstances have limited their choices and power of action.  The
choices available to people with disabilities are severely limited, and
those limitations act to limit their freedom.43 For the most part, the
kinds of restrictions that disabled people experience are limitations
on their capacity to act.  The design of buildings, shopping facilities
and domestic equipment limits the capacity of people with reduced
physical abilities.44 As the limitations become more serious, however,
people in this situation become increasingly vulnerable to restriction
and abuse.  There is a long history in institutional care of scandals
centring on insensitivity, incompetence and brutality.  Brutality is less
often violent than it is dehumanising: reports in UK institutions
describe patients being neglected, tied down, dropped in baths of
scalding water, cleaned with a toilet brush, or in one case a patient
being held upside down and using his hair as a mop after he had
vomited.45 In one of the many enquiries of the 1970s, into
Normansfield Hospital, one of the many problems identified was that
an exaggerated concern with accidents led to severely disabled people
being confined to beds for long periods of the day without activity.46
These were people with profound physical and mental disabilities,
who relied on other people to help them get up, clean them and feed
them.  They were not held prisoners in their beds.  The problem was
that they did not have the capacity to get out of bed without help, and
the withdrawal of support meant that they were not able to do what
they otherwise might.  Describing people as ‘free’ in these circumstances
is faintly absurd.  The distinction between coercion and lack of capacity
may matter for the allocation of moral responsibility, but in other
respects it is a distinction without a difference.
Positive freedom
The weaknesses in the idea of negative freedom point us in the direction
of a counterbalancing idea, ‘positive’ freedom.  The idea of positive
freedom is used in two rather different senses.  For some, positive
freedom is the power to act.  People are free to act if they are able to
do so; they are not free if they are not able.  Berlin uses the idea of
positive freedom in a more questionable sense, to refer to ‘self-mastery’




understandings of the term.  In this section I shall confine myself to
the first, the power to act.
The power to act
One of the central objections to the idea of negative freedom is that
people who are unable to do something, like the earthquake victim
trapped under the rubble, or the homeless person who cannot afford
to get somewhere to live, are still treated as being free to do it.  A
positive concept of freedom gets round this problem directly.  People
are not free to do things they cannot do, and there does not have to be
another person who is stopping them.  If an old person is too ill to
leave their home, this is not the result of the actions of other people,
but it would increase that person’s freedom if someone came and
helped them.  Illness, disability and poverty all reduce people’s power.
They are, then, obstacles to freedom.
Poverty is probably the most contentious of these examples.  ‘Poverty’
is a complex concept, covering a wide range of different circumstances:
in other work, I have outlined several discrete clusters of meaning.47
In broad terms, it can be summarised as implying material need, limited
economic circumstances, and a pattern of social relationships typically
preventing people from participating in a society.  In each sense, poverty
restrains freedom.  Where people are in material need, their capacity
to act and their ability to decide is limited.  Where they are economically
restricted, they are not able to participate in economic transactions, to
exchange, or indeed to do the sort of things which advocates of  market
economies most wish to promote.  When they are excluded from
effective participation in a society, they are denied the choices and
opportunities which are available to others.  Berlin writes:
It is argued, very plausibly, that if a man is too poor to
afford something on which there is no legal ban – a loaf of
bread, a journey round the world, resource to the law courts
– he is as little free to have it as he would be if it were
forbidden him by law....  If my poverty were a kind of
disease, which prevented me from buying bread ...  as
lameness prevents me from running, this inability would
not naturally be described as a lack of freedom....
Poverty, he concludes, could only be considered an infringement of
freedom if it was held to result from the actions of others.48 In the
terms of a negative view of freedom, poverty may not limit freedom,
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but it certainly makes people vulnerable, and it limits their choices.
To take a small example, many countries prevent the sale of body
parts, like kidneys or lungs.  The people who might be persuaded to
sell their body parts are people who are constrained by poverty.  The
existing trade is characterised by exploitation, but beyond that it implies
further, often permanent, restriction of the capacities of poor people,
a choice they make because their options are so limited.  Berlin
acknowledges that for freedom to be meaningful, a ‘maximisation of
opportunities’ is needed.  Freedoms are not simply additive – increasing
the power of one person does not necessarily depend on reducing the
powers of others – but if the problem is understood in terms of negative
liberty, where one person is constraining another, this does seem to
demand some redistribution of freedom between people – and some
redistribution of power or resources.  Berlin suggests the implications
are ‘agonising’.49
Poverty is primarily, Amartya Sen argues, a lack of capabilities.50 A
person without money cannot buy goods, like food, clothing, fuel or
shelter.  The things that people need, or ‘commodities’, are understood
differently in different social contexts, but the core issue is whether
people are able to do the things they need to do – to eat, live, to move
around, and so forth.  Often poor people have to juggle their resources,
and the pattern of deprivation shifts constantly: the shortage of money
means that they will go without food to buy clothing at one point, or
go without fuel to buy food at another, and so on.  This has been
called a ‘web’ of deprivation: like a fly trapped in a web, it is possible
for people who are trapped to lift one limb or another, but that is not
the same as being able to escape.51
The primary objection to a positive concept of freedom comes
from those who, like Berlin or Hayek, believe that freedom cannot be
determined in terms of capacity.  There is no simple way to resolve
this difference of views: either one accepts the limitation or one does
not.  In practical terms, an emphasis on positive freedom leads to an
emphasis on social structure and social competences.  It is possible to
exaggerate the differences, though, because a negative concept of
freedom also depends on issues of opportunity, choice and the actions
of other people.
Normalisation and empowerment
The development of capacity is a particular concern for people whose
capacity is challenged or limited.  Debates in child care, learning




‘normalisation’.52 It has also been expressed as an aspiration for an
‘ordinary life’.53 ‘Ordinary’ people can decide for themselves when
they eat, when they go to the bathroom, or when they sleep.  People
living in institutions cannot.  On one level, the term ‘normalisation’
seems to imply that people will be left to get on with life like everyone
else, or expected to conform: that is certainly the impression given by
some of the criticisms of the principle of normalisation by later
writers.54 But it also means, beyond that, that people should be helped
to develop the capacity they need for an ordinary life to be possible.
This calls for measures to support, enable and liberate people whose
activities are otherwise restricted.  The advocates of normalisation
sought to give people the opportunity to express their concerns and
identify their own priorities, and to do so in their own words.55 The
idea of normalisation in this sense has largely been supplanted in
subsequent literature by the concept of ‘empowerment’.
The language of empowerment is not quite the same as the language
of freedom, but the concepts are closely related.  The term became
popular relatively recently in the 1970s, mainly referring to political
power developed through collective action;56 Iris Young refers to it as
participation in decision making.57 It can also be used in a variety of
other ways, whether for people or for groups.  People are empowered
when they gain the capacity to act and the ability to express their
concerns.
Empowerment can be identified closely with some aspects of
freedom.  In relation to negative freedom, empowerment might refer
to people being given choices, and the ability to express preferences.
An important element of empowerment in this sense is the idea of
‘voice’, drawn initially from consumer studies.58  Voice is the expression
of views and concerns, and is fundamental to the expression of
preferences.  This concept of empowerment is particularly used in the
context of learning disability (now called ‘intellectual disability’ in the
US).  People with learning disability often lack choices.  This may be
because they have difficulty in expressing their choices, and in the
most severe cases they may need special forms of help to express views
at all.  More typically, it is because their views when they do express
them are likely to be disregarded.  There is a growing literature in
which people with learning disabilities have been allowed to express
their own concerns and feelings; the expression of serious issues in
clear, direct language has considerable emotional force.59 More
generally, the idea of voice plays a major part in user consultations in
public services, and is widely referred to in consultations on community
care and health services.
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In relation to positive freedom, empowerment is usually taken to
refer to capacity building, a widely used concept in community work.
If positive freedom consists of the power to act, empowerment can be
taken as action to ensure that people have such a capacity.  The form
of capacity building which tends to be favoured in community work
is collective: people are encouraged to form groups and to argue their
case in a political arena.  The forms of capacity building can also
include individual capacities: the development of political and
administrative skills, training and education.
Empowerment is not confined to the idea of freedom, however: it is
also concerned with power.  Implicit in the idea is the sense, not just
that people are being enabled, but that people who lack power will
gain control over their lives.  Empowerment is intended to increase
that control, and so to improve their relative power.
Personal autonomy
The second sense of ‘positive freedom’ is sometimes expressed in terms
of ‘self-mastery’.  This term is slightly artificial.  Hobhouse drew a
distinction between negative and positive freedom in his critique of
idealism in 1918, describing the Hegelian idea of positive freedom in
terms of ‘self-determination’:
... the underlying principle is that freedom consists not in
the negative condition of absence of restraint but in the
positive fact of self-determination.60
Berlin preferred to describe this in terms of ‘self-mastery’ because he
wanted to emphasise the extent to which the Hegelian approach had
departed from common understandings of freedom.  The basic idea
behind self-mastery is more often expressed in terms of ‘autonomy’.
An autonomous direction is one which people choose for themselves,
and autonomy is the capacity to make one’s own decisions.  Whether
or not people ‘master’ themselves, they can at least choose for themselves.
To make choices, people have to have the capacity to decide, and they
have to have the right to do so.
The capacity to decide
The capacity to decide is sometimes referred to as ‘psychological




presumed to have the capacity to make decisions unless there are strong
reasons to the contrary.
The exceptions are, however, important.  The first and most obvious
is the case of children, who are generally assumed not to have the
capacity to decide.  This is self-evidently true of the very youngest
children, but the situation becomes quickly obscured as children grow
and mature.  The ages at which children reach maturity have been
defined fairly arbitrarily: between birth and the age of a person’s
majority, usually 18 or 21, there may be several intermediate stages –
the age of criminal responsibility, the age at which children can consent
to sex or marriage, the ages at which they can form valid contracts,
and so forth.
In various circumstances, children’s freedom of action may be limited
in order to promote their longer-term autonomy.  One example is
their position in the family.  The purpose of family care is to give
children the opportunity to develop into responsible adults – the point
at which children will be able to make decisions for themselves.
Nurture, moral guidance and education have a common purpose: to
make it possible for children to make informed choices.  Most of us
would accept, I think, that it is permissible for a parent to require a
child to go to bed at night, or to take a bath – restraints we would
never accept as adults.  As a general proposition, it may be desirable for
parents to raise children in a way which gives them enjoyment in
their daily routine, and bedtime should be an enjoyable evening ritual,
not a contest of wills; but young children (and some older ones) do
not necessarily have the judgement to be able to determine their
bedtime for themselves, or whether they need a wash.  As a parent, I
have to confess to using coercion (firm instruction, a guiding hand
and a determination to override the child’s protests) in both
circumstances.  There are several possible justifications for this.  One is
that the rights of the child are framed in terms different from adults,
and that freedom is not very high on the list.  Another, which seems
less convincing, is that the parent’s rights and freedoms also have to be
considered.  It can be argued, though, that there is no contradiction
between this kind of restraint and personal freedom.  Caring for children
is part of turning them into grown-ups; the process enhances their
freedom, rather than reducing it.  The restrictions cease to be justifiable
when they go further than can be justified in these terms: discipline
which is carried too far becomes abuse, and we condemn ‘over-
protective’ parents because they are not giving the chance for their
children to learn to be free.
The same arguments apply to the process of education.  Schooling
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is a hugely restrictive process, conditioning children into a battery of
rules of behaviour and conduct, sometimes called the ‘hidden
curriculum’.  This process ceases to be justifiable, however, in
circumstances where it limits the freedoms of children: we accept
education, but not indoctrination.  The primary justification for
education is that it is liberating.  Schooling, or equivalent education, is
compulsory in most developed countries – a restriction on both
children and their parents.  A child in a developing country who
leaves school to earn money at the age of 11 or 12 loses the
opportunities that others who stay at school will gain.  Where there is
no compulsion, the children who drop out of the process are often
most disadvantaged.
For adults, there are equally several circumstances in which
compulsion may be used to enhance autonomy.  The best known case
is mental illness, where people who are suffering from mental illness
which is capable of treatment can be ‘sectioned’, or deprived of liberty
and required to undergo treatment.  The rationale for this is sometimes
to protect the public, but more commonly it is that a person with a
serious mental illness needs to be protected from self-harm.  Although
I have undertaken several research projects with psychiatric patients
in the past, I have only witnessed the procedure directly once, during
an observational placement in a psychiatric hospital.  A woman was
detained under compulsion, and I talked with her for an hour or so
while the psychiatrist was preparing the papers.  She had been told to
kill herself by the voice of the devil, who had spoken to her through
the television, and she felt compelled to obey.  (This is not quite what
happened, but I have altered the story to maintain confidentiality.  Many
patients who hear voices are tormented by them.  Religious delusions
are fairly commonplace.) The usual argument for compulsory treatment
is that, while people are mentally ill, they may not be capable of making
decisions about their treatment.  This is possibly true, because some
mentally ill people do not realise that they are ill.  However, the
provision is subject to abuse, and in some cases where people try to
make decisions which are seen as illegitimate, their actions may be
dismissed because they are ‘not in their right mind’.  The argument
for intervention because people’s judgement is impaired is not a very
good one, because it might equally be applied to other problems where
people make inappropriate decisions.  The real issue is the avoidance
of harm.  People who are mentally ill can still make decisions, and like
anyone else they are free to make bad decisions.  This freedom ceases
to apply, however, when the effect of such a decision would be to




Conversely, if treatment prevents harm and restores people’s ability to
choose, it can restore their autonomy, and give them the opportunity
to make choices for the future.  The compulsory treatment of mental
illness is, then, defensible in terms of its effect on liberty.
A related condition is the issue of dementia, which is the class of
illness which is most likely to lead to circumstances in which adults
are considered incapable of making decisions.  Dementia is defined
by Sir Martin Roth as:
... a global deterioration of the individual’s intellectual,
emotional and conative faculties in a state of unimpaired
consciousness.61
The loss of intellectual faculties involves an inability to retain new
information, and in consequence an inability to absorb it.  The loss of
conative faculties – those concerned with self-direction and will –
may affect both self and household care, as people become less able to
maintain a routine, to distinguish between day and night, or to
understand events around them.  Emotional changes may include strong
expressions of emotion, including misplaced anger or sorrow, changes
in behaviour, and consequent disruption of personal relationships,
reinforced by the changes in capacity and behaviour which dementia
implies.
The Green Paper Who decides? accepted in principle that it is desirable
to promote the autonomy of people with mental disabilities.  The
approach which the Green Paper advocated towards incapacity was
based on four principles:
• a belief that all intervention must be justified;
• a presumption of capacity, which is defeasible;
• maximising the decision-making capacity of people with mental
disabilities; and
• balancing the wishes of the disabled person, and the desire to
encourage participation and autonomy, with the views of
others.62
The basic model is, then, one which seeks to offer safeguards to persons
who are deemed to be incapacitated.  Once a person has been declared
incapacitated, there is an effective presumption that they are incapable
of making decisions unless there is evidence to the contrary.
This is not, however, how incapacity is likely to be expressed.  Most
mentally ill people can make decisions; the problem is that the decisions
they make are not always the ones they would make if they were well.
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The most common form of incapacity, or inability to make decisions,
is through dementia.  Dementia is a progressive disease, and most
people suffering from it retain social functioning to some degree.
Kitwood and Bredin make the case that even people with severe
dementia remain responsive to their social environment.  Responses
which are socially inappropriate (trying to clean up after incontinence
with an item of clothing) still show a degree of social awareness, while
in other cases there may be ‘rementia’, or a regaining of abilities through
social interaction.63 Impairment through dementia does not imply
incapacity, but failing capacity.  An emphasis on autonomy implies
respect for the disabled person’s remaining capacity, rather than
incapacity.  The legislation on incapacity which followed the
consultation made some important moves in this direction, including
some respect for any views and feelings that people with incapacity
could express.  However, it is still based in the idea that the norm is
non-intervention.  In circumstances where a person with dementia is
living in isolation, non-intervention may have the effect of diminishing
capacity.  Autonomy requires support.
The right to decide
The choices that people make have to be eligible, or capable of being
chosen.  That is only in part a question of what the options are; the
decisions have also to be legitimate, in the sense that the power to
make them must be morally accepted.  The moral case for positive
freedom depends, in large part, on the view that people have the right
to decide issues for themselves.
The legitimacy of people’s decisions tends to be taken as axiomatic.
Conventional welfare economics identifies people’s choices with their
‘utility’, and with their well-being;64 similarly individualistic positions
are taken by some political scientists, and Dahl argues that interests
can only meaningfully be identified by the people who have them.65
There are  illiberal objections to this – that some other decision should
be made, for example because people are poor judges of their own
interests, or because they will be better off.  The idea of ‘paternalism’
is considered later in this chapter.  But the difference in these positions
is not really susceptible to argument – either one accepts that people
have the right to make their own decisions, or one does not.
More important, for present purposes, are the arguments for
restriction of choice which still apply despite the presumption of free
choice.  There seem to be three main ways in which, if the liberal




first case consists, obviously enough, of actions which infringe the
rights of other people; these were discussed above.  By extension,
arguments for limiting decisions can be applied to circumstances where
some kind of regulatory framework has been introduced to protect
other people – situations such as the provision of a driving licence,
which restricts behaviour which is capable of causing harm to others,
or the regulation of marriage, which among other things can be argued
to protect the circumstances of vulnerable people.
The second case is that there is a class of decisions which cannot be
taken in the name of freedom, because they negate the principle of
freedom.  People who are autonomous cannot legitimately choose to
give up their autonomy.  This is a complex issue, and I have discussed
it later in a section on ‘limits to autonomy.’
The third case, which is the most directly relevant to issues of capacity
and positive freedom, consists of circumstances where people are not
incapable of pursuing a course of action, but are not entitled to do it
either.  The lack of capabilities associated with poverty, Sen argues, is
not just a matter of what people can and cannot do physically.  It
stems from a lack of entitlement.66 Famines occur, not where there is
not enough food, but where people are not entitled to have the food
which is produced.  The person who cannot buy food does not have
the same choices that other people have, and so is not free.  But poverty
is a general condition, not one which is specific to a single commodity
like food.  The lack of entitlement to food is indicative of a more
general lack of entitlements, usually mediated in modern society by
lack of money.  Sen argues for the extension of freedom through
economic and social development.67 Economic development is
important, not just because it creates goods and services, but because
it develops entitlements.  People gain entitlements by being integrated
into the formal economy.  But those entitlements can also be developed
in other ways, most notably through political processes.  There has
never, Sen argues, been a famine in a democracy.  Sen’s position depends
strongly on a positive understanding of freedom – an idea of freedom
as being about capacity, empowerment and choice.  But it still accepts,
in common with a negative view of freedom, the premise that people
may not be able to make choices, because they are not entitled to
make them.
Autonomy and self-determination68
Autonomy rests in the ability to make decisions.  People are
autonomous when they are able to make their own choices.  The
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promotion of autonomy is fundamental to freedom.  A primary
justification for many of the interventions made in the lives of people
whose ability to choose may be limited, like children, people with
learning disabilities or older people, is that intervention can increase
their autonomy.
A person who is autonomous is able to make decisions, but that is
not necessarily the same as someone who actually does make decisions.
The process of making one’s own decisions is referred to as ‘self-
determination’.  The idea of self-determination’ is a specialised form
of freedom, frequently found in the literature of social work.  The
origins of the idea are partly to be found in the liberalism of the mid-
19th century, but they were also strongly influenced by the individualist
Christianity of that period: salvation depended on personal choices
and conduct, and God had granted every person the choice to take
the right path.  When social workers argue that clients have both an
intrinsic moral worth and a ‘right to fail’,69 it parallels Christian beliefs
about salvation.
The concept of autonomy relates to the power to decide; self-
determination, to the act of deciding.  For example, a disabled person
may be fully competent to make decisions but unable to make them
in practice without the cooperation of others; that person would be
autonomous but not self-determining.  People can be required to be
self-determining, in the sense of being forced to make their own
decisions, even under constraints.  For an offender on probation, the
‘right to fail’ may mean breach of a court order and imprisonment.
The ‘right to fail’ is certainly necessary to be autonomous, but it is
arguable whether it is necessary to be self-determining, because the
effect of failure may be to put probation clients in a position where
they are no longer able to choose for themselves.
The idea of self-determination, as it is practised, is very unclear.70
Social workers may try, in the spirit of self-determination, to establish
not just what people seem to want, but what they really want.  Self-
determination may mean self-determination within ‘realistic’ limits.
It may be subject to the needs and rights of others;71 the degree of
self-determination which probation officers encourage in a client does
not generally extend to criminal activity.  And it could mean ‘rational’
self-determination – a term which is liable to abuse, for a person may
be considered ‘rational’ when they do the sorts of things that they are





An example:   helping with incontinence
Mill argues for the independence of each person: no one should be subjected
to interference unless their actions threaten to harm others.  The individual,
he wrote,
... cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be
better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the
opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or even right.  These may be
good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or
persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting
him with any evil in case he do otherwise.72
Remonstrating, reasoning and persuading can, however, present
considerable scope for interference in people’s lives.  Several professions,
including, for example, social workers and health visitors, offer supervision,
guidance, and argument whether people want it or not.  The following
passage is written by a nurse specialising in incontinence:
‘Any problems with your bladder or bowels?’ ‘No’, said Mrs N, looking
the health visitor squarely in the eye.  ‘So, no difficulties with your
waterworks?’ ...  ‘No’, said Mrs N, her chin now jutting firmly forward....
‘Sometimes as people get older they have to go to the toilet more often
or need to get to the toilet more quickly – but you haven’t experienced
anything like that?’ ‘No’ ...  ‘I couldn’t help noticing as you walked in front
of me that you had a wet patch on your skirt....’ The tears started rolling
down Mrs N’s face....73
Health visitors are trained nurses (generally midwives or district nurses)
with a remit to encourage healthy behaviour.  The origins of the profession
lie in maternity visiting, introduced after the First World War; maternity
visitors checked the circumstances of every new-born baby, and every
new mother, partly to advise and partly to monitor the care of children.
The profession’s remit extended in the 1970s to cover health promotion
across a much wider range of groups.  The idea of ‘health promotion’
suggests a primary concern with welfare, rather than individual freedom,
and it is not perhaps surprising that the health visitor should be concerned
about the older person’s uncontrolled incontinence.  The example given
above is presented by the writer as an illustration of good practice.  The
health visitor has come as part of the older person’s annual health check.
The older person is embarrassed, and reluctant to admit to her incontinence:
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more than that, she is defiant, and tells the health visitor ‘no’ three times
before the health visitor gets through – and does so by reducing her to
tears.
This is probably not the kind of encounter with government that Mill
had in mind, but it happens rather more frequently in practice than some of
the more fanciful examples favoured by political theorists.  There are some
important issues to consider.  Can the actions of the health visitor be justified?
All the health visitor is doing is reasoning, remonstrating and persuading:
that much seems to be allowed by Mill.  But that formulation can also cover
a great deal of unacceptable conduct.  If a door-to-door sales representative
or religious missionary behaved like this, we might reasonably think that
they were being intrusive.  When someone in a position of authority does it,
the implicit imbalance of power adds another dimension.  Older people are
often fearful of the intervention of social workers and health professionals.
This is not because older people are particularly deferential; it is because
they have a great deal to lose.  They cannot be made to move to residential
care directly, but they are heavily constrained.  The move to residential care
is likely to mean a loss not just of independence, but of liberty, personal
choice and control over one’s own environment.  This is not like a negotiation
with a sales representative, and it is difficult to see how, on any reasonable
interpretation of negative freedom, it could be acceptable.
There is, however, another side to the argument.  Someone who is
incontinent is probably not able to function socially or to participate
adequately in social events.  Incontinence is distressing to the people who
suffer from it.  Most incontinence can be controlled, and even if it cannot be
controlled completely, it can be managed.  What an incontinence advisor is
offering is, then, a real benefit: practical assistance which makes it possible
for a sufferer to have as normal a life as possible.  The health visitor’s
intervention is a first step to reasserting Mrs N’s control over her own life.
There may be difficulties in justifying this in terms of negative freedom;
there are none in terms of positive freedom.  If the purpose of asserting
freedom is to avoid coercion, it could be argued that older people need
some safeguards to protect them from this kind of intrusion.  But if freedom
rests in personal autonomy, and the purpose of freedom is to let people
make choices, the health visitor’s intervention is not just desirable, but
necessary.
Most people working in health and social care have had to make similar
decisions about intervention in people’s lives at some point in their careers.
But few would find it difficult to justify what they do – it is hard to see how
they could do otherwise and still stay in the job.  That justification would
be made, not just in terms of enhancing the welfare of the people they





If people are seen as autonomous and self-determining, they have the
right to make decisions about themselves.  But there are decisions that
cannot legitimately be made in the name of freedom or autonomy.
People cannot choose not to be free – or at least, they cannot do so in
the name of freedom.  Freedom is inalienable – it cannot be sold or
bargained away.  If it can be disposed of, it ceases to be freedom.
Some of the implications of this principle are disputed, and it might
help if I begin with the least contentious point of the argument: that
people cannot agree to be slaves.  This is universally agreed in modern
society – the League of Nations agreed a convention on slavery in
192674 – and it has generally been accepted as part of international
law.  But this has not always been the case.  The 12th commandment
in the Book of Exodus says that slaves have to be set free after seven
years, but if the slave insists on staying in the master’s household, they
become slaves permanently.  People could, then, agree to be slaves.  In
many societies, there have been mechanisms for people to become
slaves through their actions – an example is bond slavery, which could
happen because people were in debt, and which would continue until
the debt was redeemed.  (The Pilgrim Fathers abolished this practice.)
Similar mechanisms continue to exist in some developing countries
today, and the persistence of forced labour has been subject to a series
of later conventions.
There are many possible objections to slavery.  It can be argued, for
example, that it has undesirable consequences – it is economically
obstructive, because it limits the mobility of labour, or it is socially
undesirable, because it implies a degree of inequality which divides a
society.  Feinberg suggests that the primary objection to slavery is
paternalistic – that is, intended to promote the welfare of people who
need protection.75 But these are not fundamental objections: other
practices which are bad economically or bad for society are not treated
with the universal repugnance that slavery merits.  Three rather more
important objections are that slavery gives the slave owner an
unacceptable degree of power, that slavery infringes human rights, or
the argument that slavery is inconsistent with people’s self-ownership.
But these are simply arguments about freedom, framed in different
terms.  The first is an objection to coercion, the second to limitations
in people’s ability to act for themselves, and the third is another way of
saying that a person has lost the ability to be self-determining.  The
central argument against slavery is that it is incompatible with freedom.
The primary, fundamental objection is that people who become slaves
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are denied all further choices.  It is not a defensible choice in terms of
freedom, because it negates all further freedoms.  That is why people
cannot agree to become slaves.
The arguments which follow hinge on the proposition that freedom
is inalienable, and so it is not legitimate to decide not to be free.  I want
to elaborate on that theme.  If the principle is admitted, it applies
much more widely than the example of slavery.  There are several
other circumstances where people might find themselves with no
further freedoms.  The implications, however, are much less generally
admitted than the argument against slavery.
The first case is suicide.  People may, in the name of freedom, have
the right to choose the manner of their dying.  If someone is dying of
a fatal illness, there is an argument to say that they should be free to
decide how and under what conditions they will actually die.
Permission for euthanasia, or assisted dying, is made in some legislatures
for people who are choosing the manner of death when continuing
to live freely is not an option.  People do not, however, have the
freedom in general to choose whether they live or die, because – like
slavery – death means that no freedom is left.  Suicide is a choice to
cease to have any further choices.  That means that, in societies which
value freedom, suicide is not a legitimate choice.
This is the subject of a common intellectual muddle.  Suicide has
been decriminalised in many legislations, because punishment is
pointless.  That does not make the action lawful or legitimate; there
are still many restrictions aimed at preventing people from taking their
own life, and (pace the Canadian courts,76 which have taken a different
view) many related actions, like assisting, advising or helping people
to commit suicide, are still forbidden by criminal law.  Many of us are
inclined to say, ‘of course people must be free to commit suicide’, but
we do not really believe it emotionally, even if we pretend to believe
it rationally.  If we are faced with someone attempting suicide – for
example, someone who has taken a bottle of pills which we discover
– most of us would call for help.  Our prejudice in this case – the
instant reaction – is the right one; people should not be left to die,
because if they do, they will cease to be free.  If freedom is inalienable,
people cannot legitimately choose not to have any more choices.  It is
conceivable that someone may wish to argue that suicide may be
morally permissible on other grounds, but it is not consistent with
freedom.
The second application of the general principle is the use of deadly
force.  Killing someone denies them all further freedoms.  There are




can be justified in the name of freedom.  Self-defence is permissible,
because that means exceptionally that the killer has the choice to
deny all further choices to someone else or to be denied all further
choices themselves.  Killing someone to protect the freedom of others
may be permissible in the same terms.  But killing someone to prevent
robbery, to defend oneself against assault, or to prevent someone
escaping, are not justifiable in the name of freedom, because the use of
deadly force is not justified by the freedom of the person who is
attacked, and it denies all further freedom to the assailant.  If any of
these actions is defensible they must be defended in different terms.  (I
am not saying that there are no arguments for killing people – they
include deterrence, just deserts, punishment and biblical authority –
but freedom is not one of them.)
The same argument extends to gun control.  Most governments in
liberal democracies, with the obvious exception of the US, impose a
substantial degree of control over guns.  This is because guns, whether
intentionally or unintentionally, deliver deadly force.  That, after all, is
what they are designed to do.  (In many cases it is unintentional on
the part of the user.  According to the US National Safety Council,
762 people in the US were killed by the accidental discharge of a
firearm in 2002.77  The figure is small compared to the numbers of
deliberate killings, or self-harm, but it is still much higher than all
deaths by firearm in countries like the UK where guns are subject to
strict controls.) Where guns are used, people die, and death denies all
freedom in perpetuity to the person who is killed.  Hughes and Hunt
make the case that people should be free to carry guns, because it
protects them.78 It may protect them – which is debatable, in view of
the extraordinary number of accidental deaths – but even if this is
right, it depends on disregarding the freedom of the people who will
be killed.  It is not impossible to defend the possession and use of guns
enshrined in the US constitution, because there are other arguments
besides freedom.  They include arguments relating to personal security,
enforceability, culture, tradition, redressing imbalances in power and
the maintenance of civilian militias.  Conversely, there are other
arguments against the use of guns, such as security, power and restraining
the illegitimate use of guns for intimidation and crime.  The suggestion
that the possession of guns is legitimised by personal freedom, however,
is a thoroughly bad argument.
The third example is drug dependency.  There is a ‘libertarian’
argument, which argues that drug dependency is a matter of individual
choice, and that no one has the right to stop people from actions they
choose, even if they become addicted.  There is also a practical argument,
31
that prohibition does not work.  But the argument from capacity
runs against this: the choice to become addicted, like the choice to be
a slave, denies freedom for the future.  Defending that in terms of
freedom is self-contradictory.
This is not an exhaustive list.  Other examples include consent to
serious bodily harm, restrictions on the sale of body organs, and a
range of measures taken to protect children from exploitation.  If there
are certain actions which deny freedom, it must be true that preventing
those actions enhances it.  The actions which most obviously deny
freedom are the actions of other people: the freedom of each person is
limited in order to protect the freedom of everyone.  But people can
do things that limit their own freedom.  Intervention to prevent people
from doing things can enhance their freedom.
This potential paradox has been the root of several abuses of freedom.
But there are clear limits to the application of the principle.  Interference
ceases to be defensible in terms of freedom, not when the intervention
first occurs, but where it limits a person’s choices.  There is no real
moral problem about banning slavery, preventing drug addiction, or
banning guns, because each of these measures can be held not just to
safeguard the stock of freedom overall, but to protect the freedoms of
the individuals affected.  There is more moral difficulty in dealing
with other circumstances where death may possibly result, but does
not generally do so: examples are smoking, alcohol consumption,
extreme sports and use of motor vehicles.  In those cases, the activities
are liable to be restricted rather than banned, in an attempt to establish
a balance between different claims on freedom.  Legal restrictions are
used to establish a framework in which freedom can be maintained.
Individual and social concepts of freedom79
The terms in which the discussion of freedom has been framed are, I
think, subtly different from the basic ideas of negative and positive
freedom.  In conventional terms, negative freedom has been associated
more with the arguments of the individualist right, and positive freedom
with the socialist left.  From the perspective of the right, the focus on
negative freedom tends to put the strongest emphasis on those
circumstances in which coercion may be applied – most obviously,
the role of the government and the state.  Taking a broader view of
freedom has the effect of admitting a range of concerns about
circumstances where people are unable to act.  Those concerns relate
most obviously to conditions such as poverty, disability and ill-health.




by other actors besides the state, including business and commercial
interests, are as important as the use of direct coercion.  An exclusive
concern with coercion tends to limit arguments for freedom to those
for civil and political rights, which, although important, do not address
the full range of concerns which the left has engaged with.  Advocates
of negative freedom do not think that choice is unimportant, but they
have problems in admitting that some kinds of limitation, such as
poverty or disability, are appropriate examples of a lack of freedom.
The advocates of positive freedom are not insensitive to the importance
of civil liberties, but they think that other kinds of freedom should be
considered along with them.
It would be possible to identify the difference between these two
positions in terms of substantive issues.  On the one hand, there are
those who see freedom primarily in terms of institutional relationships
– especially as a limitation on the actions of governments.  On the
other, there are those who interpret freedom in broader terms, including
relationships in business, education, religion and family life.  This
distinction would be defensible, because if freedom is determined by
whether or not the activity is valued, the differences can be attributed
mainly to the importance attached to different spheres of activity.  I
think, though, that it is possible to argue that there is also an underlying
difference of principle.  It does not fall clearly between left- and right-
wing views, because there are left-wing arguments which rest on
opposition to government (like anarchism), and r ight-wing
conservative views which take a broad view of social action (like
Christian Democracy).  The difference can be characterised more
effectively, I think, as a difference between individual and collective,
or social, concepts of freedom.  Related terms were used by Hobhouse
nearly a century ago.80
The idea of individual freedom starts from the premise that each
person should be self-determining.  Mill writes: ‘Over himself, over
his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign’.81 The idea of
‘sovereignty’ in this context refers to the location of authority.  Authority
is vested in the individual, not in society, government or some other
people.  People are free when they are able to act, negatively and
positively, in a self-determining manner.  The basic criterion is choice.
Individuals are free if they are making their own decisions, subject
only to their capabilities.  Although the emphasis falls on protection
from coercion, the concept is both negative and positive – it assumes
that people are not restricted, and that they make their own decisions.
A person trapped under rubble is not able to make decisions, but a
person who is poor, disabled or homeless is still self-determining, and
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so is still free.  This, I think, encapsulates much more effectively than
‘negative freedom’ the position which is taken by right-wing liberals
like Hayek82 and Friedman .83 (Hayek himself uses the term ‘individual
freedom’ liberally.) They are not arguing that freedom has no positive
aspects, and they are certainly not saying that the freedom to choose is
unimportant or irrelevant.  They are, however, defining the scope of
action according to the individual, rather than according to the social
context the individual is placed in.
It is possible to see this kind of individualistic argument as ‘right
wing’, but the position is not straightforward.  There is a growing
literature concerned with social policy governing the body.84 Much
of this literature is placed, via Foucault,85 in the left-leaning, quasi-
Marxist camp which sees control over people’s bodies as evidence of
repression.  The issues are concerned with relationships in society and
imbalances in the structure of power.  But the arguments for people
being allowed to do as they please with their bodies are highly
individualistic, and (paradoxically, perhaps) the arguments against them
doing so are generally social.  Sheila Shaver makes the point, in relation
to abortion, that it is in liberal regimes where women are held to have
rights to control what happens to their bodies: in continental Europe,
where collectivist principles are more generally accepted, social morality
and the interests of others are much more readily accepted.86 The
example of abortion represents a case in which several people besides
the mother might be thought to have an interest.  The individualist
view is that only the individual most affected has a right to decide: for
proponents of abortion, the mother, and for opponents, the unborn
child.  The social view is that others are involved – fathers, families,
professions allied to medicine and the broader society.  Any of these
claims, if admitted, acts as a limitation or condition on the rights of
individuals – and that limitation is reflected in European laws on
abortion.
There are two main kinds of objection to the assertion of the
sovereignty of the individual in this sphere.  The weaker of the two
objections is the idea that, whatever we do, other people are liable to
be engaged and involved.  The stronger objection is a social perspective
which argues that, irrespective of the claims of individualists, society
does have a claim and an interest in the conduct of each person within
it.  That is the position argued by conservative moralists like Stephen
and Devlin.87 When it comes down to cases, few people genuinely





• Should domestic disputes involving violence be considered
private between the parties?
• Should people be free to inflict extreme pain or mutilation on
consenting adults? (That was the subject of the ‘Spanner trial’ in
1990.  The participants’ conviction generated various indignant
protests, but it was upheld in a series of appeals, finishing at the
European Court of Human Rights in 1997.88)
• Should marriage be permitted between brothers and sisters?
Any of these issues might be considered to fall in the private sphere
by libertarians, but if you can answer ‘yes’ to any of these questions,
you are unusually liberal, and if you can answer yes to all three, you are
exceptional.
Social freedom starts from a different set of moral premises.  It sees
freedom, not as a property of individuals, but as a relationship between
people.  People’s capacity is seen in the context of their social
environment.  Both their own ability to act, and the effect of others
upon them, are forms of power.  ‘Freedom’, Tawney argues, ‘is always
relative to power’.89 Like the individual conception, this encompasses
both negative and positive senses of freedom.  The difference between
individual and social freedom rests more in one’s interpretation of the
nature of social action than in the identification of conceptually distinct
elements.  Social freedom stresses, not self-determination – which can
be exercised by an individual in isolation – but the relative power to
act; not the absence of interference, but the relative power of others.
Because people who are homeless, disabled or poor are unable to
escape from their situation, they are not free.90 In the same way as the
individual concept may be linked to pathological explanations, the
social concept may be associated with structural views, which attribute
poverty not to the responsibility of the individual but to the structure
of a society.  Intervention may be justified to liberate them from their
restricted circumstances.  Freedom can be increased by increasing
power.  Financial resources, because they enable a person to act, are
one source of power.  A person with more money has more choice,
and is therefore more free.  Poverty, by the same argument, restricts
choice, and so restricts freedom.
Arguments against liberty
This discussion has ranged over much of the political debate, and it
has taken in a range of apparently opposed views.  There is so much
agreement that freedom is a Good Thing that it is tempting to think
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that no one disagrees with it.  That is not really true; if there was no
opposition, it is difficult to see why any government should ever
knowingly take steps to undermine liberty.  Opposition to the principle
comes in several ways.  Part is based not so much in opposition to
freedom as in conflicts between different views of freedom – most
obviously, disagreements between positive and negative freedom, and
individual and social concepts.  Part is based in the view that, irrespective
of arguments about freedom, there may be positive grounds for
compulsion.  The core argument for compulsory participation in social
welfare schemes is that people cannot expect to benefit without
contributing, and the level of interdependence in a society is such
that claims not to use services like roads, transport or the social
infrastructure are generally spurious.  More fundamentally, there is an
argument that liberty is not a primary good and that other moral rules
are more important.  Kant tells us to ‘act only on that maxim through
which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal
law’.91  If moral conduct works on universal principles, those principles
apply to other people, not just to ourselves.
Frequently, liberty is weighed against other competing principles –
primarily welfare and security.  Opposition to freedom is often justified
in terms of economic development: it is difficult to find people who
are opposed to both.  In many developing countries in the 20th century,
Stalinism was profoundly influential: Stalin had argued that rapid
economic development required a combination of central direction
and harsh measures.92 An alternative, but no less influential, model,
combines economic liberalism with firm political control.  This has
been the pattern favoured by South East Asian countries, and most
recently by China.  This begs the question, however: why, if
governments in the poorest countries are generally pursuing freedom
or economic development, do they seem to have neither? One
explanation might be that they cannot be separated, and each depends
on the other.  People need food before they can exercise choice; they
need choices to be sure they will have food.  A second explanation is
that both depend on prosperity: freedom and economic development
are best protected in the developed economies of the West.  The third
is that there is some other factor, like democracy or security, which is
necessary for both to prosper: famine is widely associated with problems
like civil unrest.  And the fourth is that some governments, despite
their protestations, believe in neither.  One comment heard with
depressing frequency from people in Latin America and Africa is that
they have a ‘kleptocracy’: government by thieves, solely in the interests




overcome both freedom and economic development, greed has to be
a strong contender.
Paternalism
Opposition to liberty is sometimes described in terms of ‘paternalism’.
In a liberal democracy, the term is often used pejoratively, although it
represents a widely held sentiment.  There are often strong moral
reasons for limiting liberty.  The first is the general application of
moral principles.  If one accepts moral rules, like respect for persons
or property, it is difficult not to accept that the rules should be applied
generally – a position taken, for example, by Kant and Mill.  It is often
possible to justify these rules in practical terms – what would life be
like if people ignored them? – but that is not the main reason why
they are there.  In many cases, social policies have been set up to do
things, like slum clearance or educating children, because their
proponents thought it was the right thing to do.  (One argument that
people seemed to find persuasive in Victorian times was the idea that
people needed a decent environment and background to be good
Christians.  This argument was made, for example, by General Booth
and Octavia Hill.93)
The second reason is to promote the welfare of the person, which is
one of the purest forms of paternalism.  Mill’s arguments suggest that
people can be protected from harm by others, but not that they can be
protected from other sorts of harm.  This is puzzling.  In practice, few
people genuinely believe that intervention in someone else’s life for
their own good cannot be justified – the strongest counter-example is
family life, where people continually try to influence the people they
most care about for their own good.  The principle is not fundamentally
different: when a society tries to protect the position of people who
are old, infirm or vulnerable, the work of the health visitor is illustrative.
The third reason for paternalism, paradoxically enough, is to promote
freedom.  If people’s actions forestall choices, for example through
drug addiction or alcoholism, intervention will help them to preserve
their independence and their freedom.  One of the implications of
the term ‘paternalism’ is that it involves treating people like children,
and of course this is also one of the justifications for limiting the
freedom of children: the object is not to prevent children from making
decisions, but to lead them to the point where they will be able to do
so in the future.
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Liberty
An example:  licensing laws
Licensing is a system for the control of the sale of alcoholic beverages.
The law of licensing is a 19th-century institution.  In the context of Victorian
society, nominally founded on the principles of laissez-faire and individual
responsibility, the control of alcohol consumption seems inconsistent.  It
was founded largely in moral disapproval of the habits of the lower classes,
and a paternalistic desire to control their excesses.  In recent years, there
has been a general trend in many fields towards liberalisation of markets,
and over time many of the practices associated with licensing law have
been modified: there have been extensions of opening hours and a growing
range of licensed premises.  During discussions of reform of the law in
Scotland, I undertook a small canvass of stakeholder opinions during debates
on proposed reforms of the system.  Working with colleagues from The
Robert Gordon University, I consulted 51 stakeholders, including members
and officials on licensing boards, representatives of different kinds of
licensees, police officers, lawyers and various people working in health
promotion.
The responses fell into five main categories.  First, most respondents
felt it was necessary to regulate the supply and consumption of alcohol:
‘Regulation provides a safer and controlled environment for the
consumption and sale of alcohol.’
‘To ensure that its use is within the boundaries of what is considered as
socially acceptable.’
Several emphasised that alcohol was a dangerous product:
‘To control what is, if abused, a dangerous product, to ensure its enjoyment
as far as possible.’
‘To regulate social problems which might arise from sale and supply of a
drug.’
‘To regulate (carefully) the availability of alcohol, which is a harmful drug
if used inappropriately.’
Second, the licensing laws were seen as a way of protecting vulnerable
users:
‘To regulate who buys and protect if possible some of the vulnerable
members of the community.’
‘To protect juveniles and other vulnerable people.’
‘We need to protect people from themselves when they’ve had a few to
drink.’
Third, licensing laws were seen as a means of protecting the wider
public:




‘The protection of the public and the maintenance of public order and
safety.’
‘To regulate, administer and set conditions of licence to ensure public
safety, control public health and ensure a safe environment for the
community.’
Fourth, licensing laws were seen as a means of controlling the licensed
trade.  Some respondents saw this as a straightforward objective:
‘To keep control of licence holders.’
‘Set and monitor standards for licence holders and licensed premises.’
Many respondents saw the licensing laws as a means of regulating trade.
Licensing laws were intended, according to some licensees,
‘To have some form of level playing field applying to those in the industry.’
‘To ensure people running public houses are properly trained and
understand their responsibilities.’
‘To promote industry.’
Fifth, licensing was seen as a way of protecting the public interest:
‘To have elements of consistency and control to protect the quality of life
of citizens.’
‘A form of social control – address the balance of availability v. prohibition,
punishment for wrong doing.’
‘To balance the needs of the community against the needs of the trade.’
A representative of the licensed trade suggested that the laws were intended
‘to ensure a fair system that allows people to enjoy themselves and those
who serve to make a comfortable living.’
while the clerk of a Licensing Board suggested that:
‘Without them, anarchy would rule.’
As for the behaviour of the clientele, the general view – held by both
officials and people in the trade – was that licensees had to do more to
curb the excesses of their customers:
‘Stricter entry controls, and service should stop if a client is drunk.’
‘Night clubs should be much tougher on drunkenness, and evict/call police
on offenders.’
‘Stricter penalties for sale to those who have consumed too much.’
‘Tightening of law required dealing quickly and effectively with licence
holders whose premises cause trouble for society.’
This was, of course, combined with a concern to increase controls and
restraints on drinkers:
‘Stiffer penalties should be administered through the courts for acts of
violence and for being drunk in a public place.’
‘Cultural change law as in drink driving can help.’
‘Police to fine public disorder offenders, like litter fines just introduced.’
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The paternalistic nature of the licensing laws is still strongly evident.
Licensing is a form of ‘impure’ paternalism, based, like the control of gambling,
in the restriction of third parties rather than direct restriction of the person
who is to benefit.  Dworkin outlines three main justifications for paternalistic
action: that people otherwise do not necessarily know the consequences
of their actions; that they may not otherwise act responsibly; or that they
lack the capacity for judgment.94 Other justifications are that paternalistic
action provide a convenient framework, consistent with people’s wishes;
that paternalism provides necessary social protection, because rationally
individual decisions do not safeguard against apparently remote risks; and
that paternalistic action may increase freedom, by limiting actions which
will diminish it.  Most, if not all, of these justifications are visible in these
responses.
Compulsion in practice
Whatever the intentions of government, in practice the use of
compulsion is tempered by a balance of moral, ideological and practical
considerations.  Because governments have a variety of coercive tools
in their armoury, it is often sufficient to apply pressure, or to hint at
coercion, rather than go all the way.  The essence of coercion rests in
the application of a sanction for non-compliance.  The effect of a
sanction should be sufficient to forestall the option – making it
effectively non-eligible – as opposed, say, to taxation, which simply
makes it less eligible.  Whether or not sanctions are coercive in practice,
however, depends on context.  Forbidding actions is coercive in effect
only if the remaining options offer a restricted course of action.
Banning bare-knuckle fighting, for example, is not widely considered
coercive, because very few people actually want to do it, and in any
case it leaves people with sporting urges several other options for
hitting each other over the head.  Making actions dependent on
permission – like possession of a driving licence – is not usually seen
as coercive, because authorisation is available under certain conditions.
The same is not true of some other restrictions, such as the use of
opiates, because the desire to use them is extensive, and the conditions
for authorisation are much more limited.
The mechanics of securing compliance with laws have a major effect
on the kinds of method it is possible for governments to adopt.  The
best known form of proscription lies in criminal law, in which people
are made liable to punishment or sanction as a result of breaking the




case of indirect compulsion, controlling behaviour through the
behaviour of others.  It is possible for a government to forbid something
without making it punishable directly.  Some actions are unlawful but
not subject to criminal sanctions.  In English law, it was long considered
that ‘sexual intercourse between husband and wife is sanctioned by
law: all other sexual intercourse is unlawful’.95 This understanding of
the law has become unfashionable with black-letter lawyers (it has
been dropped from later editions of the source I cited), because it
relies on a reading of principles which goes beyond the letter of the
law.  It makes sense nevertheless.  If sexual intercourse were lawful,
like (say) higher education, people could advertise it, help others to
do it, employ people to assist, offer facilities for its commerce, and so
forth.  The restrictions can only be there because the action itself is
implicity unlawful.
Some laws define an offence in absolute terms, so that any
infringement, no matter how minor, is potentially criminal.  The
common law of battery defines any physical contact – even a tap on
the shoulder – as illegal.  This is eminently enforceable; it is sufficient
to show that physical contact took place, and it is not necessary to
demonstrate a degree of force or an intention to cause harm.  The
same rationale lies behind laws which forbid hitting children.  A hit is
unlikely to be prosecuted.  What an absolute ban does is to remove a
defence based on a misjudgement of force.  (There is another argument
for this kind of restriction: it may be justified on the rabbinical principle
that the way to stop people doing something serious is to stop them
doing anything at all.  The intention of a total ban may be to shift the
distribution of acceptable behaviour, and with it the pattern of social
conduct.) An alternative approach is to allow a margin of latitude.
Speed limits for motor vehicles in Britain are enforced in most locations
only after a margin of excess has been allowed.  The margin of excess,
reported as being 10% + 2 mph, allows for the inaccuracies of
speedometers, coupled with an allowance for usage and practice.  In
stark contrast, there are also laws which set the criteria for enforceability
well in excess of anticipated practice.  If legislatures want abortions to
be performed by 20 weeks, but it is accepted that the boundaries are
difficult to define, they may allow for a maximum limit of 24 weeks.
(The same argument as that applied to speed limits might have implied
that the way to arrive at an effective limit of 20 weeks would be to
impose a limit of 16 weeks.  In the case of abortion, however, policing
of the limits has been strict, and erring doctors may be informed on
by their colleagues.)
There are alternative methods of enforcement, too, beyond criminal
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law.  Some governments use civil law, relying on a combination of
compliance and individuals taking legal action as a means of bringing
behaviour under control.  Some, of course, use other forms of
punishment, such as those used in schools, to instil appropriate
behaviour.  And many governments, despite the extensive range of
compulsory powers available to them, prefer to use alternative methods
– persuasion, propaganda, incentive and reward.
The position is not, then, one where governments simply tell people
what to do.  There is an implicit negotiation going on: governments
have to judge what is legitimate, and what is possible.  Some of the
constraints on the use of compulsion are moral and ideological.  It
may be possible to reduce the incidence of littering by deprivation of
liberty, but it is not an option which would commend itself to most
governments.  Although the principle is far from consistent in its
application, liberal democracies tend to take the line that the appropriate
level of intervention is proportionate to the offence and the minimum
required for effectiveness.  A large part of the rationale is practical.
There are, of course, circumstances in which governments are able to
proscribe certain activities and punish people who break the rule.
However, many examples of coercion are not so straightforward,
because the boundaries are difficult to define.  Enforceability is often
more important than apparent meaning.
Liberty in theory: an overview
The conventional understanding of liberty focuses on negative, positive
and psychological freedom.  I have suggested an alternative formulation,
in the distinction of individual and social freedom.  Whether or not
that particular formulation is accepted, the approach taken in this
chapter argues for a broader concept of liberty than that found in
many of the texts I have referred to.  The principle can act to restrict
action, but it also implies positive duties, including the development
of capacity and the promotion of autonomy.  Understanding liberty
in these general terms tends, I think, to shift the argument in favour of
social understandings of freedom.
The relationship between the principle of liberty and the
development of policy sometimes seems indirect.  To those for whom
liberty implies non-interference, the main effect of the principle seems
to be to impose a barrier – to prevent certain policies from being
undertaken if they would restrict the freedom of the people they
affect.  Arguing for a more broadly based, social concept of liberty




for any measure, there may be normative implications.  The next chapter
attempts to consider the broader relationships.  The devil, however, is
in the detail.  Liberty has many aspects, and there are few simple
generalisations which will cover all circumstances.
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The idea of liberty is a guide to action, rather than a specific
prescription, and there is no single policy which is demanded by it.
In a seminal essay, Charles Taylor makes the important point that all
freedoms are not equal.  He gives the example of two countries, one
of which limits freedom of religion but does not have many traffic
controls (his example was Albania), while the other, like the UK, has
freedom of religion but a lot of traffic lights.96  These are not equivalent.
Freedom matters because it protects the things we value, like religion,
education or the ability to discuss issues.  A free society is not the same
as a society where people are free to do whatever they want, or a
society where the private sphere is not regulated.  It is a society where
certain key activities are protected, and capacities are developed, so
that people can do the things they value.
A persuasive argument can certainly be made that a nation with a
market economy or a free press is more likely to be ‘free’ than another,
but it does not follow that more freedom is fostered effectively by the
most libertarian position (unregulated trade, or the freedom claimed
by pornographers).  The reason for this is that the freedoms of each
person have to be viewed in context: freedom in one sense has to be
set against freedom in others, the freedom of one person may infringe
on the freedom of other people, and the value of freedom depends on
the value of the actions it is protecting.  Which policies are necessary,
and in what combination, is difficult to establish.  In the following
sections, I want to focus not on specific policies which might enhance
freedom (such as rights for people in institutions or rules governing
consent to medical treatment) but on the general conditions which
are needed for freedom in the wider society.  This is, of course, only
part of a much broader set of issues.
A free society
If freedom is generally encouraged and respected, it has implications
for the way in which society is organised, and the way in which
politics is run.  In social terms, the expression of freedom implies
diversity and difference.  A free society has to be pluralistic, in the
sense of fostering and protecting a plurality of interests.  In political
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terms, freedom implies empowerment and the protection of individual
rights.  These issues, taken together, are closely identified with the
principles of liberal democracy.
Diversity and pluralism
There are three core arguments for diversity.  First, diversity should be
tolerated.  Tolerance, like respect for persons, depends on our willingness
to accept the validity of patterns of life and behaviour that are different
from our own.  This is a difficult injunction to accept, because at root
most of us think the moral choices we make are better than the
alternatives – that is why we make them.  The idea that moral codes
and norms apply only to ourselves and no one else is incoherent.  The
argument for tolerance is partly that we should do as we wish to be
done by, and partly that tolerance is itself a virtue, but also that we all
need to understand that we just might be mistaken.
Some people would argue that, beyond tolerance, diversity should
be valued in itself.  If people are valued, what they are, the way of life
and what is different about them should be valued.  Valuing diversity
sounds good at first, like motherhood and apple pie, but there are
objections to it.  If the idea of ‘value’ has any meaning, it has to be
differentiated.  Some patterns of behaviour, and some forms of diversity,
will be more valued than others.  Tolerance is a more modest aim, and
a more achievable one.
This leads on to the second argument: that diversity benefits a society.
Diversity develops options.  It makes new ideas and patterns of life
available to people.  From diversity there comes the capacity to change.
Here, again, it seems important to attach several riders.  There are
patterns of life which need to be the subject of restrictions, either
because they are damaging to people (traditional medicine is an
example) or because they deny freedom (like some forms of religious
indoctrination).  It makes no sense to justify slavery in the name of
freedom, or intolerance in the name of tolerance.  The central argument,
however, is hard to dispute: a vibrant society, an active economy and a
strong culture depend on change and the ability to absorb new
influences.
Third, diversity is the product of freedom.  It is difficult to see how
one can have one without the other.  This is vulnerable to the objection
that freedom is not necessarily something which should be valued in
itself – what matters about freedom is the things it lets us do.  Unless
people all wish to do exactly the same, and it is difficult to see how in
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conditions of freedom this could happen, diversity is the inevitable
consequence.
Wherever people live differently, and societies are diverse, there will
be conflicting interests.  Robert Dahl argues that any mechanism for
decision making which reflects that plurality will come to bear the
characteristics of a democracy.97 Madison’s argument for majority
voting is not based in the view that majorities know better than
minorities: it is that voting represents different factions, and that those
factions will coalesce differently on different issues, and the nature of
majority changes as coalitions of interest change.  He wrote:
It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard
the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard
one part of the society against the injustice of the other
part.  Different interests necessarily exist in different classes
of citizens.  If a majority be united by a common interest,
the rights of the minority will be insecure.  There are but
two methods of providing against this evil: the one by
creating a will in the community independent of the
majority – that is, of the society itself; the other, by
comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions
of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority
on the whole very improbable, if not impracticable.98
The problems with this approach arise when there is a consistent
majority interest on an issue.  Pluralism, in the political sense, relies on
a sufficient degree of movement or instability to prevent that happening.
Pluralism is sometimes caricatured in academic writing as representing
a belief that power is distributed equally.99 Pluralists do not say that.
They say only that, for pluralism to work, interest groups and factions
have to be sufficiently diverse to prevent any faction exercising
consistent domination over others.  Whether or not that obtains in
practice is a matter of empirical fact.
An example:  the Islamic headscarf
Pluralism and diversity depend on the recognition of minorities.  There
may, however, be difficult problems when the practices of cultural minorities
are seen as limiting the freedom of people within minority groups.  Several
issues, including arranged marriages, female circumcision and the wearing
of the veil, have created dilemmas for western liberals.  These issues have
several points in common.  They reflect cultural practices derived from
Towards a free society
46
Liberty, equality, fraternity
illiberal societies, where they are supported by coercion.  They reinforce
the disadvantage of women.  And they are often seen by members of
minority communities as an expression of their culture, and their choice.
The argument in France has recently centred on the wearing of
traditional headscarves in schools by Islamic pupils.  This has been a complex
debate, with four main strands.  The first is the assertion of choice by
individuals: the case which brought the issue to public attention was that
of two girls from a mixed marriage, whose Jewish father supported their
action.  A demonstration by Muslim women chanted: ‘Ni frère, ni mari, le
foulard on l’a choisi’.  (Literally, this means ‘neither brother, neither husband,
one has chosen the headscarf ’.  It doesn’t make much more sense in French
than it does in English, but when it’s chanted, it scans splendidly.  It can be
taken to mean that the headscarf is chosen by women, not by men.) The
second strand has been a strong expression of feminist opposition, from
those who consider that the veil is a symbol of oppression.  The headscarf
is not a choice like the decision to wear earrings or not.  It is a symbolic
action, and beyond that traditional veils or burkas also directly limit the
freedom of action of women who wear them.  Third, there has been an
underlying undertone of hostility to Islam and in particular to people from
North Africa, most obviously expressed in France by the high vote in
presidential elections for the leader of the anti-immigrant Front National.
Lastly, there is a strong tradition in French republicanism of anti-clericalism,
and a determined maintenance of the secular nature of the state.  In opinion
polls, more than two thirds of French respondents agree with the sentiment.
This has proved decisive in the argument.  In deciding to ban ostentatious
symbols of religious observance in schools, the French President, Jacques
Chirac, commented (more than once) that secularism was fundamental to
respect, tolerance and dialogue between citizens.
Secularism guarantees freedom of conscience.  It protects the liberty to
believe or not to believe.  It guarantees for all the possibility to express
and practice one’s faith, peacefully, freely, without the threat of having
other conventions or beliefs imposed.  It is the neutrality of the public
space which allows for the harmonious coexistence of different
religions.100
Le Monde argued that, far from creating a perception of neutrality and
diversity, the banning of the veil was likely to be seen as exclusive and
stigmatising.101 There is a conflict at the heart of this debate between those
who see liberty in terms of the removal of restraints on individuals, and
those who emphasise the importance of diverse cultures and traditions.
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Liberal democracy
There are close conceptual connections between liberty and democracy.
There are more varieties of democracy than I can hope to refer to
here, but even allowing for a certain vagueness of terms, democracy is
seen as a protector of freedom and difference.  Democracy is sometimes
represented in terms of the rule of the majority.  The pluralist
understanding of democracy is very different: it is not about the rule
of the majority, but the rights of minorities.  Majority rule does not
give the majority the authority to suppress the rights of minorities.  A
majority is nothing but a combination of different minorities.
Liberal democracy is based partly on the principles of liberal
individualism; it is also strongly influenced by the American republican
tradition, represented in The Federalist Papers.102 The key elements are
individual liberty, pluralism, and the rule of law, and its primacy over
government.  Individual liberty, and to some extent the rights of
minorities, is fundamental; a country which oppresses its minorities is
generally considered not to be democratic on that account, even if it
has the form of a democratic government in other respects.
Liberal democracy is identified less in terms of the specific mechanism
of government than through observance of civil rights – equality before
the law, freedom of religion and freedom of assembly – and political
rights, including the right to free speech, the right to vote, and
participation in politics.  Political rights are often seen as fundamental
to liberty, although some of the material I have reviewed up to now
raises questions about that relative priority.  Discussion of the full
range of civil rights goes rather beyond the scope of this book, but
there are three elements I think are particularly relevant, and which
need to be acknowledged, even if I do not propose to discuss them at
length.  These concern freedom of assembly, freedom of speech and
protection of the rights of individuals.
Freedom of assembly means that people are able to form groups without
hindrance.  The right of assembly has been restricted at many times in
many countries, largely because of the (justifiable) fear that when people
get together in groups, they may be able to discuss things that rulers
may not wish them to discuss.  Freedom of assembly is necessary, first,
for social interaction: restrictions on assembly for some purposes, like
restrictions on demonstrations and political meetings, are difficult to
enforce without rules that apply to other purposes, like larger social
events or religious congregations.  One of the reasons that the guilds
of the 17th and 18th centuries formed secret societies, including
arrangements for mutual aid and social protection, was that such
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meetings had to be arranged in defiance of the laws.  Social interaction
in these terms is necessary, in turn, for cultural activity and religious
worship.  Second, freedom of assembly is necessary for economic
development.  The link is more debatable, because some economies
have succeeded in promoting growth despite important restrictions
on political and social development, but economic exchange depends
on markets – interaction, the flow of information and the development
of networks – which presume assembly.  Third, freedom of assembly is
essential for the genesis of political activity.  Political organisation and
development in democratic countries depends on pluralism – not
only on structures but on the formation of groups, interests and factions.
This is, of course, precisely why freedom of assembly has so often
been suppressed.
Freedom of speech means that diverse views and opinions can be
expressed.  The importance of free speech is so well established that it
seems beyond question.  Without it, there can be no movement in
science, in art, or government.  The central arguments for free speech,
stated by Mill in On liberty, are that the dissenting opinion may be
true, or have a portion of truth, and that the received opinion, even if
it is right, should not be closed to examination, and held only through
prejudice.  Mill writes:
If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, and only
one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would
be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he,
if he had the power, would be justified in silencing
mankind.103
This does not mean, however, that speech is subject to no rules.  Free
speech (like free action) is necessarily restricted by the effect that it
has on other people.  Speech can restrict the freedoms of other people,
and there are forms of speech – like hate speech – which people have
a right to be protected from.  Some spoken actions can be criminal
offences.  This includes incitement and conspiracy to commit criminal
offences, incitement to racial hatred and ‘public libels’, including in
the UK obscenity and blasphemy.  In Schenck v United States (249 US
47, 1919), Justice Holmes argued: ‘The most stringent protection of
free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre
and causing a panic’.  (Theatre staff, by the way, are usually instructed
not even to use the word ‘fire’; the front of house staff are alerted with
a coded message.)
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There are two possible rationales for these restrictions.  One is that,
like any other freedom, freedom of speech has to respect the freedoms
of others; liberty is not license.  The second rationale is that freedom
of speech is a misnomer – it is not what we should mean at all.  Freedom
of speech may have less to do with free speech, or free expression,
than it has to do with the rights of the audience – the rights that
people have to obtain information and differing points of view, and
the rights they have to be protected from hateful and damaging material.
On that account, both freedom of speech and the restrictions on it are
based in the same kinds of rights.
Third, there is the protection of the rights of individuals.  In the previous
section I argued that the rights of minorities were fundamental to
democracy.  Most liberals, even if they agree with the sentiment, would
describe this in different terms.  The core of liberal democracy is
represented in terms of the rights of each individual, and so of each
and every person.  The rights of minorities are protected in so far as
they represent the rights of the individuals who compose them.  They
are not protected in circumstances where (for example, in forced
marriages or religious indoctrination) they threaten the liberties of
individuals.
The rights of individuals are protected in three main ways.  First is
the rule of law: this means that the circumstances of each person are
determined in accordance with commonly applied rules.  The second
principle is equality before the law and the related assertion of equal
rights, which I shall come on to in Part Two of the book.  The third is
the liberty of the person, including physical protection from violation
of the body, protection from coercion, and rights against deprivation
of liberty.
Some of the examples I considered in the previous chapter also
point to further special considerations.  The ‘individual’ of On liberty
is, more or less, a well-bodied adult of intermediate age, informed by
a basic education and sufficiently secure in the necessities of life to be
able to be concerned about other issues.  That is not Mill’s intention,
of course, but once these implicit norms are relaxed, many of the
arguments are challenged.  If the rights which are instituted are
genuinely to be the rights of each and every person, they need to
apply to everyone – children, older people, people with disabilities,
people with dependencies, people in minority groups, and so forth.
People who are vulnerable do not need fewer rights or less protection
than others; they need more.
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Creating the conditions for liberty
Liberty depends not only on the absence of coercion, but also on the
capacity to act and the promotion of autonomy.  Freedom is closely
associated with command over resources, both because resources endow
people with choices, and because people’s command over resources –
their income and wealth – are indicators of entitlement and integration
in society.  Commerce, including trade and economic exchange, is
fundamental to many capacities, and so to freedoms.  The division of
labour in society means that people specialise in the tasks they perform,
and their work is subsequently traded.  Everyone gains power as a
result of the process: basic essentials, like food, clothing and heating,
would be laborious and often unattainable without it.  In right-wing
thought, liberty is often linked with economic activity and production.
Viewed historically, this is quite true.  In mediaeval times, feudal societies
limited people’s capacity to trade and exchange – people could not
sell labour, land or housing.  The development of negative freedom, in
terms of the reduction of restraints, helped to foster commerce.  The
argument that commerce in turn fosters freedom, however, is based in
a positive idea of liberty.  If it fosters freedom, it is because it increases
positive freedom – the power to act.
Economic development is also related to the process of inclusion.
One of the most basic means of addressing poverty is by integrating
people into economic processes.  The process of social inclusion is
concerned with the parallel process of integration into networks of
social responsibility.  Some of these networks are linked to economic
processes, through patterns of employment, exchange and economic
entitlement.  Others depend on social processes, including the
relationships of family, neighbourhood and community.  The term
‘social capital’ is used to refer to the development of capacity through
social networks – Putnam argues that it is important, not just for social
relationships, but also for economic prosperity.104 The use of the term
helps to draw attention to factors which, although intangible, and
difficult to quantify in any meaningful sense, nevertheless play a major
role in determining people’s capacity.  The power to act depends not
only on the actions of individuals, but also on people acting in concert
in a social context.
Collaborative action is also important for the development of capacity.
For  much of the past century, mutual action and aid has provided
people with social protection (such as sickness insurance and
unemployment benefits).105 In several countries, this kind of provision
has developed further: trades unions have provided housing (in
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Scandinavia) or health services (in Israel).  The actions of governments
in the provision of welfare services should be seen in the same light.106
Governments have been engaged in similar kinds of activity to such
mutual organisations, often for the same kinds of reason: this is what
citizens expect their governments to do.  Historically, the development
of free societies has depended on a long process of development; a
range of social, economic and political conditions need to be satisfied.
In Development as freedom, Amartya Sen identifies five key areas of
freedom.  He refers to them as ‘instrumental’, partly because they
create the conditions for development, and partly because they act to
increase people’s capabilities.  The five areas are political freedoms,
economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees and
protective security.107 Political freedoms were considered in the
previous section.  Transparency guarantees – issues which include trust,
disclosure and the exchange of information – can largely be understood
in terms of the same kind of civil and political rights.  The other
issues, however, are not always considered in discussion of freedom.
In this section, I want to move on to consider the economic and
social conditions for freedom.
The economic conditions for freedom
Arguments from the political right tend to see the existence of the
market economy as both an expression of freedom, and a condition
for it.  Market economies have delivered prosperity, security and
personal liberty for large numbers of people.  The market is an
expression of freedom because wherever large numbers of people are
able to interact, express preferences and exchange, an economic market
will exist.  It is a condition for freedom because it gives people the
capacity to act independently and to make their own choices.  The
‘freedom to choose’ embraced by Milton Friedman108 is not just
freedom to get on with things without interference: it implies capacities
and positive choices.
I agree with the gist of this argument, but I do not think it goes far
enough.  People need to be able to interact, to exchange, and to choose.
The main limitation on such action is poverty.  Poverty restricts freedom
through material need, which obstructs the capacity to act; through
economic limitations, which obstruct the ability to choose; and through
exclusion from participation in society.  The main policy response
from international organisations, notably the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund and the United Nations, has been to
promote economic development, and to encourage the incorporation
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of poor people into the networks which formal economies establish.
This is often linked to issues of governance, institutional structures as
well as economic development.  The Poverty Reduction Strategy
Programmes which developing countries have been asked to
implement mirror the planning processes of governments in developed
economies, such as the National Action Plans of countries in the
European Union.
Poverty is not confined to developing countries.  Significant
minorities in the populations of developed economies are also liable
to be excluded, usually because they are not part of the active labour
force.  These populations commonly comprise older people,
unemployed people, people with disabilities, and single parents, who
are mainly divorced women with principal responsibilities for child
care.  The proportions coming from each category vary, depending on
the structure of the economy and the benefits system.  This poses, in
different terms from the problems facing developing countries, the
same question: how to ensure that people are incorporated into the
economy, and able to participate in society.  Other aspects of this issue
will be returned to later in the book, but for present purposes it should
be sufficient to note that inclusion depends on redistribution, so that
people in some groups support others.  Every developed economy,
without exception, has some form of redistributive mechanism, offering
support to people in these categories.  (The support is differentiated
according to ideology, historical tradition and practice, but the very
generality of the principle, considering the strength of the opposition,
is surprising.  I have considered the issue in much greater depth in a
previous book.109) If participation in economic markets is a condition
of freedom, then so is social welfare provision.
Freedom, markets and social protection
For many neo-liberals, such as Hayek and Friedman, the operation of
the economic market is fundamental to freedom.  There are three
interconnected threads in their arguments:
1. If people interact and exchange freely, a market will arise.
Suppression of the market is a suppression of that freedom.
2. Markets facilitate choice, which is the expression of freedom.
3. Economic freedom enhances welfare.
There are some reservations to make about these propositions, but
broadly speaking they are right.  In relation to the first, the development
of economic markets has been closely associated with the development
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of democracy, civil rights and the modern understanding of personal
freedom.  The second proposition is more debatable, because the choice
which markets offer is conditional on resources, and some people
have much more restricted choice than others: but the main response
to this is to ensure that resources are available to the poorest, not to
prevent distribution through the mechanisms of the market.  The third
proposition is also disputable, because economic licence – like other
forms of unrestricted freedom – can limit the freedoms of others; but
it does seem clear that the world’s prosperous economies, and those
which offer the highest degree of welfare, are all societies in which
markets are well established and operate freely, while those which
have restricted the market have generally failed to prosper.
What is much more contentious is the argument that in any of
these respects, the liberty associated with markets is in some way
compromised or threatened by systems of social protection.  The first
proposition is that the suppression of markets suppresses freedom.  Does
social protection, however, suppress markets? There is some reason to
think that redistribution can alter the terms on which markets operate,
but that is not the same thing; and there are circumstances in which
social protection can promote markets, by incorporating people into
the formal economy who would otherwise be excluded.  Social security
for unemployed people, for example, acts as an economic regulator,
injecting money into the economy at times when production is
restricted, and withdrawing it when production is booming.
Second, markets facilitate choice.  Does social protection restrict
choice? I argued earlier that the concept of freedom is itself
redistributive: it implies the restriction of some people in order to
make it possible for others to act.  Exactly the same principle applies
to the redistribution of resources for social protection, which restricts
the choices of some people while expanding the choices of others.
Third, economic freedom enhances welfare.  The argument that
social protection reduces this effect is based on a particular interpretation
of the workings of the economy.  There may theoretically be some
point or threshold at which social protection undermines the operation
of the market, but the argument has no empirical foundation.  As a
general proposition, richer countries spend more on social welfare
than poorer countries – but they have more to spend.  If the comparison
is confined, more relevantly, to developed economies, then countries
with higher taxation or greater public sector expenditure do not have
more or less successful economies than others.110 The figures can be
confirmed from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) website.111 Because of economic fluctuations,
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it is possible to use the evidence selectively to suggest that some
countries with greater or lesser welfare expenditure are suffering adverse
consequences, but the truth is that the figures are too diverse to support
any firm conclusions.  The level of expenditure on social protection is
not visibly relevant to the success or failure of an economy.
The social conditions for freedom
The operation of the market should not be seen in isolation from the
social circumstances which make it possible.  In the first instance, the
development of both free economies and democracy has depended
on communication and the exchange of information.  This is linked
to civil and political rights, but it has an impact far beyond that, affecting
economic and social interaction.  Second, there has been the extension
of basic education.  Education is important for a range of issues,
including the operation of the extended political community, the
functioning of the economy, and the maintenance of communication
in contemporary society.  In theory, it is possible for these factors to
be achieved adequately in a society where education is partial or
intermittent, but the general experience of most countries is that
progressive improvement in education and investment in human capital
are requisites for development.  Third, the establishment of economic
security, including security in housing, health care and social protection,
provides a necessary foundation for free action.
The main problem here, as elsewhere, is what happens to the minority
who are not included in development.  Poverty is once again a principal
source of exclusion, although in the terms considered here – including
communication and access to education – it is not the only issue:
people can also be excluded from participation by disability and
difference.
The conditions of a free society
In attempting to establish the conditions of liberty, I have emphasised
a cluster of inter-related issues and principles.  None of them, taken
separately, is sufficient to guarantee liberty.  None of them, if denied, is
enough to prevent a society from being free.  (Even in the liberal
democracies of the West, there are occasions when the rule of law is
suspended, when people are subject to arbitrary arrest, and when the
press is censored or barred from action.  I write at a time when the
executive of the US, with the complicity of other western governments,
has suspended civil r ights, the jurisdiction of the courts and
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international law in respect of people accused of engaging in armed
conflict with them.) If these elements are neither necessary nor
sufficient for freedom, I cannot be sure that I am right to emphasise
their importance.  But it does seem to be true that a society which has
all these conditions is likely to be free; that a society which is denied
them all is not free; and that a society in which some of them are
threatened or restricted is at risk of losing its freedoms.
There are several ways to interpret the association of freedom with
these principles.  The first is that the conditions are indeed necessary,
in the same way as certain biological conditions are necessary to life:
their necessity only becomes apparent when one of them is denied, at
which point the whole system starts to crumble.  Some tyrannical
governments have begun by denying or eroding rights, like the Nazis
in the 1930s; the loss of one liberty is often a precursor to the loss of
others.  It is tempting to think there is a slippery slope, but it is not
borne out by the experience of other countries: there have been many
cases – like the suppression of native peoples, the sterilisation of women
with learning disabilities in Northern Europe, or the treatment of
prisoners – which have been unhappy, contradictory patterns in the
gradual development and growth of liberal democracy.
A second interpretation, prompted by the disturbing elements of
that history, is that the apparent linkage between the conditions of
freedom is illusory: we only see these issues as evidence of ‘freedom’
because we prefer to think we have a free society, and use them as a
cover while ignoring abuses of the rights of minorities (like minority
ethnic groups, people with disabilities and non-citizens).  There is a
case to answer here.  I have recently been engaged in research on the
circumstances of minority ethnic groups in rural Scotland; the people
I have been speaking to are routinely abused and threatened as they
pass in the street.112 There is much in the current pattern of western
society which speaks of complacency and wilful blindness.  At the
same time, I think the argument goes too far; the experience of such
minorities is precisely confined to minorities, and confined only to
part of their experience, when there have been many times and regimes
where oppression has been the experience of every person.
This prompts a third interpretation: that, despite the contradictions,
we have been moving towards a free society.  Awareness of the denial
of freedom, and the strength of reaction to that denial, is evidence not
of deterioration in standards but of gradual improvement.  Issues like
civil rights and freedom of the press are crucial, not because they
guarantee freedoms in themselves, but because they make it possible
to challenge practices which are in breach of principles.  They are
Towards a free society
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vital channels through which concerns about freedom can be expressed,
and claims can be made to protect people who are denied rights and
respect available to others.
Freedom and the welfare state
There is a widespread view, on the political right, that there is a
contradiction between freedom and the welfare state.113 Provision by
the state seems to imply, in some sense, a restriction on freedom.
Part of the problem here lies in the idea of the ‘state’.  The state is
closely identified with the organs of government.  It reflects deliberate
action by formal institutions to intervene in society.  The liberal
prejudice against intervention is a valuable safeguard, but it is a prejudice,
and as such it is defensible; state intervention is sometimes justified.
Social welfare provision, however, is not necessarily the product of
state action, and the formal institutions may depend substantially on
the voluntary actions of people in society.  Social welfare provision in
the UK developed in large part from the influence of the Poor Law
and the growth of the mechanisms of government.  Eventually these
came to supplant the role of other bodies in areas like health (where
voluntary hospitals were taken over by the National Health Service)
and social security (where the role of the friendly societies withered
after the introduction of National Insurance).  The literature on social
welfare has been distorted by the experience of England and the
countries most directly influenced by it – although the US did not
have the English Poor Law, it was still understood in those terms.114
The English experience is not, however, typical of all countries.  In
much of continental Europe, social welfare provision developed through
a combination of mutual, voluntary and charitable effort.  Governments
built on or complemented the process of development.  In The welfare
state, I argued that the development of social welfare follows certain
general patterns of social development, and that intervention by the
state usually features only as a later part of the process.115 If that is
right, the welfare state is largely doing what people in other
circumstances would try to do for themselves.
The economic literature on welfare provision tends to assume that
preferences are formed and expressed individually.  In those
circumstances, the collective imposition of choices is nearly always
inferior to the aggregation of differentiated individual choice – ‘inferior’
in the sense that it implies lower utilities for participants in aggregate.116
This begs important assumptions, however, about the nature of the
activity which is being undertaken.  In the first place, the actions
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which people take are not necessarily a reflection of individual
preference.  The terms of employment are commonly set either by
employers or by conventional agreements between employers, unions
and government.  There may be no alternatives.  Second, the terms on
which social protection operates are often conventional.  Money is
not necessarily saved in funds: many arrangements work on a ‘pay as
you go’ basis, where current contributions pay for current benefits.
Third, money that is being used for the purchase of  social protection
is not necessarily going to be available for use by individuals if it is not
spent that way.  Salaries and wages are set by social convention, not by
the intrinsic value of labour.  Those conventions include social insurance
contributions, which are part of the cost of employment.  In effect,
neither ‘voluntary’ nor ‘compulsory’ schemes for social protection may
be what they seem.
There are certainly elements of compulsion, but one has to ask
what the purpose of such compulsion is.  In countries which developed
voluntary systems,117 the people who were included in such systems
were those who could afford it.  Inclusion in mutualist schemes mainly
begins, not with working-class movements, but with people in secure,
stable, often middle-class occupations.  The effect of compulsion is to
push for inclusion at the margins, extending provision to people in
lower-paid occupations.  The element of compulsion is primarily
experienced, in that context, by employers rather than employees: the
effect is to require such employers to incorporate employees who
otherwise would not be party to systems of social protection.
An example:  public health
On the face of the matter, public health is mainly a matter of welfare.  It
leads to restrictions in the activities of individuals, either by preventing
them from doing unhealthy things (like eating infected food) or by requiring
them to receive medication (like the fluoridisation of water supplies to
avoid dental caries).  As such, public health medicine may come into conflict
with liberty.
This can be represented as a dispute between liberals and paternalists,
but there are other dimensions to the argument.  The Victorians who
developed the core principles of public health were not simply concerned
to overrule individual freedom.  An example is the dispute about the
introduction of sewers.  Sewers were intended to reduce disease.  The
arguments of the 1840s and 1850s were based on a flawed understanding
of the connection with disease – Edwin Chadwick, who was instrumental
in the establishment of compulsory sewerage, was convinced that disease
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was spread through ‘miasma’ or smells – but that does not detract from
the central principles.118 The introduction of sewers was opposed by
ratepayers who might be required to pay for the system; it was supported
by people who wanted improved public health.  In a masterstroke of
propaganda, the opponents were called the ‘dirty party’, while the
supporters were the ‘clean party’.  The ‘dirty party’ were, of course,
individualists and liberals, who held they had no responsibility and that the
provision of sewerage should be a matter of individual choice.  Were the
‘clean party’ interfering with liberty? That is a conclusion which many people
of a liberal disposition would be reluctant to draw, because no one nowadays
seriously wants to argue for squalor, and the argument for cleanliness would
put them in the same camp as the paternalists.
Three defences against the charge of illiberalism can be made for the
‘clean party’.  The first is that certain things threaten liberty.  The lack of
sanitation in the cities meant that disease, and cholera in particular,
shortened many lives, and jeopardised the safety of the well-to-do as well
as that of the poor.  The second argument is that the spread of disease
happens because of the actions of other people, and that regulation of
people’s conduct protects everyone from the consequences of other
people’s actions.  The third argument is an argument from democracy.
Government is not necessarily a coercive force, but a method of operation
that allows people to do together what they cannot do individually.  The
debate which took place about the introduction of sewers does not mean
that people were being forced to accept a policy against their will, although
some may have been.  It is also an indication that the policy went through
a legitimate process of decision making, and was accepted on that basis.
The ‘clean party’ happened to be arguing for something that more electors
wanted.  (It could also be argued that a liberty which required people to
live like beasts is not a liberty worth having,119 but that is a different kind
of argument.)
This argument is also, at root, dependent on the distinction between
individual and social understandings of liberty.  If freedom is about the
actions of individuals, then individuals cannot be forced to pay for services
they do not want, even if those services are as essential as public sanitation.
This is the consequence of the position argued by libertarians like Nozick,
who rejects the idea of public service funded through taxation as an
infringement of people’s rights.120 If, on the other hand, freedom is about
balancing the actions of people in society in order to make the most of
everyone’s opportunities and choices, the objection to sewers seems
fatuous, and makes no more sense than an argument to abolish the police
force.
This historical dispute helps to establish the principles which apply to a
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series of contemporary arguments about public health.  The social principles
behind public health have become unfashionable, and in many contemporary
debates liberal individualism has come to dominate.  The idea that people
should pay for water and sewerage services, abandoned in Victorian times,
has come again, and non-payers in England and Wales can have water supplies
suspended, despite the attendant risks to their own and other people’s
health.  Vaccinating people against epidemics depends on the coverage of a
high proportion of the population to be truly effective; herd immunity,
where the spread of a disease is halted, depends on the virulence of the
disease and the effectiveness of the vaccine, but it typically calls for
something in the region of 90% of the population to be vaccinated.  The
principle of dealing with collective problems has been eroded through
concern about individual risks.  The defence of public health has had to be
made in terms of the relative risks to the people who are vaccinated, not
in terms of the benefit to the population as a whole.
Smoking offers a strong contemporary example.  There is a direct
argument based in welfare for banning smoking, and for restricting
dangerous activities.  Crudely put, the negative effects on welfare of certain
activities, like smoking, so far outweigh any conceivable benefit that on any
welfare consideration the activity ought to be stopped.  Smoking is the
biggest killer in the UK, dwarfing every other identifiable factor causing
death and disability.  It is probably responsible for about 120,000 deaths a
year.121 This is the primary objection to smoking, and it is not an argument
based on liberty.
There are three main arguments from individual freedom which might
be used to object to smoking, although none of them is as strong as the
argument from welfare.  The first is that death and disability tend to get in
the way of personal freedom, and smoking has a huge effect on both.  The
second is that smoking undermines mental capacity, inducing dependency
and accelerating dementia.  The third argument is that smoking affects
other people, because of the anti-social effect of pollution and irritants,
the danger from fires (a third are caused by smoking) and the health effects
of passive smoking.  Passive smoking seems to have been given more
credence in public policy than the others.
The core of the difference, however, rests in individual and social views
of freedom.  If the individual is sovereign, then individuals should be free to
undertake activities which can make them ill.  People are usually allowed
to do quite dangerous things.  The sovereignty of the individual implies that
if people are aware of a risk, if that risk is socially accepted, and people
choose to take it nevertheless, then that is their right.
The social argument on risk is different.  A risk for an individual is not
the same as a ‘risk’ for a society.  When we say that people accept a risk
Towards a free society
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through smoking, we are not basing the calculation on an estimate of
probability, like the toss of a coin, but on observed proportions.  We are
saying that a sizeable proportion of people who smoke – about a third –
will be killed by it.  We do not know who will be in that third, but we do
know roughly what the numbers will be.  In a social model, disability and
death are social responsibilities.  The ill health which smoking imposes
puts a burden on other people.  Wherever risks are pooled, through public,
mutual or private insurance, people’s actions affect others.  Wherever
provision is made for individuals who are sick or disabled, smokers are a
substantial proportion of those who take advantage of it.  As one of the
principal causes of disability in the UK, smoking imposes major costs on
everyone else.  Smoking is linked, not just with death and terminal illnesses,
but with respiratory conditions, circulatory disorders, stroke, dementia
and amputations.  This may be acceptable in a theoretical world where
every person is an island.  In the real world, there is some room for doubt.
Social welfare and liberty
If social welfare provision is designed to protect the liberty of each
person, it has to do three things.  First, systems of welfare have to
ensure that the liberty of the person is not endangered by lack of
welfare.  Poverty, illness, disability and homelessness threaten freedom
as well as well-being.  The institution of social protection is essential
to protect people from coercion, to make it possible for them to act,
and to preserve their autonomy.
Second, social welfare has to avoid restricting liberty.  The potential
that provision has to restrict liberty is not so much to do with taxation
or state coercion, which have been the focus of much of the criticism
of welfare by liberal opponents, as in the restriction of action in everyday
life.  Because the provision of welfare is often concerned with the
intimate details of personal action, including such issues as physical
dependency, personal care and household management, it has the
potential to dominate choices and patterns of life.  The argument for
empowerment – an alteration of the balance – is central to the liberty
of the people affected.
Third, beyond this, welfare provision has to promote and develop
the capacity of each person to act.  It is not good enough to avoid
interfering: that is not an option in many of the cases I have considered.
Non-intervention is an acceptance of unfreedom.  Welfare systems
have, rather, to have a developmental function, intended to ensure that
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each person has the capacity and power to act, which is essential to
freedom.
Overall, however, social welfare is enabling rather than limiting.  The
general tenor of the arguments up to this point suggests that there is
no conflict between freedom and social protection.  On the contrary,
they are directly complementary.  Social welfare is necessary to enjoy
freedom, and freedom is necessary to enjoy well-being.









The meaning of equality
Social inequality is about disadvantage.  People are unequal when one
has an advantage over another.  Advantage and disadvantage are social
relationships.  People are not said to be disadvantaged because they
are worse off, or in a less desirable state than others,122 but because
their social relationships make them worse off.  For example, if one
person has cancer and another does not, that is not inequality; it is a
difference in need.  The very extensive literature on ‘inequalities in
health’ is not about the fact that some people are healthy while others
are not: it is rather concerned with the relationship between ill health,
material circumstances and social relationships, including poverty and
social class.123 People on lower incomes, and in lower social classes,
are more likely to contract cancer.  That is an inequality: disadvantage
in social relationships leads to poor health.  Despite the fact that people
in lower classes are more likely to contract cancer, they are less likely
to receive the necessary treatment.  This is another example of inequality.
It has been called the ‘inverse care law’: the care that poorer people
receive is inversely related to their needs.124 The principle of equality
in health does not mean that everyone should suffer the same pain, or
die at the same age; it means that the differences in people’s
circumstances should not be attributable to social disadvantage.  Equality
means the removal of disadvantage.
It is unusual, in theoretical writing, to begin directly with a defining
statement.  Definitions have to be drawn out of the way that people
use words, and insisting on a definition from high runs the risk of
being arbitrary.  Unfortunately, so much drivel is written about equality
that it has become difficult to talk about the topic without being
misinterpreted, and beginning with a clear statement should help to
set things straight.  Being equal does not mean that people should be
the same.  Equality between the sexes does not mean that men and
women become the same; it means that neither is advantaged over the
other.  Equality between races does not mean that everyone should be
of the same race; it means that the disadvantage of races should be
eliminated.  People are not unequal because they are different.  There
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is no immediate social advantage or disadvantage, for example, in having
different colour hair, height or weight – although there are
circumstances when differences could lead to advantage or disadvantage.
Some critics of equality like to pretend that equality means
uniformity.125 This is a straw man, set up to be attacked: it is not
addressed in any way to the arguments that egalitarians actually make.
There is a relationship between equality and sameness, because people
who are equal will be treated in the same way if they are in the same
circumstances.  The rationale for this is consistency: the rule which
applies to one person must also apply to another.  In any decision, any
punishment, or any allocation of resources, people who are equal should
not be given an advantage or disadvantage.  It follows that any departure
from the general rule has to be justified.  Where people are in the
same circumstances, they have to be treated the same.  Where they are
in different circumstances, they might be treated differently, but the
difference has to be relevant to the rule.  Equality before the law
means that judgments are made by relevant factors, like innocence
and guilt, and not by factors which lead to people being advantaged
or disadvantaged, like race or religion.  The characteristic moral position
which prompts a concern for equality is a belief in fairness, coupled
with the view that the differences between people are largely irrelevant
to moral conduct.  ‘Fairness’ is another version of the argument for
consistency.  If people are treated differently without good reason, it is
not fair.
Stated in these terms, the principle of equality commands an
astonishing degree of agreement.  I use the word ‘astonishing’ because
this agreement would not have been true for most of human history.
The idea that people are fundamentally equal was one of the key
revolutionary principles of the 17th and 18th centuries.  The idea was
revolutionary precisely because it opposed the established order.  Feudal
society depended on distinctions of status between people of different
ranks.  Before the English Civil War, most people would simply have
accepted that people were unequal, and that they ought to be so.  By
the time of the French Revolution, that position had become much
more difficult to sustain.  Arguments were still being made in favour
of traditional privileges – like Burke’s case for the aristocracy126 – but
they were losing.  In contemporary society, the principle of equality
has triumphed almost universally.  No one seriously argues nowadays
that there should be different laws for the aristocracy and the clergy.
There are relatively few people in western countries who would argue
that people of different races should not be equal in their political and
civil rights.  The last political system to take racist views seriously, the
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apartheid regime in South Africa, became a pariah state.  That regime
made a formal distinction between the legal status of four main groups
– Whites, Asians, Coloureds and Blacks – who had different statuses
and rights in relation to services like health and education, which
were organised separately for different racial groups.  If you do not
believe in this sort of thing, if you believe that you are as worthy of
consideration as the next person, then you too are an egalitarian.  The
main question is how deep your egalitarianism goes.  People are
selective in the forms of equality they think appropriate.  Many liberals
accept the principle of equality before the law, and most would accept
a principle of equal access to education, but there is considerable
disagreement about issues like the distribution of income.  The
fundamental debate about equality in the 21st century is not whether
people should be equal; it is how far that principle should be applied.
Inequalities
There are many relationships in society in which people might be
said to be disadvantaged, and many different ways of looking at that
disadvantage.  Conventionally, the most important are probably the
inequalities of income and wealth, class, gender and ‘race’.
Income and wealth.  Although there is a great deal of emphasis in the
literature on income distribution, income is not really the central issue
which is addressed.  The main issue that attracts attention is ‘command
over resources’127: people who have a greater command over resources
are better able to acquire the goods and amenities they want or need.
In theory, wealth – the stock of resources – should play a major part of
this; so, too, should other issues like the ability to obtain credit.  In
practice, discussion of income stands for all of these factors.  This is
true partly because the other factors are more difficult to measure, but
also because wealth is often misleading.  Clothes may have no
marketable value, but not having enough clothes has a major impact
on welfare.  Conversely, someone who owns a house does not
necessarily have greater welfare than someone who rents it.  Income
helps to focus on the issues that matter.
Many of the arguments about income tend to centre around what
people can afford to buy.  This is most appropriate for goods like food
or fuel, but money does not have a fixed value, and it does not apply
to everything.  Inequalities of income are also important.  For some
goods at least, what people can buy depends on what the people




also be also true of some other ‘positional goods’128 like education,
where people may be able to buy advantages of status and opportunity
over their neighbours.  Wherever goods are in limited supply, markets
favour demand from those who are able and prepared to commit more
resources than others.  Inequalities in income mean that some people
are favoured, and others are disadvantaged, in the competition for
scarce resources.
Class.  Social class means many things.  The term is used to refer to
people’s relationship to the system of production; to their general
economic position; and more broadly, to identify people’s social status.
Sociologists use the idea of class mainly because of its association with
life chances, and its usefulness as a predictor of outcomes.  Class is
strongly associated with education and health; it is less strongly, but
still clearly, associated with income and housing.
The idea of class has become less prevalent than it was, for two
reasons.  One is the withering away of Marxism, which emphasised
the primacy of class above other forms of inequality.  (Marxists were
often dismissive of issues relating to gender and ‘race’, which were
seen as derivative of the fundamental economic relationships of a
capitalist society.  Engels, for example, wrote:
... the real content of the proletarian demand for equality
is the demand for the abolition of classes.  Any demand for
equality which goes beyond that of necessity passes into
absurdity.129)
The second is the decline of ascribed social status – that is, statuses
attributed to people from birth – and the growth of social mobility.
There is a growing awareness of risk and uncertainty in people’s lives:
studies of the dynamics of poverty show, not that a defined class of
people are likely to be poor, but that most people are vulnerable to
poverty at different points in their lives.130
Gender.  Like class, gender clearly has a major role in determining life
chances.  Unlike class, gender is overwhelmingly ascribed, and men
and women are liable to have their roles set regardless of their capabilities
or wishes.  There are many different objections to the inequalities
which result.  Some are individualist: the central argument of ‘liberal
feminists’ is that women should not be disadvantaged when they have
capabilities and capacities as good as a man’s.  Some are collectivist:
the argument is often made that women as a group should not be in a
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position that is different from men as a group.  Some deny difference,
arguing that women and men are largely capable of the same things;
others assert difference, arguing that women and men have distinctive
abilities or characteristics which call for equal value.
Although some of the production of inequality can be attributed to
discrimination and differential treatment, much of the disadvantage
experienced by women arises from the operation of social norms and
the structures of education and employment.  Despite legislation against
discrimination, there are marked differentials between incomes and
still a high degree of segregation between male and female occupations.
Radical feminists have argued that society is ‘patriarchal’, reflecting
the power of men over women.131
There are differences between males and females which reflect their
physical differences.  Women, for example, live longer, and tend to
have higher rates of disability.  They are more often subject to surgical
intervention.  It is difficult to pick this apart from their social
circumstances, because social relationships and physical differences
interact.  The test of equality is not that differences should be ignored,
but that they should not lead to disadvantage.  On that basis, gender
has become one of the principal considerations in discussions of
equality.
‘Race’.  ‘Race’ is an artificial concept.  There are sometimes physical
differences between people with different culture and descent, but the
social differentiation between groups is not clearly based in those
differences.  Religion, language and identity are at least as important.
Historically, many of the structures of disadvantage in different societies
have been based on ethnic origin, and that continues to be true in
most developed societies.  It is not necessarily true that the same groups
are always most disadvantaged: the status of (for example) immigrant
Jamaicans, Indians or Koreans depends on their social context in the
society they have moved to.  Minority ethnic groups are diverse, and
few generalisations apply consistently across all of them.
Like gender, racial inequality is based both in overt discrimination
and in structures which promote disadvantage.  ‘Racism’ has been
argued to exist not only in the expression of prejudice and biased
treatment, but in the systematic production of disadvantage through
the operation of systems weighted against different racial groups.
Disadvantage in employment is related not only to discrimination,
and to the importance of social networks, but to geographical location,
educational opportunity and previous employment record.




some racial groups, and to systems of finance, but the allocation of
housing services according to residence and previous tenure.  Inequality
results from a combination of cumulative disadvantages.
These are not the only kinds of inequality.  Part of the shift of
perspective in the political left since the decline of Marxism has been
a recognition of the importance of diversity and difference.  People
can be disadvantaged for other reasons, like age, nationality, disability
and sexuality.  The identification of such groups has been an important
part of political discourse: if identity creates injustice, it is probably
also true that injustice creates a sense of identity.
Explanations for inequality
Inequalities are pervasive, and that makes it difficult to offer any generic
explanation for the production of disadvantage.  In broad terms,
however, there are three main classes of explanation for inequality.
The first set of explanations is pathological: they attribute advantage
and disadvantage to the characteristics and abilities of the people or
groups who are in those positions.  Some people are richer and more
favoured because they are more competent or have talents which are
socially prized; those who sink are less competent or less talented.
Examples of this kind of explanation might include The bell curve,132
which attributes racial inequality to differentials in intelligence, or
Losing ground,133 which attributes long-term poverty to the choices
made by poor people.
The second class of explanations is structural.  Society is based in a
complex series of relationships, and positions of advantage and
disadvantage are part of those relationships.  Charvet argues that there
is a necessary differentiation of roles and relationships in any complex
society, and that statuses, which are positions of social honour and
esteem, derive from those roles and relationships.134 Marxists argue
that statuses are contingent on economic position, or class, and so the
structure of inequality reflects the structure of economic power.
There is, however, a difference in structural explanations between
those which attribute inequality to the pattern of social relationship
and those which emphasise human conduct or choices, or ‘agency’.
The third class of explanation is based in the idea of power: disadvantage
is produced because of deliberate choices and actions.  Power is a
complex concept, and Lukes distinguishes three different
understandings of its operation.135  The first is power as ‘the production
of intended effects’, where those who have power are able directly to
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alter outcomes in their own favour.  The second is the area of ‘non-
decision’, where certain options are kept off the agenda or not properly
considered because an inegalitarian status quo is accepted.  A third
understanding sees power as the exercise of ‘hegemony’, where
decisions are made in favour of those with power because there is no
visible alternative.  Lukes gives the illustration of a sail boat, which
clears out of the way of a supertanker even if it has notional right of
way: the crew on the tanker may not even notice.  Examples are the
acceptance of established property rights or the current distribution
of opportunities and rewards.  The main weakness of explaining these
issues in terms of agency is that, once a system is established, there is
no need to refer to power to explain why it continues.  If people enter
a competition on unequal terms, it should not be surprising that the
competition yields unequal results.
None of these explanations is exclusive; it is possible for all of them
to apply simultaneously.  If a person loses a race, the pathological
explanation is that he ran too slowly.  The agency explanation is that
the race was rigged.  The structural explanation is that in any race,
someone is going to come last; we need to ask whether this is the
appropriate way to organise relationships of status or the distribution
of resources.
Arguments for inequality
To be legitimate, remedying disadvantage depends on the assumption
both that the disadvantage is illegitimate, and that action to alter it is
permissible.  Both these propositions have been disputed by critics of
egalitarianism.  Arguments that disadvantage is legitimate are found in
a range of writings, and it is difficult to summarise them all effectively.
The principal arguments are that:
• disadvantage is legitimate because it is intrinsic to society;
• disadvantage is legitimate because it is produced by legitimate
processes;
• disadvantage is legitimate because the results of inequality are
beneficial to society.
There is one other argument that we can dismiss immediately: that
disadvantage is legitimate because it is natural.  This argument is made,
for example, by racists who argue that some races are intrinsically
inferior to others (for example, Gobineau)136 or by those who argue
that social differences reflect differences in aptitude, talent and




relies on a common mistake in ethical thinking, ‘the naturalistic fallacy’.
The way things are is not necessarily the way they ought to be, and it
is never possible to derive legitimate rules of moral conduct simply
from establishing that something is that way in nature.  People in
nature are animals, and if the things that animals did were all legitimate,
it would be right to kill, to steal, to intimidate, or to live by the use of
force.  Morality is, in large part, intended to stop people doing what
comes naturally.
Disadvantage is legitimate because it is intrinsic to society
People in society are not ‘individuals’, surprised whenever they bump
into another human being.  They live in society; they live by moral
codes, and common understandings.  The conservative objection to
equality has always been that this is simply not the way things are.
Fitzjames Stephen’s argument against equality, and particularly against
equality for women, was in these terms:
I think it is unsound in every respect.  I think that it rests
upon an unsound view of history, an unsound view of
morals, and a grossly distorted view of facts, and I believe
that its practical application would be as injurious as it is
false.137
Beyond this, people have roles, relationships and statuses.  Charvet’s
argument, mentioned above, implies that because roles in any complex
society have to be differentiated, the differentiation of status has to
follow.138 Wherever status is differentiated, there is inequality.  Inequality
is part, then, of what a society is.
The strongest argument that disadvantage is intrinsic to society is
based in ‘communitarianism’, which identifies moral relationships not
in terms of general rules but of specific social relationships.  We are all
born into networks of social relationships: children have responsibilities
to parents, and parents to children.  MacIntyre argues:
... we all approach our own circumstances as bearers of a
particular social identity.  I am someone’s son or daughter,
someone else’s cousin or uncle; I am a citizen of this or
that city, a member of this or that guild or profession; I
belong to this clan, that tribe, this nation.  Hence what is
good for me has to be the good for one who inhabits these
roles.139
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Moral responsibilities depend on specific relationships.  Most are held,
not to humanity in general, but to particular people.  If people have
different rights and responsibilities, the central argument for equality
falls; there are very few general rules to apply.  The argument has been
well put by Jean Marie Le Pen, the long-time leader of the French
National Front.  Even if aspects of Le Pen’s views are abhorrent – it is
debatable whether his pronouncements can be dealt with in good
faith – his arguments are not negligible, and in 2001 he came second
in the French presidential election on the strength of them.  Le Pen
draws on a moral scheme which is based on moral difference, not
equal worth.  In Le Pen’s view, the duties we owe to different people
are different.
I like my daughters more than my cousins, my cousins
more than my neighbours, my neighbours better than those
I don’t know and those I don’t know better than my
enemies.  Consequently I like the French better.  I like the
Europeans next, and then I like westerners, and then I like
those countries in the world which are allies and those
which like France.140
Le Pen’s argument is persuasive to many in France because it does
reflect the moral feelings and relationships which define a society.  If
this position is followed through consistently, then it is legitimate to
offer preference to people who are close to oneself.  One example is
nepotism, or favouring relatives and close friends in appointments.
Another is preference for the ‘old school tie’, one of the systems by
which privilege has been maintained in class-ridden societies like
England’s.
The argument for equality is an argument for rejecting the outcomes
of these relationships.  The way things are is not necessarily the way
they ought to be.  It is possible to accept some of the general principles
– for example, that people have stronger duties to their family than to
others – while accepting at the same time that there should be general
rules and rights.
Disadvantage is legitimate because it is produced by legitimate
processes
This argument is made by Nozick, who argues that if inequality is
produced by legitimate processes there is no basis on which to alter




equality, simply fails to address the opposition; of course there is no
reason to change the subsequent distribution if one is prepared to
dismiss in advance all the moral arguments to the contrary.  If there
are legitimate reasons to change the distribution – for example, that
people should not be left to starve – then there are reasons to think
that equality, too, might be legitimate.
There is the core here of arguments both for and against inequality.
The argument for inequality is that some legitimate processes will
lead to it.  Henry Ford once claimed that all good millionaires go to
heaven: if you have exchanged goods so that large numbers of people
obtain something they want to have, as Ford did, you can reasonably
claim to have added to the sum of human happiness.  Nozick gives
the related example of a popular sportsman who is paid small amounts
of money by lots of people, and who becomes rich on the strength of
it.  This is true, but incomplete.  Money is not an absolute good; it
derives its meaning from social conventions.  Those conventions are
based on many factors, including understandings of the value and
meaning of money, experience, and liability to taxation.  Issues which
are determined through social conventions can legitimately be altered
through them.
Even if Nozick’s argument is accepted, it does not follow that, because
some inequalities are legitimate, that all are, or even that most are.
Much of the distribution of resources depends on a range of factors,
including historical accident and past injustice.  Nozick is prepared to
accept that in cases where the initial distribution is not legitimate,
there should be some redress for historic grievances: it is difficult to
envisage any part of the present distribution of resources in society
which is not affected by such a provision.
Disadvantage is legitimate because the results of inequality are
beneficial to society
There is a commonly held position which argues that either a market
needs inequality – that is, inequality of rewards is required for the
operation of a market – or inequality is a necessary consequence of
the arrangements through which markets operate.  For this purpose
the arguments have the same implication: if we accept production and
distribution through the economic market, we must accept inequality.
This position is advocated most obviously by the supporters of the
free market, but it is also acknowledged by John Rawls in his book A
theory of justice.142 Rawls proposes that inequality can be justified if
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the effect of that inequality is to make everyone better off.  He calls
this the ‘difference principle’.
The first of the arguments for this position is that inequality of
rewards is required for the operation of the market.  This is closely
related to the libertarian argument for advancement on merit.  Society,
and economic development in particular, depends on the system of
rewards and punishments.  Financial rewards, the argument runs, reflect
the importance of different items to society, and the marketing of
goods and services ensures that essential functions are performed.  The
process by which inequality makes people better off is by providing
people with a system of incentives – rewards and punishments for
doing better or worse.  The argument, like many others in this area, is
half right.  It is true that the market is essential to the division of
labour in society, and that goods have to be priced.  It is simply not
true, however, that financial rewards in society are based on merit, or
even that they reflect merit approximately, because they are based in
other things (such as the supply and demand for labour).  The operation
of an economic market is not based on moral judgments.  In a developed
society, most people are not producing things with a recognised value.
The value of what they do is determined by convention, by the
numbers of other people who are available to do the task, and by the
willingness of people to pay.  They are part of a complex system of
production and exchange.
The second argument, that market processes produce inequality as a
by-product, is a strong one: some of the processes were considered in
the previous section.  Production for personal reward is a proven
method of achieving economic development.  No less important,
alternative methods of organising production and exchange have failed.
The idea that inequality has to be accepted as a concomitant of market
production leaves it open, however, for the level of inequality to be
moderated.  The extent to which distributions can be altered depends
on the responsiveness (or ‘elasticity’) of producers to changes in their
financial situation.  Despite high taxation and limits on the range of
income, senior managers in Scandinavian economies have not been
self-evidently less productive than their contemporaries in other
countries (like the UK) with lower taxation and greater personal
rewards.
A third set of arguments suggests that inequalities are beneficial (or
‘functional’) for society.  The effect of inequality is to create a ladder
of aspiration and achievement, to ensure that the strong rise and the
weak fall.  Herbert Spencer, the principal advocate of ‘Social




well and poor people did badly: if that were not true, he believed,
people would choose to be poor and idle, with disastrous consequences
for society.
The poverty of the incapable, the distresses that came upon
the imprudent, the starvation of the idle, and those
shoulderings aside of the weak by the strong, which leave
so many ‘in shallows and in miseries,’ are the decrees of a
large, far-seeing benevolence.143
One problem with this argument is that poverty and wealth seem to
have very little to do with individual effort.  The main circumstances
in which people in the UK are on low incomes, disregarding children
who have to suffer for the situation of their parents, are long-term
illness, old age, unemployment and divorce.  The structure of inequality
prevents the system of rewards and punishments from functioning: if
people cannot get access to opportunities, they cannot respond to
incentives.  Inequality also has important negative consequences:
poverty exposes many people who are not poor to risk.  This is one of
the core objections to Rawls’ position: it ignores issues of social class,144
and the problems of exclusion associated with inequality.
Lastly, it is argued that inequality has good effects.  Inequality is a
good thing, some inegalitarians argue, because privilege is good.  De
Jouvenel, for example, argues that if there were no superbly rich people,
there would be no patrons of the arts.145 Objectors to land reform in
Scotland have been arguing that very rich people are especially good
at maintaining and preserving the countryside: Mohammed al-Fayed,
the owner of Harrods, has written of his careful husbandry of his
Scottish fisheries.  It has to be true that people with money can do
some good, as it has to be true that people with money can do some
harm.  That does not seem a very persuasive reason for the maintenance
of disadvantage.
Equality of what?
One frequent criticism of egalitarian views is that people are asking to
be equal in areas where they cannot be equal.  People are not equal in
their physical or intellectual attributes, the argument runs, so why
should they expect to be equal in their status or income? If the question
boils down to the suggestion that people are not the same, it misses
the point of the debate.  If it means that inequality is right and proper,
and that some kinds of people should be treated better than others,
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then we might reasonably disagree.  You could finish the question just
as easily with the suggestion that people should not expect to be
equal before the law, and the problem with the form of the statement
becomes obvious.
There is, though, a real issue here.  Why should we care more about
equality of some kinds than we do about others? Why should equality
before the law be more generally accepted than equality of income?
Why does racial disadvantage command so much more attention than
disadvantage in housing? One possible explanation is that some forms
of equality are more important than others, but this is debatable.  ‘Race’
is profoundly important, and for many people its influence is pervasive,
but the same can be said for housing provision.  Important as the law
is, not many people really think that access to the law is more
fundamental to life than access to water.  The central reason for the
difference in priority is that egalitarian arguments are based in
principles, and some issues (like legal process or ‘race’) exemplify those
principles more directly than others.
Equality of persons
The first of these principles is equality of persons.  The US Declaration
of Independence states:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.
The first part of this, that ‘all men are created equal’, has a powerful
resonance.  The starting point is that there are no intrinsic differences
between human beings which justify disadvantage.  That form of
expression is crucial to understanding many egalitarian arguments.
The central argument for equality is the argument, not that there are
no differences between people, but that differences in circumstances
have to be justified.  If they cannot be justified, the society is not
legitimate.
In terms of several of the inequalities I outlined earlier – the
inequalities of class, gender and ‘race’ – equality of persons is
fundamental.  The widespread acceptance of the principle is also the
reason why racial and gender equality are considered central to many
of the debates about equality.  It is questionable whether the founding




of the statement that all men are created equal in terms that they were
to be applied by subsequent generations – in particular, the rights of
women, and the call for racial equality.  Martin Luther King’s most
famous speech refers directly to the principle:
I have a dream that one day this nation will rise up and live
out the true meaning of its creed: ‘We hold these truths to
be self-evident that all men are created equal’. I have a
dream that my four children will one day live in a nation
where they will not be judged by the colour of their skin
but by the content of their character.
This is in an immediate line of descent from the Declaration of
Independence, and it seems impossible to argue that, if everyone is
equal, the statement should not be applied to people of different races.
The idea of equality of persons goes beyond the simple principle
that disadvantage is unjustified.  The disadvantage of people with
disabilities, for example, can be held to reflect judgments about their
relative capacities, and there are circumstances in which differences in
capacity may be a relevant ground for discrimination.  The principle
of equality of persons needs, in such cases, to be interpreted more
broadly.  Kant argued that we should
... always treat humanity ...  never simply as a means, but
always at the same time as an end.146
Nagel suggests that Kant’s principle is implicitly egalitarian,147 which
I think has to be right.  If a principle is universal, it has to be both
general and consistent, and the demand for consistency creates the
presumption of equality.  Equality of persons can be taken to mean,
not just that people should not be disadvantaged, but that people have
to treat others with basic respect.
This principle is sometimes referred to as ‘respect for persons’.148
The statement that people must be respected is not a statement about
those people, but rather a moral injunction which affects the way in
which other people should behave towards them.  Consider this
forthright statement on racism from the Commissioner of the
Metropolitan Police:
If you do not believe in the fundamental right of all people
to be treated with respect, dignity and compassion then I
do not want to share my service with you.  You should not
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try to join.  If you are a serving police officer or staff member
and cannot claim such a belief as your own you should get
out of the Met now.149
This position is profoundly egalitarian.  In another epoch, it would
have seemed deeply radical.  It is also eminently defensible.
Equality of rights
The Declaration of Independence goes on to the idea of rights.  Rights
are rules which govern the behaviour of other people towards the
person who holds them.  The idea that equality is based in rights is
found, for example, in the work of Joseph Raz, who suggests that
egalitarian statements take the form either that ‘all Fs are entitled to G’
or that ‘being or not being an F is irrelevant to one’s entitlement to
G’.150 The common element here is the issue of entitlement.  (Raz
claims, by the way, to be discussing the idea of equality in western
culture.  He is not; this is only a small part of it.)
There is a wide range of rules of this sort, and the rules are not the
same for everyone.  One core distinction lies between general and
particular rights.  General rights apply to everyone – to every human
being, to every person in a country, to every citizen, to everyone in a
specific category (like older people or children).  Most general rights
begin from a presumption of equality, because the principle of
consistency applies.  Particular rights, by contrast, are those which are
held only by certain identified people.  Rights to property, contractual
rights and occupational pensions are particular rather than general:
they are individual, specific and dependent on circumstances.  There
is no presumption of equality in these rights, because there is no
presumption of general application.  However, the equal application
of rules, even where the substantive content is different, is fundamental
to their operation: an emphasis on rights is the reason why equality
before the law is considered a core value, when equal access to water
is not.
Rights which apply to everyone are usually referred to as ‘human’
rights, and sometimes as ‘natural’ rights.  The rights claimed in the
Declaration of Independence, of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness,
are often thought of as human rights (not just the rights available to
citizens of the USA).  It could be contested whether there are any
human rights – moral rules like respect, mutual responsibility or duties
of care do not have to be seen as adhering to the person who they




should be seen as general human rights, expressed in such documents
as the International Declaration of Human Rights, the European
Convention of Human Rights, the Declaration on the Rights of the
Child, and so forth.
The list of rights which might be included in these terms is often
contentious.  Rights to life, liberty and due process of law are widely
accepted.  If there are such rights, Hart suggests, liberty is probably the
strongest contender.151 Less accepted are such rights as ‘the economic,
social and cultural rights indispensable for (the person’s) dignity and
the free development of his personality’, enshrined in Article 22 of
the United Nations (UN) Declaration of Human Rights.  There are
two main points at which the argument might be thought to be
vulnerable to objection.  The first question is whether people have
rights to welfare of the kind stated in the UN Declaration.  Rights
govern the conduct of other people, and the statement that a person
has rights implies that there is something about all our conduct which
should be different.  That position is disputed by many critics.  Some,
like Bentham, are simply dismissive of the idea of rights beyond the
scope of legally enforceable obligations:
... reasons for wishing there were such things as rights, are
not rights; a reason for wishing that a certain right were
established, is not that right – want is not supply – hunger
is not bread.152
Others, like Nozick, would accept the idea of rights, but do not extend
the principle beyond a conventional scope.153 He argues that people
have rights to property but not to welfare.  That position seems arbitrary.
Christman writes:
Consider the selectivity with which libertarians choose
the rights and duties they think are basic: there are rights
against fraud, but not against being lied to generally; duties
to honour contracts, but not duties to keep promises
generally; there is no right to mutual aid, but there are
(presumably) duties not to abandon one’s children....  Access
to certain resources, such as food, housing and medical
care, (is) as central to living an autonomous and fully human
life as the right to hold on to one’s riches.154
There is no obvious reason for accepting one kind of human right
and rejecting another which is at least as well founded.
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Equality
The second question is whether such rights can be said to be human
rights.  Cranston objects to the classification of needs as human rights
because, he argues, human rights have to be truly general – universally
applicable, practical and of paramount importance.155 But social and
economic rights are of paramount importance, and they are no less
universal and practical than other rights.  A stronger ground for
objection is the argument that the rights might be general without
being human rights.  Rights are not ‘natural’.  People do not live in a
state of nature; they live in societies.  The basis for welfare in most
societies is a combination of particular rights – rights from employment,
pensions, insurance and family resources – and general rights associated
with citizenship, including social protection provided by the state.
The idea of human rights implies a generality beyond the territorial
boundaries of the state, of the sort taken in international courts dealing
with crimes against humanity.  If there are such obligations, no state
has yet recognised them.
Whatever human rights are, the presumption of equality is built in.
‘Equality’ in this sense is not a human right in itself: it is part of the
formula which says ‘this rule applies to everyone’.  The same principle
applies to other categories of general rights, including the rights of
citizens in particular countries.  Wherever general rights are asserted –
rights which apply to everyone in a category – they apply to everyone
in that category, unless there are specific reasons why they should not
do so.  The ideas of equality and general rights have developed together,
and it is difficult to conceive of one without the other.
An example:  civil partnerships
Reflecting a contemporary debate about the recognition of same-sex
relationships in society, several European governments have developed the
principle of civil partnership registration.  The object of registration is to
extend to same-sex partners the rights and responsibilities which are
otherwise confined to married couples.  Examples of such rights include
rights to pensions, housing and inheritance.  There are serious problems of
disadvantage associated with such relationships, and the principle of equality
of rights has led directly to a demand for equivalent status.  For example,
when one partner in a married couple dies, that person can generally
continue to occupy the matrimonial home.  When a same-sex partner
dies, the effect of inheritance tax, from which married couples are exempt,
may be to require the sale of the home.
Working with colleagues from The Robert Gordon University, I helped
to process the results of the public consultation on civil partnership
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Liberty, equality, fraternity
registration by the Scottish Executive.156 Most of the advocates of the
reform see the issue as a simple matter of equality.  The Royal College of
Nursing, for example, wrote to the public consultation:
The Royal College of Nursing welcomes and supports proposals by
Government that aim to give equality to all people, and, at the same time,
that removes stigma and prejudice, whilst outlawing hatred and
discrimination.  These rights are currently lacking in relation to people
with non-heterosexual orientations and, in particular, in the associated
partnership status and recognition for lesbian and gay people.  To this
end, the proposed legislation for ‘Civil Partnership’ is a significant
contribution towards a fairer and more just society.
Others were not so sure that the issue satisfied the demands of equality.
On the one hand, some advocates of same-sex relationships felt the
proposals did not go far enough:
These proposals are cowardly and feeble.  Anything less than full and
equal access to civil marriage is an insult to all gay men and lesbians in the
UK.
Some opponents, on the other hand, felt that the proposals favoured same-
sex relationships over others:
It elevates homosexual relationships by conferring rights upon
homosexuals denied to long-term, committed, co-dependent home sharers
such as two sisters, two single ladies, daughter and elderly mother, disabled
person and long-term friend/carer etc, all of whom would attract an
additional burden of inheritance tax when one dies.  This is highly
discriminatory.
The Economist argues:
The case for allowing gays to marry begins with equality, pure and simple.
Why should one set of loving, consenting adults be denied a right that
other such adults have and which, if exercised, will do no damage to
anyone else?157
From the perspective of the arguments in this book, that is an interesting
formulation, because it identifies the idea of full marriage with equality and
liberty.  Nothing in law – or human relationships – is ever straightforward.
The UK government has not made marriage available to same-sex partners,
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but a different, analogous arrangement – a situation which in Germany has
already led to anomalies.  In its submission to the English consultation, the
Lesbian and Gay Lawyers Association points to a series of issues, including
the possibility of entering a marriage simultaneously with civil registration,
the problems of people engaged in cross-border travel, and the terms of
dissolution of relationships where evidence of fault is sought.  There are
issues to resolve concerning, for example, deception, domestic violence
and immigration status.158 Several of the features of this list reflect parallel
problems in conventional marriages.  The core problem may not be the
principle of civil partnership, but the dog’s breakfast that passes for family
law in the UK.
Citizenship
Citizenship is understood in two main senses.  The first is based in
rights.  Citizenship has been described as ‘the right to have rights’.159
Citizens are, then, people who are invested with rights, a situation
which can arise either through the acceptance of universal rights, or
because rights are accepted for a defined group of people who are
privileged to hold rights which others do not.  The idea of citizenship
is not intrinsically egalitarian; it becomes so only when citizenship is
inclusive and generally available.  Egalitarian arguments for citizenship
tend to be instrumental.  Citizenship is necessary for people to be able
exercise rights within a society, and it acts as the foundation for other
aspects of rights.  The principles of both equality of persons, and equality
of rights, require advocates of equality to argue for citizenship, because
without it, persons cannot be protected and rights cannot be enforced.
An example might be the circumstances of people with learning
disabilities.160 The denial of rights has included not only tokens like
limitations of the right to vote, but use of drugs to control their
behaviour, admission to institutions without their consent, or
compulsory sterilisation.  The dehumanised conditions have
engendered a long line of scandals in institutions, including cases of
neglect, brutality and degradation.
There are three main arguments for extending citizenship to people
with learning disabilities.  First, there is a presumption of inclusion.  If
citizenship is accorded to all other individuals, there is no reason why
citizenship should not be accorded to people with learning disabilities
on the same basis.  Second, although citizenship may be denied in
some countries on certain grounds, such as competence or moral




excluded without effectively challenging the presumption of inclusion
applied to other groups.  The idea that people might have to
demonstrate their competence before they can leave home, marry or
have sexual relationships is clearly repugnant.  Third, and perhaps most
important, there are reasons why people with learning disabilities need
to have rights, both to protect them against limitations and abuses, and
to offer scope for their personal development.  This is an argument,
not for the reduction or limitation of their potential field of activity,
but for increasing it.  Harris argues:
To regard people as equals is precisely to recognise that
they are not equally able to protect themselves, or further
their own interests or are necessarily the same in any other
sense.  It is because of inequalities that people are in danger
of arbitrary and ill usage, tyranny, exploitation and so on.
To regard people as equals is to take a stand on how they
are to be treated, not to make a remark about their
capacities.161
The ‘right to have rights’ is central to many of the mechanisms by
which vulnerable individuals can be protected within society.
The second meaning of citizenship, Bellamy suggests, is
communitarian, or at least community-based.162 Citizenship defines
membership of a community.  Marshall refers to citizenship as ‘a status
bestowed on those who are full members of a community.  All those
who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties
with which the status is endowed’.163 For Marshall, citizenship was an
essential element in progressive attempts to address the inequalities of
class.  He argued that the welfare state represented a progressive
extension of the ideas of citizenship and the right to welfare to different
constituencies.  The assertion of equal status is essential to claims for
equality.  Rawls, similarly, argues for citizenship as the basis for equality,
fairness and justice.
It is as equal citizens that we are to have fair access to the
fair procedures on which the basic structure relies.  The
idea of equality is, then, of significance in itself at the highest
level: it enters into whether political activity itself is
conceived as a fair system of social cooperation over time
between persons seen as free and equal, or in some other
way ...  citizens are equal at the highest level and in the
most fundamental respects.164
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Citizenship is inevitably exclusive as well as inclusive: any definition
of membership has to distinguish members from non-members.  This
is problematic for egalitarians.  People cannot be equal without
citizenship; but nor can they be equal with it.  Ruth Lister has argued
for a more inclusive use of the idea of  ‘citizenship’ to make a plea for
the rights of disadvantaged groups – effectively extending the material
benefits of citizenship to a wider circle.165 It is not possible to include
everyone in a definition of citizenship, but it is always possible to
include more people than we include at present.  If people are to be
more equal than they are now, the boundaries of citizenship have to
be pushed progressively outwards.  This is vulnerable, however, to the
objection that others will continue to be excluded.  The point will be
returned to in Part Three, in the discussion of fraternity.
Access to the ‘conditions of civilisation’
The demands for equality of persons, equality of rights and the equal
status of citizenship, still fall somewhat short of the concerns of
egalitarians.  Rawls states that ‘unless there is real scarcity, all should
have at least enough to meet their basic needs’.166 The idea of access
to ‘basic needs’ tends to carry with it the implication of an absolute
standard of poverty.  The UN describes absolute poverty in these terms:
Absolute poverty is a condition characterised by severe
deprivation of basic human needs, including food, safe
drinking water, sanitation facilities, health, shelter, education
and information.  It depends not only on income but on
access to social services.167
This, however, is only a partial understanding of deprivation.
Deprivation is also relative: the situation of poor people depends not
only on immediate material needs, but on the context of the society
where those needs are found.  Townsend writes:
People are relatively deprived if they cannot obtain, at all
or sufficiently, the conditions of life – that is, the diets,
amenities, standards and services which allow them to play
the roles, participate in the relationships and follow the
customary behaviour which is expected of them by virtue




Tawney argued for public expenditure to create a more equal society
through the establishment of a common social infrastructure and
foundation of services, providing a common pattern or texture of
social relationships.  He argued for public expenditure
... to make accessible to all, irrespective of their income,
occupation or social position, the conditions of civilisation
which, in the absence of such measures, can only be enjoyed
by the rich.169
This implies a concern with substantive outcomes and the distribution
of resources.  It implies minimum standards in income, nutrition,
housing and health care.  For children, it implies a common foundation
of education and family care.  These are aims which most countries in
the world have subscribed to, in signing the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.  Clearly, many countries in the world are unable to
meet these standards, because they lack sufficient resources to provide
for basic needs.  For present purposes, it should be sufficient to note
that the claim for access to the conditions of civilisation implies a
major alteration in the distribution of resources.  In a world where
almost three billion people – nearly half of humanity – live on less
than $2 a day, and any reasonable standard would be much higher
than that, the reallocation of resources required may be fairly radical.
Even in the developed economies, where the majority of people have
such access, a significant minority do not; and if the test is that these
conditions should be available to all, not just to most, it is a standard
which most countries in the developed world still fall short of.
Equality of welfare
Claims of right take many forms.  Hohfeld distinguishes ‘liberties’ –
areas which other people should not interfere with – from ‘claim
rights’ – rights which impose active duties on others.170 The basic
claim rights most often referred to in discussions of social policy are
claims for social security – that is, poor relief or income maintenance;
rights to housing, in the sense both of access to decent housing and
avoidance of deprivation; access to health care; and the right to be
educated.  The basic liberties which are sought include protection
from crime; protection from unsafe or unhealthy environments; the
avoidance of discrimination; and legal security, in the protection of
citizens from arrest or legal harassment, and the avoidance of injustice.
Some rights hover ambiguously between categories: the right to raise
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a family may be seen either as a claim for support or as a presumption
against intervention, while the right to work is sometimes represented
as a claim right to be provided with work, and sometimes as a liberty
to pursue work in the marketplace.
The idea of rights leads to a stronger concept of equality when
rights are held to cover broader aspects of human conduct.  Economic
and social rights, and associated rights to welfare, seem to imply an
equality not only of process but of circumstance.  Amartya Sen has
argued that welfare has to be seen less in terms of the goods and
commodities that are available than in the ways in which such goods
and commodities are applied to meet ‘capabilities’, the capacities which
people need in order to function.171 If people have a human right to
an adequate standard of living, as the UN Declaration holds, they
hold that right equally.  Unless the standard of adequacy differs markedly
between different people, the right seems to imply that a broadly similar
material foundation for people is required universally.172
Townsend’s understanding of poverty as ‘relative deprivation’ relates
poverty directly to inequality.  The effect of inequality is to deny
people access to the conditions and standards of life which are required
in the society where they live.  People’s ability to command resources
depends on the resources available to others, not just on the absolute
value of their income.  A person’s relative purchasing power is important
for establishing an adequate quality of life (such as housing and the
physical environment), opportunities (like opportunities in education
and employment) and participation in social activities (which typically
require disposable income and access to transport).  Inequality can
have a direct effect on welfare, and to that extent the reduction of
inequality can also be seen as a way of furthering welfare in itself.
This goes beyond the argument for access to the ‘conditions of
civilisation’, but it is still not an argument for an equal distribution of
resources, or for equal outcomes.  I think it might be classified in
terms of ‘equality of welfare’, but the kind of ‘welfare’ I am concerned
with here is not the sort of welfare that economists write about –
utility, or happiness, or personal satisfaction.  The kind of welfare this
is concerned with is one where needs are met, where people are not
poor, and people have a decent standard of living.  An example of
welfare in this sense might be the concept of ‘health’: we can identify
health as a desirable condition, and it makes perfectly good sense to
talk about ‘inequalities in health’ when people are disadvantaged, but
there also comes a point when we should be able to say that ‘this
person is healthy, and not relatively disadvantaged’ and leave it at that.




calls a ‘diminishing principle’.  People do not have a right to more
than an adequate standard of welfare, so the most pressing claim is
from people who are furthest below the standard, and once the standard
has been reached the claim is no longer important.
The difficulty of applying the concept of equal welfare seems to lie
in the translation of the concept from general principles to substantive
outcomes.  The principle has mainly been applied to particular kinds
of inequality – in particular, the inequalities between social classes, or
between rich and poor countries, and in specialised areas such as
inequalities in health.  The areas in which equality of welfare is sought
are conventional, and it may be unwise to look for a clear rationale in
the selection.  Universal health care is largely accepted, and is a reality
in most western democracies; a general right to shelter is not.  Universal
education is often accepted as the responsibility of a society, but the
nutrition of children is the responsibility of their parents.  An income
in older age is often guaranteed, but personal care for frail older people,
although recently extended in Germany and France, has not been.
Walzer argues for a concept of ‘complex equality’: there are ‘spheres
of justice’, and the application in different contexts depends strongly
on social construction of the issues.173 It does seem to be true that the
demands for equality of welfare have tended to expand as time has
gone on.  In part, this reflects the growth of rights, and a realisation
that some rights (like liberty) are vitiated if they are not founded in a
reasonable degree of prosperity.  In part, too, it reflects a changing
perception of the role of government, which is increasingly seen as an
instrument to support economic and social development.
Equality and social justice
The principle of equality is closely related to the principle of social
justice.  The literature on justice is extensive, and I do not propose to
review it here, but it is difficult to consider the issue of equality without
at least pointing to the connections.  The idea of ‘social justice’ is used
in two main senses.  On one hand, it is used in a Platonic sense.
Plato’s rather muddled arguments about justice frame it in terms of
virtuous conduct.  The just man, to Plato, is the good man.174 William
Godwin’s Enquiry concerning political justice mainly depends on a view
of justice as the application of basic moral rules.
Society is nothing more than an aggregation of individuals.
Its claims and duties must be the aggregate of their claims
and duties, the one no more precarious and arbitrary than
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the other.  What has the society a right to require from me?
The question is already answered: everything that it is my
duty to do....  What is it that the society is bound to do for
its members? Everything that is requisite for their welfare.
There is one thing that political institutions can assuredly
do, they can avoid positively counteracting the true interests
of their subjects.  But all capricious rules and arbitrary
distinctions do positively counteract them.  There is scarcely
any modification of society but has in it some degree of
moral tendency.  So far as it produces neither mischief nor
benefit, it is good for nothing.  So far as it tends to the
improvement of the community, it ought to be universally
adopted....  Political institutions, to be good, must have
constant relation to the rules of immutable justice; and ...
those rules, uniform in their nature, are equally applicable
to the whole human race.175
John Rawls similarly takes a Platonic view when he argues that ‘justice’
is a principle to which every reasonable person would assent.176 His
assertion that reasonable people will accept the importance of liberty
may well be true, but it fits into a concept of justice only if justice is
held to consist of the principles that people will reasonably assent to.
This treats justice as equivalent to what is good.  Both ‘justice’ and
equality can be part of a good society, but people might reasonably
disagree on what makes for a good society.
Rather more important, for present purposes, is the Aristotelian
concept of justice, which identifies justice with proportionate action:
This, then, is what the just is – the proportional; the unjust
is what violates the proportion....  The man who acts
unjustly has too much, and the man who is unjustly treated
too little, of what is good.177
The principle of proportion does not mean that people are equal, but
it does mean that inequalities have to be justified, and so that there is
an initial presumption of equality.  Social justice is represented by
action which is proportionate to relevant criteria.  Corrective justice
– that is, justice and punishment in the context of criminal law –
depends on actions which are proportionate to the offence.  Distributive
justice, or justice in the allocation of resources and opportunities, implies
distribution in proportion with agreed principles.




treated according to status, merit, needs or rights.178 The identification
of justice with status, or established rights, is associated with a feudal
society: if resources and opportunities reflect legitimate inequalities,
their distribution will be unequal.  Miller gives the example of David
Hume as a philosopher who accepts only such established status as the
basis for distribution.  Distribution according to merit, desert or
contribution to society similarly implies inequality, but it does so on
different terms: people will receive goods and rewards according to
their social value, which means that some will receive a great deal
while others will receive nothing.  Miller’s example is the thought of
Herbert Spencer.  Distribution according to need is much more equal,
although there will be some variation.  The example he gives here is
Petr Kropotkin, the Russian anarchist.  Going beyond Miller’s
framework, a fourth model might be reflected in arguments for equality
of rights: where people have rights which apply universally, as they
are in the UN Declaration, justice implies distribution on an equal
basis.
Although this approach to justice does not necessarily imply greater
equality, the combination of an Aristotelian concept of justice with an
emphasis on need or human rights is significantly egalitarian.  This
concept of justice is not solely concerned with distributive issues, but
it is central to the application of principles of equality to the distribution
of resources.  If resources are allocated disproportionately, there is a
moral argument for reallocation, and so for redistribution.  I will return
to this argument in Chapter Four.
The confusion about the meaning of justice means that in practice
its relationship to equality tends to be obscure.  People who write
about justice – including both supporters like Rawls, and opponents
like Hayek – often claim that it has something to do with equality,
without being very clear as to what the link is.  They are right, of
course, because both justice and equality start from the assumption
that people have to be treated consistently.  If justice is universal, it
applies to everyone.  That means that people will be treated equally
unless there are reasons to the contrary.  Social justice implies a moral
claim for a different kind of society.  That claim cannot be acted on
without some modification to existing relationships.  That also means
that there needs to be some intervention to deal with disadvantage,
because without a remedy for disadvantage people will be dealt with
inconsistently.
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Individual and social equality
Equality is necessarily a social concept, and it is not possible to
distinguish a distinctively individualist concept of the same type as
the individualist argument on freedom.  There is, however, a position
which is more directly identified with liberal individualism.  This is
the acceptance of a limited view of equality, asserting principles like
equality before the law, equal opportunity in education and equal
treatment in the workplace, while rejecting further moves towards
equality of outcome.  Hayek argues that only equality before the law
commands attention.  At the same time, he applauds the degree of
equality of condition achieved in the US, and suggests that policy
makers may select more egalitarian options when a range of legitimate
alternatives present themselves.179 The new right, Rae comments, is
not so much anti-egalitarian as narrowly egalitarian.180 Although this
position is often identified with individualist thinkers, it is difficult to
identify a clearly individualist rationale for it.
There are, however, other arguments which are concerned with
individual and group perspectives.  Rae refers to a distinction between
‘individual-regarding’ and ‘bloc-regarding’ equality.181 There is a marked
difference between saying that ‘women should not be disadvantaged’
and that ‘this woman should not be disadvantaged’.  Women are
disadvantaged as a group if they are barred from the structure of
opportunities available to men.  The appropriate comparison is between
women as a group and men as a group.  But this could mean that a
rich, middle-class woman is advanced, while others (like poorer men)
remain disadvantaged.  If the perspective which is taken is concerned
with individuals, then the position of each individual has to be
considered relative to other individuals.
Individualist arguments can be arguments for inequality as much as
for equality.  The disadvantage experienced by middle-class women
faced with the ‘glass ceiling’ denies them the opportunity to be as
superior to other women as their male counterparts are to other men.
If the position regards blocs, then the relative distribution of each bloc
needs to be adjusted.  Many of the comparisons relate to access to
privileged positions, like leadership in industry or access to well-paid
professions.  Dworkin argues that some positions, like access to medical
school or legal training, are particularly important in ensuring that
essential services and points of empowerment are available for others
in the bloc.182 (This is debatable: it is not self-evidently true that lawyers
or doctors from minority groups will serve other people from their




studies which focus on disadvantage are likely to pick up issues where
the disadvantage seems to be disproportionate for certain groups, like
the ‘feminisation of poverty’ or racial disadvantage in education.  The
bloc-regarding approach tends to focus attention on the points where
blocs differ most visibly, at the tops and tails of distributions.
Individualists approach equality in a different way to collectivists:
they are unlikely to accept bloc-regarding equality, and even if
individual women or people from minority groups should not be
disadvantaged, it does not follow that there should be any redress of
disadvantage for the group as a whole.  It is difficult to see why, though,
individualists should necessarily reject equality of welfare.  On the
face of the matter, guaranteeing individuals the right to basic needs
like food or health care could be seen as fundamental to individual
autonomy, and it is perfectly possible to imagine an individualist
adopting such a position.  The disjuncture comes because many
individualists are convinced that people cannot obtain basic needs
except through redistribution, and redistribution is believed to take
place at the expense of other people’s property rights or freedoms.
That is a common enough objection to greater equality, but it is not
obvious that it is required by an individualist position.  There are,
indeed, some anarchists who take an individualist stance at the same
time as arguing for redistribution.183 Conversely, it is not clear that a
collectivist has to accept a bloc-regarding view of equality.  If all
inequality is based in social relationships, the idea that inequalities
ought to be redressed is, in itself, a collectivist position.
An example:  quotas and police recruitment
One of the most common tests of whether a group is being discriminated
against is to review the proportion of that group in the population, and to
see whether it has proportionate access to the services and opportunities
which are available to others.  This often leads to some questionable
calculations, because, for example, newly established immigrant groups are
rarely directly comparable to the larger population in these terms, but it
can still be helpful as an indicator of access and distribution.
It is a small step from this point to treating the proportionate indicator
as a target – a figure which must be reached.  Here the problems begin.
First, treating a proportionate indicator as a target establishes a quota,
based on the proportion of the group.  Quotas are exclusive: they work
not only by keeping people in but by keeping others out.  If access to
medical school is to be proportionate to racial origin, then some groups
which are relatively advantaged – such as Japanese Americans, Lithuanians
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and Jews – need to be held back.  This is discriminatory and likely to breed
resentment.  Some famous legal cases – Bakke and De Funis – were taken
up in the US by aggrieved people who were excluded on this basis.  Second,
quotas become ceilings.  The evidence reviewed by Jon Elster in Local justice
suggests that although quotas seem to favour minority groups at first, they
tend to limit opportunities as time goes on.184 Third, the limiting effect
happens before the quota is reached.  An example comes from the
experience of racial dispersal in Birmingham’s council housing, where the
council attempted to ensure that people from minority ethnic groups
occupied only one house or flat in six.185 The result was greatly to slow
down the speed at which people from minority ethnic groups were
rehoused.  This happened partly because the quota did not reflect people’s
need or eligibility for housing, partly because vacancies do not occur at
equal rates in every place at every time, and partly because people from
minority ethnic groups did not necessarily want to live in the places where
they were being offered property.  The principles can be generalised: when
quotas are introduced, applicants are likely to be delayed.  Taken together,
the problems of quotas mean, ironically, that minority groups are less likely
to be treated well if a quota is in place – and that their position is more
likely to be resented.
These issues have had to be considered recently in recruitment to police
forces in the UK.  The Macpherson Inquiry, which accused the police of
‘institutional racism’, directed the police service to review its recruitment
policies.186 The Inquiry report argued that:
• there should be performance indicators relating to levels of
recruitment, retention and progression of minority ethnic recruits
(recommendation 2.vii);
• policing plans should include targets for recruitment, progression
and retention of minority ethnic staff (recommendation 64);
• police services should facilitate the development of initiatives to
increase the number of qualified minority ethnic recruits
(recommendation 65); and
• Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary should report on these
issues as part of their inspections (recommendation 66).
But if these targets were expressed as quotas, they ran the risk of
introducing systematic disadvantage – and so, of reinforcing the accusation
of institutional racism.  I argued, in Police Review, for targets based on numbers
rather than proportions.187 This may sound like it should mean the same
thing, but this is a question of social relationships and processes, not
mathematics.  Numerical targets, unlike proportionate quotas, cannot be
met by excluding people.  This was the route the police service initially




recruit over 8,000 officers from minority groups in the course of the next
10 years.  (In the previous year the police service had recruited 37.) In the
subsequent years, however, it fell short of the targets, and the figures were
consequently presented differently.188 Later reports describe the missed
1999 targets as ‘out of date’ and have reverted to describing targets in
terms of percentages.189 Recruitment quotas are now being openly
advocated by the Commission for Racial Equality.190
Equality and freedom
Balancing freedom and equality
The supposed conflict between equality and freedom has been at the
root of many objections to egalitarian policy.  There is bound to be
some conflict, because freedom itself is a contradictory concept: if
one person’s freedoms conflict with other people’s, then of course
action intended to increase freedom in one respect can be objected to
on the grounds of the freedom in another.  As I argued in Chapter
One, freedom can be redistributed.  Governments balance some
people’s freedoms against other people’s, and one person’s freedom
can be enhanced by limiting another’s.  By the same token, egalitarian
policies – that is, policies intended to reduce disadvantage – can increase
freedom from one perspective while reducing it from others.  A policy
preventing discrimination against racism in employment increases the
freedom of people from minority groups, but does so by limiting the
freedom of employers.  Redistributing money from one person to
another increases the choices of one person and reduces the choices
of the other.  Suppose, for example, that a government in a developing
country legislates to introduce universal school education, financed
by taxation.  This increases the freedoms of children who in other
circumstances would not have received an education (possibly at the
expense of some of their other freedoms, because school education is
often compulsory).  It is paid for by other people, from their taxation:
that limits their freedom.  I think most observers, however, would
consider that the overall effect was an enhancement in freedom –
provided, of course, that the object is genuinely to increase education,
which enhances power and capacity, rather than indoctrination, which
reduces it.
This does not mean that no policy for equality restricts freedom,
and there are some policies – like the policies of the Bolsheviks in the
former Soviet Union – which have attempted to limit freedoms in
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the belief that equality is the superior value.  Levelling down has
traditionally been advocated by people who disapproved of luxury in
principle.  The Puritans, for example, believed that everyone would
be better if they lived simpler lives; their descendants are found in
some Greens.  Egalitarian opposition to higher standards of living is
still relatively unusual in contemporary society, however, and for the
most part the idea that equality is achieved at the expense of personal
fulfilment is a caricature.
Equality and power
Equality of persons has often been understood as a statement about
rank and privilege: the advantages and disadvantages which people
have should not be ascribed in terms of nobility and baseness.
De Tocqueville calls the idea ‘l’égalité de conditions’:
No-one being different from his peers, no-one can exercise
tyrannical power; men will be perfectly free, because they
are wholly equal; and they will be wholly equal because
they are perfectly free.  It is towards this ideal that democratic
peoples aim.191
This is sometimes expressed in terms of the non-domination of
society.192 Objections to domination are often expressed as disapproval
of a particular kind of social order, which implies other values besides
equality of persons, but they are fuelled by the same principle.  The
key issue is not advantage, but power.
This link of equality and power is sometimes expressed in terms of
‘oppression’.  Thompson defines oppression as:
... inhuman and degrading treatment of individuals or
groups; hardship and injustice brought about by the
dominance of one group over another; the negative and
demeaning exercise of power.193
The concept owes much to traditional Marxism – Marx used the
term to characterise the relationship of classes.  The term has recently
enjoyed a revival in some fields, including social work and community
education, where it has been strongly associated with anti-racist
movements.194
These different concepts of oppression and non-domination are




People are oppressed if their freedom is limited by their disadvantage.
Oppression comes about because people with limited choices are
vulnerable to exploitation and coercion, and because people’s capacities
are limited by poverty and disadvantage.  From the perspective of
equality, the idea of oppression is bloc-regarding, but it is also centrally
based in equality of persons, understood both as the removal of
discrimination and the extension of equal respect.  This is not a
particularly radical formulation: the association of the idea with
radicalism stems more from its association with arguments for the
restructuring of society than from its specific prescriptions for policy.
In practice, there is often little distinction between arguments against
oppression and the traditional liberal plea for dignity and respect.
Equality for freedom
Many arguments for individual liberty had their origins in radical
opposition to the dominant norms of feudal society, and it is not
wholly surprising if these arguments are compatible with other radical
arguments.  In most circumstances, arguments for equality, liberty and
individual rights grew hand in hand.  The revolutionary claim for ‘the
career open to the talents’ is a claim for both liberty and equality.
Opposition to discrimination, rights for women, and protection of
the vulnerable are simultaneously positions which stand for both.
In some cases, equality is necessary for freedom.  In Part One, I
reviewed a number of alternative concepts of freedom.  Some degree
of equality is necessary to each of them.  Negative freedom depends
on the absence of coercion.  People’s vulnerability to coercion depends
on the number of options they have.  If someone is able to close off
options, so that only one option remains, this is coercive.  In conditions
of serious inequality, people may have reduced, or even have no, eligible
options.  That makes them especially vulnerable to coercion, and the
problems of poor people commonly include personal insecurity relating
to others, including the state, who are capable of coercing them.  Positive
freedom depends on the capacity to act, and the effect of inequality is
to restrict capacity and to deny options to people.  The model of
individual freedom begins implicitly with the value of the individual,
rights and equality of persons; individual freedom is realised through
choice and equality of opportunity.  Social understandings of freedom
call for a more extensive emphasis on capacity.  Norman argues:
A society of equality will be one in which the conditions
of freedom are distributed equally.  The more people share
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equally in power, wealth and educational opportunities,
the more they will then share equally also in freedom, and
the more truly their society can then be described as a ‘free
society’.195
In every sense, then, there are links between concepts of freedom and
positions relating to equality.  Equality and freedom are not
contradictory, but complementary.
Equality in theory: an overview
Equality is a multi-faceted concept.  The central question for
understanding the concept, Amartya Sen suggests, is ‘equality of
what?’,196 and I have tried to tackle that question head-on.  I have
reviewed various concepts: equality of persons, equality of rights,
citizenship, access to the conditions of civilisation, and equality of
welfare.  Although there are differences, and potential contradictions,
between the various understandings of equality, the effect of considering
a broad range of concepts does not seem to me to undermine them.
On the contrary, it seems to strengthen the moral sentiment that equality
is something to be valued and striven for.
The application of the concept to practice, however, presents many
problems.  Some prescriptions for equality lead in incompatible
directions.  Rae comments that the strongest opposition to equality
tends to come, not from concerns about liberty or the economy, but
from competing understandings of equality itself.197 The next chapter






In Chapter Two I considered some of the elements of a ‘free society’.
It is more difficult to represent the elements of an ‘equal society’,
because the range of understandings is much wider.  Equality covers a
range of different concerns and aspirations; it embraces several discrete
approaches, such as equality of persons, equality of rights and equality
of welfare; and different forms of equality are achievable through a
wide range of different methods.
Policies for equality
Equality of treatment
There are five main types of policy for equality.  Firstly, there is equality
of treatment.  People are not treated equally by being treated uniformly:
equality before the law does not mean that everyone is imprisoned,
regardless of circumstances, and equal treatment in the health service
does not mean that everyone gets their legs cut off.  People are treated
equally when they are treated on an equal basis – that is, without
disadvantage, bias, prejudice or oppression.  In other words, they are
treated as equals.
The removal of bias should mean, in principle, that only those factors
which are relevant to decisions are considered, and that the personal
characteristics of the people involved should play no part.  It should
not matter, then, what a person’s gender, class or ‘race’ is.  This
formulation is problematic, however.  Disadvantage is pervasive, and it
may establish the context in which a decision is made.  There may, for
example, be circumstances in which gender or ‘race’ should be
considered relevant.  Consider, for example, a recent legal case in the
UK, where Pakistani groups rioted following a racial incident.  The
rioters were treated with considerable harshness by the courts, which
did not consider membership of an offended racial group to be
sufficient reason for riot.198 In a strictly individual sense, the courts
may have been right but viewed in context, the failure to take into
account the racial context and the public sensitivity of the issues seems
inappropriate.  Similarly, gender issues have not infrequently been raised
in considerations of domestic violence, such as circumstances where a
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woman who has suffered repeated abuse is provoked to violent action.
There is also the further problem that the exclusion of personal
circumstances may make it impossible to allow for disadvantage.
Arguments for ‘affirmative action’ in the US have been based in the
view that people who have been disadvantaged, especially through a
history of oppression, need to have some compensatory allowance for
that disadvantage.199 Wherever disadvantage is present, it may need to
be taken into account.
An example:  political correctness
Much of the focus on ‘equal treatment’ has fallen in recent years on the
removal of direct discrimination, and much of that has come to focus on
the issue of prejudice.  Language matters, and the way in which people
express themselves matters.  Some of the terms in which social policy has
been discussed in the past, and some which are used in the present, are
offensive.  ‘Political correctness’ has been concerned with the sensitive use
of language.  There are three main reasons for attempting to be politically
correct.  First, sensitivity in language is part of respect for others.  Describing
people in terms of a stigmatised characteristic – words like ‘cripple’ or
‘moron’ – is offensive, and although both words have been used in the past
with avowedly positive intentions, it is difficult to imagine them being applied
now without giving offence.  Second, awareness of the implications is
important for communication.  When people communicate, they convey
not only the direct sense of their words, but also tone and secondary
implications, which are no less important for meaning.  Third, discrimination
and prejudice are important parts of the ways in which disadvantage is
generated in society.
As a field of study, social policy is often characterised by desperate
attempts to impose a sensitive use of language, in the belief that this will
help to reduce offence and limit the scope of disadvantage.  Sadly, the
experience has often been very different.  There is a long history of altering
the names of stigmatised groups, in the belief that this can lessen the stigma.
Matza gives the example of references to poor people200: they have been
described as a lumpenproletariat, the submerged tenth, the undeserving
poor, the abyss, degenerates, problem families, multiple problem families,
the ‘hard-to-reach’, people in a ‘culture of poverty’, and most recently as
an ‘underclass’.  People with intellectual disabilities have successively been
described in the UK as degenerates, mentally deficient, subnormal, mentally
handicapped, people with learning difficulties and people with learning
disability.  We may think of the terms up to the present as insensitive
insults, but the position is not so simple.  The idea of ‘subnormality’ was
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introduced in UK legislation in the 1950s to replace the stigmatising terms
of idiot, imbecile, feeble-minded and moral defectives used in the 1913
Mental Deficiency Act.  ‘Mental handicap’ replaced the stigmatising language
of ‘subnormality’ in the 1970s (Bayley’s seminal book on mental handicap,
published in 1973, apologises for the residual references to subnormality 201).
‘Learning disability’ and ‘learning difficulties’ (around which there are
continuing disputes) largely replaced ‘mental handicap’ in the 1980s.
Part of the problem, too, is that despite the claim of commentators to
be sensitive, politically correct speech has often been desperately insensitive
to the uses of language.  The political choice of ‘learning difficulty’ in place
of ‘mental handicap’ invites confusion with other forms of educational
disadvantage.202 The World Health Organisation’s (WHO) use of the word
‘handicap’ to describe a social understanding of disability203 has been roundly
attacked by groups representing disabled people204 (partly, one has to say,
because they did not seem to understand what the WHO was proposing).
In the 1950s, Nunally devised a technique to establish whether particular
words carried negative connotations.205 To the best of my knowledge, the
test has not been used since.  Adopting new terminology in disregard of its
potential implications rather undermines the claims to sensitivity.
Equality of opportunity: social mobility and access to advantage
The second main approach to remedying disadvantage is the promotion
of equality of opportunity.  This is an ambiguous term.  In some
circumstances it means nothing more than equality of treatment: people
should not be barred from certain opportunities on the basis of
irrelevant factors like ‘race’ or gender.  The French revolutionaries
argued for la carriere ouverte aux talents – that people who show an
aptitude should be able to advance in society without the restrictions
imposed by a feudal system.  (This position, revolutionary in its day, is
now widely accepted by the political right wing.) The same principle
applies to caste societies, where mobility is prevented through rules
governing occupation and marriage.  Equality of opportunity means,
beyond equal treatment, that people have opportunities – that they
are able to change their status or life chances.  This implies, however,
that people will be able to obtain advantage or disadvantage.  Inequality
will continue to exist.
The study of ‘social mobility’ is tied in with this approach.  In
conventional sociology, society is often described in terms of social
‘stratification’ or levels, such as caste or class.206 Mobility implies that




at society is widely accepted, but the assumptions behind it are value-
laden, and some people take a different view.  There are objections
from individualists, who argue that ‘class’ no longer has a meaning;
there are also many ‘post-modern’ and critical approaches to sociology,
which argue that other social divisions, like ‘race’ or gender, mean
more than traditional divisions of caste and class.  The idea of social
stratification assumes, as well, that societies have a structure, and that
the structure needs explaining – both when it changes, and when it
stays the same.
The principle of equality of opportunity implies that social mobility
– or movement between social strata – is both possible and desirable.
Most subsequent interpretations have accepted the importance of
making opportunities real, by offering a basis for participation in society.
This is the basis for equality of opportunity in education.  The principle
of liberal education is based on the idea that everyone should be able
to develop according to their own abilities.  There are many educational
systems which are inegalitarian, because only a limited group of the
population has access to them.  Universal access to education is a
widely held objective: it is treated as a right in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, and the United Nations Development Programme
treats the proportion of the population without access to education as
one of the tests of development.207
Equality of opportunity has been criticised because of the limited
opportunities that exist in many social systems.  Schaar argues that it
allows the less competent individual to go only
... as far as he could have gone without the aid of the
doctrine – to the bottom rung of the social ladder – while
it simultaneously stimulates him to go further.208
Janet Radcliffe Richards disputes, however, the idea that equal
opportunity takes place only after talents and aptitudes have been
developed.  She argues, I think persuasively, that the principle should
not be a ‘knockout competition’, but a continuous process, where
opportunities are maximised at each stage of a person’s life – for
example, through continuing education, job mobility and the
preservation of employment for older people.209 Equal opportunity
still has to be understood as the opportunity to become unequal, but
it does not need to be quite as limited as it sometimes seems.
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Equality of provision
The third category of egalitarian policy is equality of provision.
Wherever provision is made by the state, in areas such as health,
education or libraries, an argument can be made for equality.  The
core of this argument rests in the case for equal treatment.  People
have to be treated consistently, without bias, prejudice or stigma.  They
should not be knowingly disadvantaged.  Governments are not
necessarily bound to make social provision, but if they do, these
conditions must apply.  Where there are equal rights, too, there are
grounds for equality in the provision of services.
Equal provision is an ambiguous concept, and it can be approached
in several different ways.  They include how much is spent on a service,
whether people are able to gain access to and use services to an
equivalent extent, and whether people suffer equivalent costs as a result
of their problems.210 This does not imply that people will have equal
outcomes: if people begin in different positions and receive equivalent
service, they will not.
The distribution of social services is subject to a range of conditions,
and a range of criteria may be introduced: typical examples include
restrictions on the basis of residence in a country or age.  Many benefits
and services are distributed according to fixed criteria, like income,
need, or contribution record.  These conditions can have the effect,
whether intentionally or otherwise, of introducing elements of
systematic discrimination.  The example of inequalities in health,
mentioned at the start of the discussion of equality in Chapter Three,
is illustrative.  Poor people are in greater need, but receive less care.
The position in the UK is not simply produced by lack of resources:
access to health care is provided through a national health service,
which does not rely on people’s ability to pay.  The reduced service is
attributable partly to differences in behaviour and willingness to seek
help, but also in physical problems of access and the difficulty of
negotiating appropriate levels of service through a ser ies of
administrative stages.
Another example of systematic discrimination is ‘institutional racism’.
One classic study of council housing in the UK showed that:
... the public sector is ...  prone to ‘accidental’ discrimination
arising from the way it tackles priorities, formulates its rules,




This happened, typically, because access to waiting lists and information
about the process was limited; the range of property provided was not
suitable for all families; the criteria for rehousing tended to favour the
sons and daughters of existing tenants, and disadvantaged people who
had moved to the private sector; and there was scope for discrimination
in the process of allocation.212 None of these factors could be said to
be sufficient in itself to explain the disadvantage.  Rather, such
conditions led cumulatively to the disadvantage of different minority
groups.  It is important, too, that the construction of disadvantage
cannot be explained solely in terms of unequal treatment.  For provision
to be delivered equally, it is necessary to look at the impact of policy
overall.
Basic security
Equality of opportunity, in the terms in which I have considered it, is
potentially a limited form of equality.  It implies the opportunity to
become unequal: to gain access to the rights, privileges and roles which
otherwise have been reserved for the few.  The ability to use educational
opportunity depends, too, on other factors, like the home environment
and material welfare.  It becomes difficult to argue for substantive
equality of opportunity without allowing something more.  If people
are denied education, starved or unable to participate in society, they
will not have a meaningful opportunity.  Rae makes the distinction
between two types of equality of opportunity: prospect-regarding and
means-regarding.  ‘Prospect-regarding’ equality of opportunity is
procedural; it is concerned to give people the opportunity to participate
in the competition.  ‘Means-regarding’ equality of opportunity is
substantive; it gives people the means to compete on an equal
footing.213
This understanding of equality of opportunity has found expression
in many forms, and I have selected one which seemed to me to
encapsulate the spirit of the ideal.  The idea of ‘basic security’ has
gained currency in the UN, following arguments made by ATD-Fourth
World.  A lack of basic security is defined by Wresinski as:
... the absence of one of more factors that enable individuals
and families to assume basic responsibilities and to enjoy
fundamental rights.214
The concept of a lack of basic security is closely linked to the idea of
poverty, because poverty has also been described in terms of a lack of
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basic entitlements.  Basic security is ‘basic’ in the sense that it provides
a foundation for the development of individuals.  It is egalitarian in
three senses.  First, it takes the form of means-regarding equality of
opportunity: people who lack security lack the ability to participate
in society.  Second, it is associated with a view that people share certain
human rights, and that the establishment of fundamental conditions is
necessary for them to function as humans.  Third, it aims to establish a
degree of equality of welfare, through the establishment of a common
foundation.
Basic security goes further than equal provision, and that is why I
have taken the unusual step of breaking up categories normally
contained in a single concept of ‘equality of opportunity’ into two
sections.  The principle of equal provision applies only in circumstances
where provision is made.  There is no guarantee of minimum standards,
and no necessary commitment to establish a common foundation.
Basic security goes much further – by identifying an extended set of
issues in which equality should apply.  At the same time, basic security
is not an appeal for equality of outcome.  It does not imply any major
reduction in the dispersion of rewards, or any attempt to bridge social
divisions, except in so far as any attempt to raise minimum standards
must have such an effect.  It is more limited, then, than many other
egalitarian claims.  Tony Crosland, a British Fabian politician who is
often misrepresented as an advocate of limited equality of opportunity,
wrote:
... equality of opportunity and social mobility ...  are not
enough.  They need ...  to be combined with measures ...
to equalise the distribution of rewards and privileges so as
to diminish the degree of class stratification, the injustice
of large inequalities, and the collective discontents which
come from too great a dispersion of rewards.215
This goes beyond basic security, to become a call for equality of
outcome.
Equality of outcome
Equality of outcome is arguably the most extreme, and certainly most
controversial, approach to equality – although it is not as extreme as it
is sometimes painted.  Equality of outcome is not a recipe for
uniformity, any more than other forms of equality are.  It is, first and




means, not that people have the same outcomes, but that the range of
outcomes, however diverse it may be, should not be so great as to
imply disadvantage.  Hence Crosland’s concerns with the range of
inequality, with the problems of dispersion, and the reduction of
injustice, rather than the imposition of uniform consequences.
The issue which distinguishes equality of outcome as a method is
not the relative strength of the principle, but its focus on outcomes,
rather than process or provision.  The test of equality of outcome is
the end-state – the situation where people finish.  So, for example,
comparisons of the effectiveness of social security and income
maintenance can be made, not on the basis of the provision which is
offered, but on the final incomes of people in different circumstances.216
Outcomes can be compared individually, but they can also be looked
at in terms of the relative position of different blocs, or social groups.
Looking at the employment or representation of women or minority
ethnic groups is usually done by comparing the proportions of those
groups relative to the rest of the population.  Another form of
comparison lies between sections of society, which Rae calls
‘segments’.217 It may make sense to say that ‘children from African
American backgrounds are disadvantaged’, but the comparison that is
being made is with other children, not with everyone else.  Segments
are important, because they are the way in which policies come to
focus on people in typical situations.  In this sense, examining equality
of outcome appears to be less an end in itself, and more an approach
to policy – a focus for attention, and a way of establishing whether or
not egalitarian policies have been effective.
There are three main arguments for equalising outcomes.  The first
is based, like the argument for equality of welfare, in rights.  If people
have rights –such as the rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness
promised in the American constitution – they may have rights to
certain substantive outcomes.  The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights offers rather more, with the implication that people have to
have a measure of basic security and a family life.  Article 25(1) asserts,
for example, that everyone should have:
... a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and his family, including food, clothing,
housing and medical care and necessary social services.
If there is a right to food, education or to health care, it is not enough
to assert only that people should be left to get on with finding them –
a ‘negative’ view of rights, equivalent to the negative form of liberty.
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Substantive rights of this kind demand resources.  Some aspects of
equality of welfare, like minimum standards in the provision of social
services, might be met through equal provision, but the extension of
claims beyond basic security seems to demand at least some
consideration of outcomes.
The second argument is fairness.  This is sometimes treated by critics
as if it was the only argument they faced,218 largely because it seems
to point up the differences between egalitarians and their opponents,
although it is probably less important than the argument from rights.
The argument for fairness is based, like the basic argument for equality,
on the application of a general rule: people should not be advantaged
or disadvantaged if the inequality cannot be justified.  There is no
reason to accept an unequal distribution of resources just because it
has happened, and in so far as moral rules can be made to apply, any
government seeking to act morally will seek to reduce unjustifiable
disadvantage.
Third, equality of outcome is sometimes seen as a practical way of
reducing disadvantage and its consequences.  For Dworkin, the problem
with the idea of equal welfare is that it demands the imposition of a
collective conception of what is good for people.  He favours greater
equalisation of resources, as a simple, relatively non-judgmental way
of reducing disadvantage, rather than any attempt to determine what
will maximise the welfare of those who are most disadvantaged.219
Some controversies about equality reflect the confusion of equality
of outcome with uniformity.  In Facial justice, L P Hartley describes a
society in which beautiful people have cosmetic surgery to make them
uglier, while ugly people are made more beautiful.220 It is true that
people who look good may gain advantages over other people – bias
in job interviews is sometimes given as an example.  The aim of equality,
however, is not to eliminate the difference, but to prevent that difference
being the basis for advantage or disadvantage.  A deeper concern is the
fear that the attempt to establish equality of outcome will threaten
other rights, including property rights and established liberties, in a
way that lesser forms of equality, like equality of treatment, will not.
The argument has some substance: one person’s liberty is another
person’s constraint, and it is invariably true that the conflicting interests
and rights of different people have to be balanced against each other.
As the pattern of equality demanded becomes more extensive, so does
the potential for conflict.
The idea is controversial, too, for another reason: that equality of
outcome may not be fully consistent with equality in other senses.




is uncertain, and welfare which is delivered by unequal processes can
still meet the requirements of equality.  For example, the patchwork
quilt of welfare benefits available in European countries often depends
on a range of complex, and apparently inegalitarian, entitlements: the
test for egalitarians is how such systems function in aggregate, when
the full range of transfers is taken into account, and some systems (like
Sweden’s) have significantly redistributive effects.221 Conversely, if equal
treatment produces unequal outcomes, the principle of equal treatment
may have to be modified.  This is the argument for ‘positive
discrimination’.  The Plowden report, which introduced the concept
in the UK, argued that:
There should be equality of opportunity for all, but ...
children in some districts will only get the same opportunity
as those who live elsewhere if they have unusually generous
treatment….  We ask for ‘positive discrimination’ in favour
of such schools and the children in them, going well beyond
an attempt to equalise resources.222
Positive discrimination does not mean that people are treated equally,
or even that people are treated according to their needs: it means that
people in disadvantaged circumstances have to be treated better, to
make up for the circumstances which have disadvantaged them.  The
same principle can be found in the arguments in the US for affirmative
action.
Equality of outcome is, then, not just a different approach to equality
from that represented by equality of treatment; it is often inconsistent
with it.  Those who accept the case for one may find it difficult to
accept the consequences of the other.
Equality and redistribution
Although redistribution is often seen as a characteristic pattern of
egalitarian policy, in practice redistributive policies cut across several
of the categories considered in this chapter.  All social welfare provision
is redistributive: the people who receive it are not necessarily those
who contribute towards it.  This does not mean that welfare provision
is necessarily egalitarian, because the direction of redistribution is not
unequivocally progressive or favourable to the poor.  There are other
types of redistribution.  Regressive redistribution is redistribution from
the poor to the rich.  It is rare for any government to undertake
overtly regressive redistribution, in the sense of taxing poor people to
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pay benefits for rich people, but there are many forms of public
expenditure which tend to favour people who are better off: examples
are transport subsidies (which favour people who travel more), subsidies
to higher education (which favour the privileged sons and daughters
of middle-class families), and subsidies to the opera (which, whether
or not opera is an elite leisure pursuit, can only be received by people
who can afford the tickets after subsidy).  Horizontal redistribution
goes between different groups of people – for example, from workers
to pensioners, or from people without children to people with children.
Much of the provision made by the welfare state is social protection,
which attempts to ensure that people’s circumstances are not altered
too radically by sickness or old age.  Earnings-related benefits reflect
previous inequalities, so that people who have contributed most also
receive the most.  Life cycle redistribution is nominally horizontal,
although it can also be seen as neutral.  The effect of compulsory
saving for pensions is not that people are made richer or poorer, but
that their resources are reallocated across the years of their life.
Rae identifies four main patterns of egalitarian redistribution.223
The first is ‘maximin’, a term coined by John Rawls to identify a
process of maximising the minimum level.  Some of the arguments
for equality, including those based on equal opportunity and on rights,
argue for the development of minimum standards.  Raising the floor,
or reducing the impact of disadvantage, does not make people equal,
but it makes them more equal.
The second is ‘minimax’, or minimising the maximum.  This pattern
of egalitarianism, which might be thought of as ‘levelling’, has a long
tradition: the Levellers were puritans who disapproved morally of the
vices inculcated by excess wealth.  The reduction of the standards of
those who are best off does not necessarily benefit the worst off.  The
argument for minimax comes mainly from concerns about fairness; it
is not directly supported by a concern with rights.
Third is a reduction of the range of inequality, limiting the extremes
both of wealth and poverty.  Money is taken from the rich to give to
the poor.  The main rationale for reducing the range is an argument
for social justice, both in the sense of fairness and in a need to alter the
distribution in accordance with moral concerns.  The argument has
been reinforced by a belief that the wealth of richer people is based in
exploitation of poorer people.
Fourth, there is another argument based in the structure of society:
Rae describes this as altering the ‘ratio’ between richer and poorer




closer to the poor, but to integrate the whole society, reducing
advantage and disadvantage at every point.
Egalitarian measures which are concerned with equal provision or
basic security tend to be focused on the position of the people who
are most disadvantaged; that argues for maximin or range.  A concern
with equality of outcome argues for a concern with ratios.  None of
the approaches considered here would put much store by minimax,
which might help to explain why so few people take that line.  If
these approaches are taken to their logical conclusion, Rae suggests,
they boil down to the same thing, producing a flat, equal distribution
of resources.  Raise the floor high enough and it becomes a maximum;
lower the maximum far enough and it becomes a minimum.  But
equality is not, in general, taken to the extremes; hardly anyone has
ever argued for equality of income.  (The only exception I know of is
George Bernard Shaw, who once called it his ‘favourite plan’.224 I am
not sure he was completely serious, and in a later book he argued for
‘levelling up’, or maximin, instead.225) More typically, the idea of
equality represents a moral aspiration, an approach, rather than an
ultimate objective.  These four approaches are consequently different
in practice, and different in their results.
An example:  the poverty threshold in the UK226
The UK government has declared the objective of eliminating child poverty
by the year 2020.  The test used for low income is 60% of the median
household income.  About a third of all children in the UK live below that
threshold.227 Most of these children are in families without work, but many
also live in families with low earnings, where the main earner is in the
bottom quartile of the earnings distribution.228
The 60% measure is not a bad indicator of poverty, because low income
is often associated with deprivation, but it is not the same thing as poverty.
Poverty is a much more complex concept, referring to patterns of material
need, economic deprivation and social relationships.  Income is at best a
rough guide.  The use of the median income as a guide was pioneered in
studies for the European Union, which identified poverty with ‘economic
distance’ from the rest of society.229 This definition identifies poverty closely
with inequality; the reference to the median income defines the standard
wholly in terms of inequality.  The median income is the income of people
at the mid-point of a society: half the population has more, half has less.
The median is not directly affected by changes in the lifestyle of those who
are better off.  However, using the median means that, by definition, it is
logically impossible for more than half the population to be poor.  This is a
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sustainable position in the European Union, and it works for the UK, but it
would not be a reasonable assumption in many other regions of the world.
The use of the median is not illegitimate.  Inequality does matter.  People’s
ability to buy goods and services does depend on what other people around
them are able to pay.  The simplest example of this is the cost of housing,
which is directly related to the purchasing power of other people.  The
prices of many things are affected by the standards of a society at large.
Distribution networks depend on the overall pattern of demand (which
often means that poor people pay more for basic goods), while the
availability of ‘poverty goods’, like cheap cuts of meat and second-hand
goods, are available only if there are sufficient concentrations of poor people
to justify economic supply.  There is some justice, then, in the argument
that people whose income is distinctly below other people’s may not be
able to participate in society or to buy the things which are considered
necessary in that society.
The selection of the 60% threshold is also debatable.  The researchers
who introduced the measure tested levels of 40, 50 and 60%.  The 50%
figure has been widely used.  At that level, however, many people in receipt
of benefit were only just above the level.  The main statistical series
introduced in the UK mistakenly took the figure as 50% of the mean, rather
than the median, and the mean is higher.  Rather than be accused of
manipulating the figures, the government opted to move to the 60% figure.
Subsequently, the preference for 60% began to appear in other European
material,230 and it has become more generally used in the European Union
as well as in the UK.231
The use of this standard has implications for policy.  Clearly, identifying
poverty wholly in terms of inequality means that the response will be a
response to inequality, not necessarily to poverty.  Beyond that, the form
of the threshold has implications for what kind of response is likely to have
an impact.  Levelling down will not meet the standard, because levelling
does not affect the median.  Reducing the range and ratio will improve the
situation, but if the tail of the distribution remains, there will continue to
be poverty.  The most effective strategy for bringing people above the
threshold is maximin, because this most directly alters the relationship
between the lowest parts of the distribution and the median.
Equality in social welfare provision
Expenditure on social welfare provision has often been linked to
equality.  At first sight, this seems to overlap with the area of equal




the UK, the Labour movement followed the view of social expenditure
favoured by Tawney,232 a ‘strategy of equality’ intended to give everyone
in British society a common foundation – a combination of guaranteed
support with the network of services ensuring minimum standards
and a basis for future development.
The link of welfare with policies for equality does not mean that all
welfare policies are egalitarian.  The policies of the Poor Law were
redistributive – resources were directed to people who were destitute
– and the ratepayers who met the cost were property holders.  To that
extent, the Poor Law reduced the range of inequality.  Describing this
as an ‘egalitarian’ policy, though, would be misleading.  The Poor Law
was inegalitarian, because it instituted disadvantage.  Paupers were
badly treated and deprived of civic rights as a matter of policy.
Policies may be egalitarian in one sense, but not in another.  Council
housing raised the living standards of large numbers of people, but it
did so at the expense of a social divide between those who were
owner-occupiers and those who were council tenants.233 Selective
education gave opportunities to some children from poorer
backgrounds at the expense of excluding others.234 By the same token,
inequalities sometimes persist in apparently egalitarian services.  In
health care, the people who are poorest are likely to be most in need,
but also to receive less service.235 Le Grand has raised the issue of a
middle-class ‘hijack’ of public services, where a range of services –
including, for example, transport and higher education – have a
regressive effect.236 This is potentially important, but exaggerated.
Where public services are provided, even at a low level, they become
available to people who would otherwise be denied them.  They raise
the floor.  Beyond that, the National Health Service in the UK, and
the increasingly universal coverage in much of the European Union,
cannot be judged only on what they spend; they also have to be
understood in terms of their opportunity cost.  If these systems did
not exist, the coverage they provide would cost every person the price
of basic insurance.  Even if people do not use the service, then, they
are receiving the benefit of social protection, and that is a step towards
greater equality.
This argument is mainly concerned with the distribution of the
benefits of welfare provision.  If equality is concerned with the kinds
of issues considered in Chapter Three – social equality, citizenship,
and access to the conditions of civilisation – then the provision of
welfare establishes equality in a more fundamental sense than by
redistribution alone.  If the aim of policy is to bring about greater
equality in society, there have to be mechanisms through which those
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ideals can be realised.  In so far as equality is concerned with citizenship,
effective membership in a society depends on the ability to participate
in it.  If equality is a demand for access to the conditions of civilisation,
those conditions are met through welfare systems.  In every case, the
provision of welfare is central to an egalitarian response.
Approaches to equality and egalitarian policies
In the previous chapter I outlined five main approaches to equality:
• equality of persons;
• equality of rights;
• citizenship;
• access to the ‘conditions of civilisation’; and
• equality of welfare.
In this chapter, I have considered five kinds of policy response:
• equality of treatment;
• equality of opportunity;
• equality of provision;
• basic security; and
• equality of outcome.
It is tempting to try to match these directly – equality of persons with
equality of treatment, access to the conditions of civilisation with
basic security, and so on – but there is not a simple one-to-one
correspondence.  The relationship between approaches and policy is
complex, and made more so by the overlaps between the different
categories.  Equality of persons is associated with the more limited
policies: equality of treatment and equality of opportunity.  Equality
of persons is not enough to make the case for equality provision.  This
extension of the argument depends on a shift from equality of
condition, narrowly understood, to equality of rights.  Once that shift
has been made, equality of rights can also be argued to support a case
for basic security.  Equal citizenship occupies similar ground, implying
equal treatment, opportunity, provision and possibly basic security.
Neither equal rights nor citizenship, however, directly imply an
argument for equal outcomes – unless, of course, the rights which are
asserted are rights to specific outcomes.  If they are, the argument has
effectively shifted to be about either the conditions of civilisation or
equality of welfare.  Welfare has to be judged principally in terms of




has the potential, like equality of outcome, to conflict with other
concepts of equality.
If equality of persons and equality of treatment represent more limited
concepts of equality, while equality of welfare and equality of outcome
represent more extensive concepts, it seems plausible to suggest that
commitment to more extensive policies grows with commitment to
more extensive principles.  Figure 4.1 shows the relationships in the
form of a chart.
What the chart shows, I think, is that the principles and policies can
be represented as a spectrum of options, moving from more limited
commitments to equality to broader and stronger commitments.
However, this observation has to be treated with some caution.  These
are not well-defined, discrete areas, and there is no clear point at which
one kind of policy leaves off and another begins.  Even if the principles
of equality are broadly accepted, the type and pattern of equality which
people favour depend on a complex constellation of views.
Towards an equal society
If equality is a principle, rather than an ideal, an ‘equal society’ is one
where the principle is widely applied.  That must, minimally, extend
to the principles of equality of persons, of rights and equal treatment;
and there must be an aspiration for greater equality, through steps to
remove disadvantage where this is considered illegitimate.  This is a
modest enough shopping list, but it is hard to find a contemporary



















Figure 4.1:  Approaches to equality and egalitarian policies
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egalitarian in its understanding of citizenship, but highly inegalitarian
in its acceptance of unequal outcomes.  Sweden is probably the strongest
contender, but even there there are marked differences between
aspiration and practice: the income-related system of social insurance
preserves inequalities into old age.)
Anthony Crosland contrasts two very different approaches to the
development of equality in society.  One, which he considered a ‘vulgar
fallacy’, depends on the construction of a blueprint of an ideal or
model society, an approach commonly associated with revolutionary
politics.  The other is to treat equality as a principle, guiding action
towards a greater degree of fairness.  He wrote:
How far towards equality do we wish to go? I do not regard
this as either a sensible or a pertinent question, to which
one could possibly give, or should attempt to give, a precise
reply.  We need, I believe, more equality than we now have
...  I am sure that a definite limit exists to the degree of
equality that is desirable….  But where en route ...  we











The idea of fraternity is based in the idea that people have
responsibilities to each other.  Fraternity was defined after the French
Revolution, in the constitution of year III, in the following terms:
Do not do to others what you would not want them to do
to you; do constantly to others the good which you would
wish to receive from them.238
The vagueness of the definition suggests that, despite its place in the
revolutionary slogan, the idea of fraternity was not clearly understood.
This is a version of the ‘golden rule’, ‘do as you would be done by’,
rather than a radical principle.
The inclusion of ‘fraternity’ in the Revolution’s most famous slogan
probably owed its place to the role of fraternities – guilds, associations
and secret societies239 – although, ironically, these societies were seen
as representing established interests, and they were suppressed by two
revolutionary decrees.240 The members of fraternities might be sworn
to ‘brotherhood’.  What that meant, in practice, was the recognition of
a common identity, the acceptance of mutual obligation, and a
commitment to charity where it was needed.  To be fraternal was to
be bound to other people, by ties of obligation or commitment.  This
could be a narrow, and on occasion an exclusive, idea, but the link
with brotherhood was taken to imply a link with broader ideas of
brotherly love, or the love of humanity.
By comparison with liberty and equality, the idea of fraternity has
rarely been considered.  Ernest Barker, writing in the immediate post-
war period, suggested that the idea had failed to relate to any clear
meaning, having more the character of an expression of emotion than
a clear conceptual understanding.241 Not everyone finds the idea of
brotherly love appealing; Fitzjames Stephen dismissed it with the
comment, ‘Keep your love to yourself ’.242 But the idea has failed to
engage people in another, more profound way.  In the modern age the
assumption of masculine gender relationships in the word ‘fraternity’
would make the commentators most likely to use the idea rather shy
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Liberty, equality, fraternity
of it.  Carole Pateman comments that women were given no conceptual
place in the new social order.
The contract is made by brothers, or a fraternity.  It is no
accident that fraternity appears historically hand in hand
with liberty and equality, nor that it means exactly what it
says: brotherhood.243
Unlike liberty and equality, then, ‘fraternity’ has come to have an
antiquated ring.  The core of the idea, though, refers to ideals which
are still important – the ideals of collective action, cooperation and
mutual aid.  This section focuses on a closely related, but slightly
different concept to fraternity: the concept of solidarity.  Before I can
do that, however, I need to explain the relationship between the two,
and their differences.
Collective action
A commitment to collective action has been characteristic of left-
wing movements.  Development studies have been heavily influenced
by a body of work which combines a neo-marxist critique of capitalism
with an emphasis on community capacity, organisation and
development.244 These approaches have been influenced by Marxism
and the forms of cooperation favoured in the Russian Soviets, but
they also reflect an older tradition represented in the French Revolution
and the thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and before that in the
solidarity of the mediaeval guilds.  The housing schemes of western
Europe are bristling with organisations committed to similar principles.
Collective action is action by social groups.  The idea of a ‘group’ is
ambiguous, because it is used in many different ways, but it is not the
same thing as membership of a social category.  People can belong to
categories with related experiences – people with disabilities, carers,
victims of domestic violence – without constituting a group.  Social
groups are made up of people who share a common identity, recognise
themselves as members of the group, and have relationships to each
other as members.245 The principle of collective action is well
established, and it should be uncontroversial.  That it is not is testimony
to the strength of the ideology of individualism.  Groups are perfectly
capable of action: when we read that ‘a family has gone on holiday’,
‘the club is hosting a meeting’ or ‘the residents’ association has decided
to oppose the development’, there is no conceptual barrier which
prevents us from understanding this as a group action.  Groups can
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deliberate, decide and act.  They may not do these things in the same
way as individual persons, but they can still do them.
Collective action takes three main forms.  The first is the formation
of groups.  They become a group only when they identify with groups,
can be said to belong to them, and have entered some kind of
relationship to each other.  Identity, membership and inter-relationship
are all necessary for group formation, but the inter-relationships are
key, because they define the possibility of further action.  The second
form of collective action is solidaristic.  Solidaristic action is concerned
with the development and reinforcement of the links between members
of the group, typically through mutual support, shared activities and
social contact.  These actions are internal to the group.  They are
essential if the group is to continue and to have a meaning.  Third,
there is externally directed action, when groups act to relate to people
or other groups beyond the group.  This implies either that people in
the group work in concert, or that there is some mechanism through
which the actions of some represent the whole.  Political activity is
generally externally directed, but so is any action on behalf of a group
– whether it is a public celebration, industrial action, or the purchase
of facilities for a community.  The difference here is not simply a
matter of the focus of the action – some actions can be solidaristic and
externally directed at the same time, like a ‘gay pride’ demonstration
or an Orange Order march – but the methods which then have to be
used: solidaristic action depends on the relationships between members
of the group, externally directed action on the ways in which the
group can act as a group.
Collective action was seen as a radical idea mainly because of its
opposition to the dominant individualist ideologies of the 19th century.
It is helpful to look at a book like Petr Kropotkin’s Mutual aid.246
Kropotkin was an anarchist, who believed that society was capable of
being self-regulating.  His starting point in Mutual aid is an attack on
the myths propagated by biologists in the Victorian era, the belief that
nature is fundamentally competitive and that humans are consequently
driven to oppose each other.  The view that society depends on
individual action and ‘natural selection’ is sometimes referred to as
‘Social Darwinism’, and Darwin’s theories are cited as proof of nature
which is ‘red in tooth and claw’.  Kropotkin counters with many
examples of cooperation and mutual aid in the natural world: one of
his examples is the Portuguese Man of War, a ‘colonial animal’ made
up of cooperating separate animals.  Individualists, like Herbert
Spencer247 or Richard Dawkins,248 tend to interpret our biological




individual.  For Kropotkin, the biology could just as easily be interpreted
as implying competition at the level of the group, requiring
collaboration and mutual support.
The normative case for collective action rests in the sentiment that
the things people do together with others are in some sense better
than the things they do for themselves – perhaps because they are less
likely to be selfishly motivated, possibly because the cooperation of
other people implies some kind of approval, but also simply because
acting with other people is often seen as a good thing.  It is seen as a
source of mutual support, development and empowerment; the
development of solidarity is seen as a good thing in itself.  Equally,
collective action has been seen as a way of giving people who were
disadvantaged, downtrodden or dispossessed the capacity to change
their circumstances.  The association has been made because collective
action typically increases the capacity of the people who participate
in it.  The fraternities of the 18th and 19th centuries used collective
action to develop systems of social protection.249 Working-class
movements were able to establish greater capacity, empowerment and
mutual support through collective action.  These aspects were
particularly important for the understanding of fraternity.
General approval of collective action is hard to sustain, however.
Some groups are able to promote their interest less through
collaboration and support, than through exclusion, favouritism and
the use of power.  It matters not only that people are able to act
collectively, but also what they use their capacity to do.  And there are
arguments to suggest that the undesirable use of power is intrinsic to
collective action – for example, that action by groups invariably leads
to the suppression of individual preferences.  The communitarian
argument in favour of moral preference to friends and relatives applies
strongly in the development of fraternal organisations; if people have
sworn brotherhood, they can be expected to help their brothers out.
Collective action has a ‘dark side’.250
Cooperation
Cooperative action is not common or uniform action.  In some cases,
people who are cooperating will do the same kind of thing, such as
contributing to a fund; but people who are doing the same thing (like
watching television) are not necessarily cooperating, and people who
are cooperating (like people trying to build a house together) are not
necessarily doing the same thing.  In many, if not most, other cases,
cooperation involves doing different, complementary tasks, rather than
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everyone doing the same thing.  This implies a division of labour –
one person does one part of the task, while another does a different
part.
It can be difficult to tell whether people are acting cooperatively
from their actions alone.  People do things for a very wide variety of
motives, and although their actions may seem to be coordinated, they
are not necessarily brought together by a shared task.  People can
engage in similar, complementary activities, like buying and selling
goods, because they are responding to common pressures in
complementary ways.  They might, like traders in a market, be
competing, rather than cooperating.  And they can appear to be
undertaking similar activities, like travel to a common destination,
when in fact they are following through individual motivations and
actions.
Cooperation can be understood in two main ways.  One is defined
in terms of common purpose: people can be said to be cooperating
when they are working to the same end.  This is an appealing idea,
because people who cooperate often do have common purposes in
mind, but it is not really sufficient.  The aim of a totalitarian system,
like Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union under Stalin, may have been
to bend everyone to a common purpose, but such societies were also
atomised – holding individuals at a distance from each other so that
they would not deviate from the general purpose.  The second view
of cooperation is that it is based in process and partnership –
engagement in a common activity.  A ‘cooperative enterprise’ is not
just one where people are working together.  It is one where people
are jointly involved in production and share ownership, responsibility
and profits.  The core elements of cooperative industry are ‘industrial
democracy’ and joint ownership.251 Control is key to both; people
can be said to be cooperating only if they are participating in decisions
about their actions.  Cooperation, then, is defined by a set of approaches,
processes and relationships.  This view also has weaknesses, because
large cooperative enterprises can sometimes seem very remote from
the people they engage, but the principle is right: cooperative action
brings people into a relationship of partnership with others, and that
relationship holds good even if the partnership is distant.
There is a longstanding tradition of cooperative industry in socialist
movements: examples include the Soviets (which were workers’
collectives), the Israeli kibbutzim (which were forms of communal
living), cooperative societies in the UK (which were mutual societies
used for collective distribution), and Mondragon in Spain (a system




discussion, and I am not intending to examine the mechanics or
operation of this kind of movement here, but there are some things
which ought usefully to be said.  These cooperatives either were part
of movements which identified socialism with the actions of the
working class, or were adopted and promoted by people with socialist
beliefs.  In those movements, the working classes were brought together
by a broader conception of ‘brotherhood’: cooperation was a
manifestation of that spirit.  When the principle of cooperation is
combined with collective action, which depends on group membership
and identity, the sense of partnership and common enterprise is a
powerful one.  However, cooperatives, even if they are motivated by
idealism, are not necessarily distinct from other forms of industrial
enterprise.  Cooperatives are not necessarily non-profit making, and
there is no necessary implication of redistribution or mutual support.
The ideas of common enterprise and divisions of labour apply just
as much to family firms as they do to cooperative industry.  The view
of the firm as an extended family, common in Japan and South East
Asia, is not at all radical, but it fits with the model of cooperation as
well as any radical alternative.  The appeal to personal relationships,
moral responsibility and collective enterprise have as much in common
with conservative thought as they do with socialism.  This begs the
question of why cooperation should have been seen as central to radical
ideas.  Part of the answer rests in an ideal: cooperation, rather than
competition, seemed to offer socialists an alternative to the competitive
economic framework.  Part comes from the historical tradition of
trades unionism, which combined social ideals with the defence of
their members’ interests.  In part, too, I suspect, it is based in a confusion
– the unwarranted assumption that cooperation, because it seemed
altruistic, in some way implied support for the weak and oppressed.
The link came because those who, like Kropotkin, believed in fraternity
found it hard to believe that people who valued cooperation would
exclude others from it.
Why people cooperate
Most of the attempts to model why people cooperate are based on
game theory, where cooperation is understood in terms of the
calculations made by each individual when faced with choices about
activities or distributions.  It is possible at least to show that rational
actors ought to cooperate in certain circumstances, although there
may be disagreement about what the circumstances are.252 But the
principal focus of this kind of modelling, the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’, is
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intended to identify the circumstances where people might have a
reason to defect, rather than to cooperate.253 It does not explain why
people should cooperate in the first place.
The core economic argument for cooperation is based on the general
truth that people working together are capable of more than people
working individually.  The proof of this proposition rests in a theory
more usually associated with international trade than with cooperation
at the personal level: this is the theory of comparative advantage.  It is
possible to show formally that in nearly every case where people have
different abilities or capacities, it is in their interests to specialise in
their work and to exchange the benefits subsequently.254 Every modern
society depends on a division of labour: making a loaf of bread relies
on the efforts of farmers, millers, bakers, power workers, and tool
workers, among others.  What we find, throughout society, is the
existence of rules, patterns of behaviour and social arrangements which
make effective divisions of labour possible.  These include not only
rules for public action, like engagement in economic activity or physical
movement, but norms applied in the private sphere, like those governing
families and child care.  Cooperative action is central to every aspect
of social life.
Activity which depends on continued cooperation activity may be
vulnerable to the selfish actions of individuals.  Olsen suggests that, in
many cases, individuals will have an incentive to leave collective
groups.255 This has been happening, for example, in the process of de-
mutualisation in the UK, where long-established financial institutions,
including banks, insurers and building societies, have been re-
incorporated as private enterprises.  The curious thing about this
example is not that it should have happened, but that the process
should have taken so long – many of these institutions had existed for
over a century.256 The assumption that people routinely choose to
defect, rather than cooperate, is at odds with general experience.  In
The tragedy of the commons, Hardin argues that common property is
unsustainable because someone will take up the resources that should
be shared with other people.257 This is only true if there are no rules,
and no code of conduct.  That happens in some cases – a gold rush, a
lawless frontier, or a civil war.  (Something like it is happening now in
the fishing industry in Europe, although that is arguably because fishing
is subjected to the wrong kind of rules, not because fisheries are held
in common.  They are not, and in the European Union people buy
and trade licences to fish.) However, some commons have lasted for




benevolent, detached or lethargic.  It is because they had rules, stuck
to them, and made sure that others did the same.
The idea that people can reasonably be expected to act cooperatively
is sometimes controversial.  There are clearly circumstances where
they do not.  But people live in society, and they interact.  They may
have common patterns of behaviour, some common experiences (such
as schooling), shared understandings (typically because they have a
common language) and some shared values.  Norms of behaviour are
reinforced by formal and informal education, moral codes and legal
sanctions.  This is the setting in which fraternity is developed.  Every
child in a family learns something from having to live with its parents.
(Admittedly what they learn might be about hierarchy, obedience and
defiance, which are all desperately inappropriate to interaction with
other human beings when they become adults, but family life is like
that.) Schools teach children to ‘behave’, which does not necessarily
include politeness or respect for other people but does include the
‘hidden curriculum’ – issues about timekeeping, habits of work and
deference.  People cooperate, whether or not it is in their personal
interests, because they grow up with other people, and they are
socialised into patterns of conduct.  Living in groups, and sharing
activities with other people, is the normal pattern of social life for
most people in developed societies.
Social capital
The idea of social capital has become fashionable in recent years as a
way of referring to the capabilities and value conferred through social
networks.  Putnam points to various uses of the term in the course of
the 20th century: the idea has been periodically invented and re-
invented to apply to a long-running debate.258 The analogous idea of
‘human capital’ has long been used in economics to signify the
investment in skills and competences made in the development of
each person.  Social capital is another type of value, often concealed
or taken for granted: it refers to the value of networks of social
interaction and support which reside in these social relationships.
It is possible to achieve a great deal through the process of economic
production and exchange, which is conceived individualistically, but
the process is heavily constrained.  The economic market depends
implicitly on an infrastructure, which makes interaction and transactions
possible.  In societies where this infrastructure does not exist, economic
engagement requires the development of such resources – both a
physical infrastructure, like roads, water and power supplies, and a social
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infrastructure, like schools and hospitals.  Social capital can be treated
as part of the social infrastructure.  J K Galbraith once referred to the
problems associated with the individualisation of economics, which
he argued led to ‘private affluence and public squalor’.259  The public
domain is not valueless, but there is a risk that it can pass without its
value being appreciated.  The idea of social capital represents an attempt
to attach value to the public sphere.
There are obvious defects in the concept of social capital: it is not
really ‘capital’, and it cannot be redistributed or expended.  It is possible
to attach monetary values to many of these activities, because people
who do not get them through social relationships have to pay for
them, but it is not necessarily meaningful to do so.  (There is also an
argument that the act of paying devalues the relationship: paying for
an escort is not the same as taking a friend out for the evening.) The
importance of considering such relationships has been to emphasise
to those weighing the policy implications of different reforms that
there may be intangible benefits which they are otherwise likely to
ignore.  In that respect, the idea of social capital has been hugely
beneficial in international debates on development.
The idea of social capital refers to a range of relationships from
which people can derive value – relationships like support for older
people, informal child care, social clubs and mutual aid.  This brings us
closer, I think, to an understanding of why cooperative social activity
is thought of as so important to radical thought.  In part, cooperative
action was a means of developing people’s capacity to act.  In part, it
stood as an implicit criticism of the priorities of the economic system.
Perhaps most important, though, it attached value to the aspects of life
which seemed otherwise to be ignored: the social relationships and
mutual bonding which make social life possible.
Mutual responsibility and aid
The third key element in the idea of fraternity is mutual aid.  The
responsibility to help others arises in two ways.  The first, which is
balanced or direct reciprocity, happens when people make mutual
agreements or exchanges.  The second form of exchange, ‘generalised
reciprocity’, occurs when people confer or receive benefits from one
person which convey obligations to someone else.260 The pattern is
most visible in families, where each person is enmeshed in a network
of obligations relating not just to their own interactions and exchanges,
but to the relationships of the people around them.  For example, the




generation of children to support their children in their turn.
Conversely, people who have supported their parents may reasonably
expect that their children will support them in turn.  The obligations
which bind generations work through three dimensions: the
relationships between parents and children, which have elements of
balanced exchange; obligations to younger generations, reflecting
services received from the previous generation; and obligations to
older generations, which stem from the support that they gave their
own parents.
Social welfare might be seen as extending the principle of generalised
reciprocity across a wider society.  That was the position argued by
Richard Titmuss, who suggested that the relationships of altruism and
commitment to other people’s welfare disguised a network of
generalised exchange (or ‘ultra-obligations’).261 In conditions of
uncertainty, people seek to manage risks.  The most effective way of
doing this is through risk pooling, or mutual insurance, and in many
societies mutual insurance has developed to deal with some of the
principal risks people face – notably pensions, medical insurance,
provision for sickness and disability and unemployment insurance.
These patterns of social protection have some important common
features.  There tends to be an assumption in much of the literature
that this sort of protection is developed politically rather than socially.
That assumption is highly questionable.  Many systems of social
protection were developed, not by the state, but by different forms of
mutual organisation.262 The provision was sometimes based on
occupational groups, trades unions and employers; in other cases it
might be mutualist.  The element of intervention by government
similarly varied, but in many countries the state took action only after
voluntary networks had been established, either by replacing the
existing pattern of provision (as in the UK263) or with the intention
of extending similar provisions across a broader range of the population
(as in France264).
An example:  pensions
There are many different types of pensions schemes.  They include:
• mutualist schemes, which people join voluntarily to pool their risk;
• occupational schemes, based on employment; and
• state-financed schemes.
All these systems are organised formally in terms of mutual aid.  Although
many pensions schemes relate benefit entitlements closely to individual
contributions, there are also strong elements of both risk pooling and of
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the acceptance of mutual responsibility.  Pensions schemes pool resources
and liabilities, so that the circumstances of the individual are protected
despite individual variation.  Mutual responsibility is expressed through
generalised reciprocity.  Most national pension schemes work on the
principle of ‘pay as you go’: current contributions are not stored in a fund,
like private pensions, but are used to pay for current benefits.  The rights of
current contributors depend on the recognition of the principle of
reciprocity by future generations.
This approach has some decided advantages.  It protects pensions against
inflation (because the level of benefits is related to current contributions)
and it is sufficiently flexible to make it possible to allow a generation of
pensioners to share in the prosperity of the subsequent generation.
Potentially, it avoids many of the complexities associated with the calculation
of individualised pension entitlement – or at least, it could avoid those
complexities if so many schemes were not trying to pretend that
entitlements are individually calculated.
At the same time, the principle of reciprocity has often been found to
be insufficiently robust to protect pensions from modification by
governments eager to control public finance.  The reform of pensions in
the UK in the 1970s introduced a nominally funded scheme, promising
current workers substantial benefits at the expense of their children without
offering similar benefits to current pensioners.  The French government
recently announced that contribution periods for pensions would increase
in 10 years’ time from 37.5 years to 42 years.  Both may look like technical
changes, but they imply that future generations will be expected to pay for
the pensions of current contributors when current contributors do not
have to make an equivalent sacrifice for current pensioners.
The three main types of pensions – mutualist, occupational and state
financed – have some features in common.  If the specific terms of pensions
schemes were meaningful, these different types would also follow clearly
defined, distinct rules.  Mutualist pensions should, in principle, be confined
to people who contribute, and geared to the level of contributions that
people have made; occupational pensions should be limited to defined
occupational groups; state schemes should be based on contributions or
taxation.  In practice, the lines are not at all clear, and where schemes seem
to be limited – for example, because the occupational base is changing, or
because some people are left out – they are often tweaked to allow for
more general reciprocity.  Mutualist pensions have been extended to include
people whose contributions have been exhausted; occupational schemes
have had measures introduced for redistribution between schemes, to allow




tax advantages.  The form of pensions schemes, then, is likely to be less
important in practice than the principle of mutual aid.
Solidarity
I have introduced the concepts of mutual responsibility and aid under
the general heading of ‘fraternity’, but this is not the way that they are
usually referred to in the European Union.  The language which is
most commonly used is the language of ‘solidarity’, and it makes sense
to re-focus the discussion on that concept.
The idea of ‘solidarity’ was used in a legal sense from the 16th century,
and it features in the Napoleonic code, where it refers to joint financial
obligations.  Sociologists sometimes attribute the term to Durkheim,265
but the term came into use more than 50 years before Durkheim’s
work on the division of labour,266 and Durkheim was writing in an
intellectual environment where the word was widely used.  Solidarity
seems to have acquired its modern meaning by the 1830s; the 1835
dictionary of the Académie Française noted that the term
... sometimes refers, in ordinary language, to mutual
responsibility which is established between two or several
people.  Solidarity binds us together.267
Like liberty and equality, the idea has strong associations with radical
social movements.  Pierre Leroux, who is probably best thought of as
a Christian socialist writer (and, incidentally, who has been credited
with inventing the word ‘socialism’), used the term to refer to a sense
of common humanity.268 Hippolyte Renaud, who popularised the
term in the 1840s, was not very clear about its meaning, but seemed
to identify it with a utopian vision of society.269
‘Solidarity’ refers to the same kind of ideal as fraternity – primarily,
obligations and mutual support between people.  The concepts of
solidarity and fraternity share a commitment to mutual aid and social
responsibility.  Solidarity differs from fraternity by emphasising moral
obligation, rather than cooperation, as the binding force which guides
social action.  This is a subtle shift, but a fundamental one.  If moral
obligation is the core of solidarity, the idea can be linked to conservative
concepts of order and duty.  But the idea is also close to the patterns of
communitarian thought discussed previously, which justify strong
differences in social status, and it has been espoused by the political
right, who have related the concept to traditional conservative concerns
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about moral responsibility and order.  Part of the reason for this is the
influence of the Catholic Church, which has emphasised the
importance of solidarity, mutual responsibility and cooperation to a
constituency which has often been associated with strongly
conservative beliefs.  In much of Europe, the language of solidarity is
accepted by both left and right.
The idea of solidarity is defined in Catholic social teaching as:
A firm and persevering determination to commit oneself
to the common good, that is … the good of all and of each
individual, because we are all really responsible for each
other.270
This is too wide-ranging to be clear, and it needs to be picked apart.
The main elements to be discussed are the common good, and the
idea of social responsibility.
The common good
The ‘common good’ is understood in the Catholic formulation in
two very different ways.  One is the good of each person: a situation
in which people benefit as individuals.  The other is the good of the
whole: what is in the interests of a family, a firm or a school, is not
necessarily the same thing as what is in the interests of each person
within it.  This is only a starting point, however, and there are further
senses of the term.
The good of each individual
Jeremy Bentham argued that the good of the community had to be
understood as the good of each person within it.
The community is a fictitious body, composed of the
individual persons who are considered as constituting as it
were its members.  The interest of the community is, then,
what? – the sum of the interests of the several members
who compose it.271
This view is basic to welfare economics, which treats welfare as the
sum of individual welfares.  The fundamental pr inciple is
methodological individualism, attempting to understand economic




part that approach has served economics well.  At times, however,
methodological individualism spills over into substantive individualism,
often of an extreme nature.  Economic arguments commonly assume
that the only relevant criterion for welfare is the personal utility of
individuals; that the sum of individual choices is always superior to
any expression of social choice; and that any limitation on individual
choice is inferior to collective decision making.272
The foundational assumption of welfare economics is ‘Pareto
optimality’, the view that a measure increases welfare if one person is
better off, and no one is made worse off as a result.   This is generally
considered desirable in economic theory, because it indicates both
that a distribution is efficient and, for a given distribution, that welfare
is maximised.  Sen comments that ‘its acceptability is typically taken
to be entirely non-controversial’.273 That general agreement does not,
however, have much purchase outside the narrow confines of the
economic literature.  The first problem with Pareto optimality is that
it disregards distributional issues.  The suggestion that utility is optimised
where one person has all the goods and another is left to starve is
perverse.  The aggregation of preferences means that the position of
individuals or minorities can be overruled; the only protection they
have is the assurance that they will not be worse off after redistribution,
which is not much help if the initial distribution is unsustainable.  For
a supposedly individualist perspective, this is hard to defend.  The
second problem is that Pareto optimality attaches an unsustainably
high value to personal utility.  Sen has questioned the valuation of
individual utilities above everything else: the utilities of some people
may imply limitations on the actions of others, and he suggests that
the Pareto principle is not compatible with individual choice or basic
liberties.274 Kaplow and Shavell argue that any concept of preference
which is not based on individual utilities – for example, because it is
concerned with liberty, equality or human rights – must at some point
depart from those utilities, and consequently will violate the Pareto
principle.275 If this is right, which I think it must be, the problem does
not lie with the moral principles; it is the Pareto principle which is at
fault.  Pareto optimality cannot possibly be taken as a fundamental test
of people’s well-being.
The ‘individual’ in economic theory is someone considered in
isolation from the world he or she lives in.  This is occasionally useful
for the purposes of moral argument, but the ‘individual’ of economic
or political theory does not exist: no one lives in isolation from other
people, and social interaction is essential to personal development.  It
makes more sense to think in terms of ‘persons’: in sociology, a person,
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unlike an individual, is understood in terms of social roles.  On the
other hand, a ‘society’ is not simply a collection of people.  Society is
defined by the relationships of people to each other: societies are
complex networks of relationships of interaction, exchange and
obligation.  The interests of people and society have to be understood
in relation to each other, because neither is separable from the other.
The good of  ‘each person’ depends on social relationships.
The good of all
The interests of groups are things which will benefit the group.  Those
interests are not necessarily the interests of the ‘individuals’ who make
them up.  Families have an interest in continuity and stability, because
without them they cease to be families.  Commercial firms have an
interest in staying in business and making profits.  Cities have an interest
in economic growth and sustainable development.  Societies, too, have
interests.  Issues like national defence, public order or economic growth,
are generally understood as a benefit for the whole society (or nation)
rather than specific people within the society.  The network of
obligations in a society extends both to past and to future generations.
A society has interests in its continuation and survival, because without
that it ceases to be a society.  This applies even if it is not in the
interests of the people within that society: it is not necessarily in the
interests of each person to ensure that there is a future for their
descendants, but it matters from the point of view of a society.
The weight which should be given to groups over individuals is a
moral question, and not one that can simply be resolved in a general
discussion of this kind.  The importance of this argument is not that it
is simply right or wrong, but that a sensible case can be made for
considering the interests of a collectivity.  Once that is established,
Bentham’s argument falls.  There is such a thing as a common good.
This idea of a ‘common good’ has been controversial.  Rousseau
made use of it in a particular way, to refer to an abstract benefit which
might be distinct from the good of each and every person.276 Claims
based on the good of all tend in consequence to excite suspicion.
That suspicion is reasonable, because it can be used to cover abuse of
the rights of people within the group.  It does not, however, negate





The complementary idea of social responsibility is key to the concept
of solidarity.  Networks of solidarity are, effectively, networks of
obligation.  Some parts of that network can be understood in terms of
mutual obligation – the interlocking, mutually reinforcing patterns of
responsibility derived through reciprocity.  Reciprocity is one of the
key elements which binds a society together, and the norms which
govern reciprocity are sufficiently general to be considered fundamental
to all societies.277 There are other patterns of obligation, however –
religious obligations, the obligations of common humanity, and
obligations within the family – which are equally part of the pattern
of solidaristic social networks.  A society is not just a shifting mass of
people, but a complex set of overlapping and interlocking networks
of solidarity and personal obligation.
People are born into networks of solidarity, where each person has
obligations to others.  The obligations are strongest to those who are
closest: this is virtually circular, because the people to whom one is
closest are also the people to whom obligations are the strongest (and,
Sahlins argues, most generalised278).  People have the greatest solidarity
to those to whom they are closest, and solidarity diminishes with
social distance.
In Catholic social teaching, the idea of solidarity is supplemented
with another principle, that of subsidiarity.  Subsidiarity means that
responsibility rests, in the first place, at the level which is closest to the
people affected.279 The strongest, and most valuable, forms of solidarity
are the closest bonds, and the duty of more remote bodies is to
supplement and complement these bonds, not to replace them.
Governments and higher bodies have a duty, not to stay out of personal
or local affairs, but to strengthen and help them.
The idea of social responsibility links solidarity to other concepts of
duty – a link which helps to explain the commitment of many of
Europe’s political conservatives, to support for the poorest.  Because it
is a moral concept, however, it does not mean that it is unqualified.
The principle depends on some degree of reciprocity; people have an
obligation to contribute in order to receive.  The moral responsibilities
which are developed in society are often particular rather than general:
people do not have the same obligations to strangers that they have to
friends, neighbours and colleagues.  Other moral concerns, such as
the moral conduct of recipients, may be thought to condition the
responsibility.  By contrast with universal principles, like rights or
justice, solidarity is liable to be severely restricted.
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Solidarity is important, though, precisely because it is based in the
moral principles that people hold.  It mobilises such moral sentiments
as a justification for support.  The extension of solidarity across social
networks means that a broad circle of people are included in
responsibilities which otherwise might be confined to a privileged
group.  The strength of the Catholic concept of solidarity is that it
draws on the power of these relationships as the basis for social cohesion.
Its weakness is that it can make the more distant strands of solidarity,
and some of the other principles governing society, seem unimportant
by comparison.
An example:  the caring relationship
The pattern of responsibilities identified in the idea of ‘solidarity’ is specific
and personal.  Solidarity is not based in a vague sense of common feeling
with the rest of humanity.  People have duties to each other, and the closer
they are to each other, the stronger those duties are.  That is almost a
definition of what it means to be ‘close’.
In many cases, this duty is expressed as a duty of care.  Parents have to
care for young children; adult children have to care for their ageing parents;
husbands and wives have to care for spouses with disabilities.  Over five
million people in Britain are engaged in this kind of ‘informal’ care for
people who are older, sick or disabled; about a third of those do so for
more than 20 hours in a week.280 The needs they meet are physical, including
help with mobility, aids to hearing and seeing, and supervision; needs relating
to personal care, including dressing, washing and personal hygiene; and
household management, including housework, preparing food and financial
management.  (People who need care have other needs, of course, like the
need for social contact, entertainment, stimulation and affection, and carers
will also help in those areas, but that does not distinguish them from any
other social contact.)
The feminist literature sees the burden of care as falling primarily on
women.281 This is only half true.  Women are more likely than men to be
carers, which means that the burden is disproportionate, but many men
are also carers.  Conventionally, the role of carer tends to fall to daughters
and daughters in law, but this assumes that there is a female in a position to
care, and often that is not the case.  The position of carers is mainly
determined by their relationship to the person who needs care: spouses
have the most direct responsibility, and the role of adult children increases
as the people in need become older.  Many carers – about a quarter of the
total in the UK – are themselves older people.




For children looking after older parents, there may be a reversal of the
roles they previously held.  Some tasks, like washing and personal hygiene,
are particularly sensitive.  For older people with dementia, the main
problems identified in the literature concern the burden on carers, the
capacity of carers, and the behaviour of the sufferer.282 The primary
determinant of stress in the carers is the impact of dementia on the sufferer’s
activities in daily living – that is, functional disability – rather than the level
of cognitive incapacity.283 The kind of problems carers report include
dressing, washing, meals, getting people in and out of a chair or in and out
of bed, and urinary and faecal incontinence.284 I have been critical of some
of this literature in the past, because it often seems to treat the carers as
the only ones who have problems: older people with dementia are no less
likely to be distressed by their condition.285
This needs, though, to be counterbalanced by some of the positive
considerations.  People care for others out of duty, and out of love.  Qureshi
and Walker’s qualitative study, The caring relationship,286 suggests that the
positive elements are not all expressed in one direction: older people often
make a positive return for care with physical help, emotional support, finance
and child care.  The relationship between carers and disabled people is an
exchange, not a simple burden.
The case against solidarity
The principle of solidarity is so firmly established in society that arguing
against it seems pointless, like arguing against the weather or the tides.
That does not, of course, prevent many critics doing just that.  The
opposition to solidarity is of two main kinds.  First, there are those
who object to the very idea of social responsibility.  This position is
mainly expressed by libertarians, a class of liberal thinkers who take
each person to be an ‘individual’, conceive of society as an accident of
geography rather than a network of relationships, and accept no
responsibilities that they have not explicitly signed up to.  Thoreau’s
Walden, to my mind a pernicious and repellent book, is an example.287
The libertarian position is extreme.  Even if it enjoys recurring
intellectual vogues, few people act as if it applies.  A society in which
no prior responsibilities were established would be impossible to live
in.
Second, there are those who object to the idea that there is any
general moral obligation to help others in society.  This is a much
more widely held view: it is most strongly held in the US, but is
supported by a constellation of liberals, individualists and thinkers of
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the ‘new right’.  The proponents of the arguments, such as Hayek and
Friedman, differ in the particulars, but broadly speaking their argument
consists of five main points, responded to in turn here.
1. Society consists of individuals.  The view of society as a collection
of individuals is central to liberal thought.  The model of solidarity
is based on a very different understanding of society.  If people
are bound together by solidarity, they become part of a series of
overlapping social networks; society is formed through a complex
series of such links, a network of networks.
2. Individuals should be free to make their own decisions.  This represents,
in many ways, the fundamental contrast between liberals and
conservatives.  Liberals believe that people are free to make
decisions; conservatives, that they cannot be.  In large part, the
liberals have had the greater influence; many people in politics
and the press would immediately agree in general terms even if
they might have reservations about specific cases.
3. Social protection imposes constraints on individuals which infringe their
freedoms.  The position begins from the premise that social
protection is imposed on individuals, which is largely untrue.
Many systems, as noted above, have been founded on a voluntary
or mutualist basis.  The penetration of such systems typically
extends to a substantial majority of the population.  The main
exceptions are those who are excluded by low wages or the
terms of their employment.  Voluntary self-exemption, where
possible, is done because people make alternative arrangements,
not because people do not want to be protected.
4. Individuals have to bear the consequences of their own decisions, and
social protection distorts those consequences.  In the arguments of the
‘new right’, and increasingly in the political mainstream,
unemployed people have to accept the consequences of not
working, and single parents have to raise their children.288 The
idea of insurance or risk-pooling works against this.  It is clearly
true that social protection mitigates the effects of some decisions
– that is what it is there for – in the same way as property insurance
mitigates the effect of exposure to the risk of fire or theft.
5. The best, and only legitimate, form of allocation and distribution arises
from the free interaction and exchange of goods.  This last proposition
takes us beyond the scope of discussions of solidarity, into similar
areas to those discussed in Chapter Two.  Solidaristic arrangements
may seem to have the implication that individual decisions will




are accumulated according to the requirements of policy rather
than the cumulated preferences of individuals.  It is possible in
consequence to show that the distribution is less likely to accord
with individual preferences than a series of individual decisions
would be.289 The main reservations to make about this position
are that:
a. pensions, like wages, depend on the conventions of markets.
There is no reason to suppose that the contributions required
of employers and employees would otherwise be available for
the decisions of individuals.  Wages are set by convention, not
according to some intrinsic value, and in developed economies
the cost of social protection is part of the cost of wages.
b. pensions, despite their apparent form, are primarily financed
through generalised reciprocity, rather than saving.  There are
not necessarily cumulated funds available for alternative
distribution.
c. despite the assumption that preferences are imposed, when
people are left to make voluntary arrangements, most make
precisely the sort of solidaristic arrangement which has
otherwise been made by the state.
There are, I think, important objections that can be made to solidarity
on individualistic grounds.  Those objections are poorly represented
by the libertarian right wing, because their conflation of liberalism
with free-market ideology and opposition to social support rejects
what is valuable about the idea, as well as what is dangerous.  The
principle of solidarity is based strongly in an existing structure of
obligations – a structure which people are bound into by virtue of
their position, about which they have little say, and which implies that
they have duties whether or not they consent, and whether or not
they benefit.  This is the same kind of argument which was used to
support a static, oppressive feudal society, the world that the principles
of liberty, equality and fraternity were intended to overthrow.  And
those principles hold the key to the problem.  Without a principle of
liberty, solidarity has the potential to be illiberal.  Without a principle
of equality, it may be inegalitarian.  It is only if solidarity is reconciled
with liberty and equality that its dangers can be resolved.
Solidarity and equality
There is a potential tension between the ideas of equality and solidarity.
The idea of equality begins with the proposition that people should
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be considered equal unless there are reasons to the contrary.  A model
of society based on the idea of solidarity begins from the proposition
that people’s positions in society are necessarily differentiated.  Every
person is part of a complex network of relationships, and everyone
has a set of responsibilities which are personal and distinctive.  There
are, in consequence, always reasons why people should not be
considered equal.  This is closely related to the communitarian argument
considered in the section on Arguments for inequality in Chapter
Three.  The reply of the egalitarian is simple enough: egalitarians do
not accept that society has to be the way it is.  But there is a much
deeper problem for those who would like to hold to the principle of
solidarity at the same time as the principle of equality, because
differentiation can legitimate inequality.
There are three common resolutions of this dilemma.  The first is
through redistribution.  Both solidarity and equality can be interpreted
to imply a commitment to redistribution.  People who are in extremely
unequal positions are not likely to enter solidaristic relationships with
each other.  One of the arguments for charity is that it emphasises the
responsibility of each member of society for others.  Sahlins points to
the generality of the principle of noblesse oblige – the idea that those
who have more have a continuing obligation to others who have less.
This idea has a remarkable generality: Sahlins identifies it in the
anthropological literature covering more than 70 societies.290 He
suggests that the reason for its generality is functional: the acceptance
of responsibility for the poor is often the only point of contact that
poor people have with the rest of society, and without such a principle
the societies which do not have an equivalent procedure cease to
exist.  If that is right, then solidarity in one sense – the redistribution
from rich to poor – is necessary to solidarity in another, which is the
maintenance of a common good.  The form of redistribution implied
by solidarity is not always egalitarian, but it will reduce inequalities
where solidarity is expressed in a commitment to people who are
disadvantaged or excluded.
The second resolution is through the idea of universality, which
aims to provide public and social services to everyone on an equal
footing.  There is some confusion in the literature between universality
as a principle, which is concerned with ensuring complete coverage
of everyone in a population, from universality as a method, by which
some benefits (like Child Benefit) go to every resident or citizen of a
certain age.291 For the current argument, the principle is what matters:
the idea that everyone is entitled to benefit.  The principle is




but it is widely accepted in others: no one seriously thinks that fire
services should only cover people who contribute (which was the
position at the beginning of the 19th century), and there is a fairly
widespread acceptance of the principle of universal education, whereby
all children should receive at least an elementary education.  Universal
education is a good example of a policy which is both egalitarian and
solidaristic.  It is egalitarian in the sense that it both provides people
with a common foundation, and is seen as central to equality of
opportunity.  It is solidaristic partly in the promotion of social cohesion,
and partly because the acceptance of social responsibility for children
is a fundamental part of generalised reciprocity and solidarity between
generations.
The third approach which can reconcile solidarity and egalitarianism
is the emphasis on social inclusion.  Solidarity implies, for some, a
principle of an inclusive society: a society in which each person extends
to strangers the kind of moral commitment and sense of obligation
which otherwise are reserved for those who are closest.  This position
was famously expressed by Richard Titmuss,292 and it has its
descendants in the strong commitment of many in social policy to
universalist principles.  Putnam argues, further, that there is an empirical
association between social equality and social capital, which he identifies
directly with the principle of fraternity.  This happens in part because
social capital helps to create greater equality, and in part because
inequality is inimical to the formation of social capital, and possibly
because both are shaped in practice by common social forces, like the
experience of solidarity in wartime.  ‘Community and equality’, he
writes, ‘are mutually reinforcing, not mutually incompatible’.293
Solidarity and freedom
As with equality, there may be a conflict between solidarity and the
idea of freedom.  Solidarity is concerned with obligation, and many
of the obligations of solidarity are incurred without the people involved
having a true choice.  We do not choose our families or our
communities, but we have obligations towards them.  In extreme cases,
the obligations imposed in solidaristic communities can be repressive
– limiting freedom of action for everyone, but particularly for people
in ascribed roles, like women and lower castes.  This is just the sort of
social arrangement that liberal individualism opposes, and in
contemporary society that opposition is considered to be almost wholly
justified.
Like the conflict between solidarity and equality, solidarity and
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freedom can be reconciled under certain conditions.  Solidarity, like
equality, may be required to give people the basic security which is
necessary to free action.  Without education, for example, people cannot
become free to act; without solidarity, education will not be provided.
Similarly, the provision of basic welfare services and development of
social protection can be seen as fundamental to personal freedom.  If
freedom is understood in a social sense, the capacity of people to act
depends on cooperation with others, and so on a degree of solidarity.
Requiring people to engage with solidaristic networks, for example
through inclusion policies, may be consistent with developing their
autonomy.  Putnam suggests that there is a direct empirical link between
tolerance for diversity and engagement in networks of solidarity.294
Solidarity may develop as a matter of choice, and some political
thought on the left has tended to assume that solidarity and freedom
are simply complementary.  Sylvan, writing about anarchism,
comments:
Is its goal individual freedom or communal solidarity?
Sometimes one, sometimes the other, sometimes neither,
sometimes both.  A pluralist anarchism offers several different
sorts of communities, not just one kind: independent
individuals, families or firms, perhaps interrelated and
organised through markets and contracts; solidaristic groups
working freely together and sharing according to need;
and various attractive intermediaries, where there may be
more individual-oriented market arrangements but there
are also safety nets ensuring distribution according to basic
needs.295
Many arrangements for social protection have been established, not
through coercion, but through voluntary association and mutual
exchange.  However, depending on voluntary engagement has
limitations.  There may be problems of exclusion, which can act to
limit social participation and the capacity of people to act.  The people
who default or opt out of solidaristic arrangement do so, not because
they feel it is unnecessary to contribute, but because they cannot afford
to do so.  The main purpose of compulsion has been to extend social
protection.  At the same time, it ought to be recognised that there is
only a limited need for such compulsion in practice: overwhelmingly,
people do contribute voluntarily.
One of the apparent reconciliations of solidarity and freedom is




families, communities or businesses, this covers up a problem.  People
within these groups may be restricted in their actions.  Freedom for
families commonly means freedom for parents, not for children;
freedom for businesses is freedom for employers, not employees.  The
same reservation is the root of Pateman’s objection to the construction
of liberty and fraternity as male concepts.
Fraternity and solidarity in theory: an overview
Like freedom and equality, fraternity and solidarity are rich, multifaceted
concepts.  Fraternity subsumes understandings of collective action,
cooperation and mutual aid.  Solidarity includes issues of the common
good, reciprocity and social responsibility.  Although these concepts
are often morally persuasive, they may be less immediately compelling
than liberty or equality.  Fraternity and solidarity have a ‘dark side’,
and they need to be seen through the lens of liberty and equality to
avoid the moral dilemmas of a closed, restricted society.  Solidarity is
most attractive when it is applied to the idea of social inclusion.  This





Solidarity has long been established in the political lexicon of European
countries, and with its widespread use comes a degree of ambiguity.
For practical purposes, there are very different understandings of
solidarity.  One model of solidarity bases it in rational cooperation
and mutual aid.  In developing countries, the primary strategy has
been to facilitate the integration of people into the formal economy,
an approach which has the decided advantages of increasing their
income, and giving them access to formal patterns of exchange, but
the disadvantage of requiring specialisation and making people
vulnerable to economic forces.  In developed economies, and in
particular in Europe, the main strategy has been to increase the coverage
of solidarity, by extending or modifying the existing networks of social
support.296 Mutualism has been used to draw people into networks of
solidarity, established on a mutual basis.  It is expressed in a concept of
solidarity as mutual insurance, based on pooled risks, mutual
contributions and clear rules of entitlement.
The main other model sees solidarity in terms of collective action,
shared responsibility and a commitment to redistribution.  This is often
expressed in terms of redistributive policies, special provisions and
responsiveness to need.  Solidarity is used to reduce differences between
different members of the solidaristic group – at which point, it becomes
egalitarian.  The ‘solidaristic wage policy’ in Sweden, aimed at
diminishing the range and dispersion of wage settlements, was overtly
egalitarian in its aims.297
This distinction is based in a shift in practical action, but it also
represents a theoretical divide.  It reflects to some degree the same
kind of distinction as that between individual and social concepts of
liberty and equality, because it is concerned like them with the
difference between people in diverse circumstances and the needs of
the group.  However, it cannot be described as a distinction between
‘individual’ and ‘social’ concepts of solidarity, because both approaches
are distinctly social.  Both elements, too, represent aspects of fraternity.
Nor can it be identified with ‘conservative’ and ‘radical’ models, because
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Liberty, equality, fraternity
there are conservative perceptions which are firmly based in social
relationships.  Perhaps the best way of thinking about the distinction
is to separate ‘mutualist’ from ‘collective’ obligations.  Mutualist
obligations are based in the relationship of each person to other people,
and the group.  In this category, there are insurance arrangements,
cooperatives, self-help groups.  Collective obligations are defined in
terms of the group, not the person.  In relation to social welfare, this
includes action for rights, egalitarian policies and state support for
excluded groups – although it also includes many other forms of
collective action, including charity and voluntary action.
Promoting solidarity
Solidarity is strongly identified with actions beyond the scope of
government – including domestic, voluntary, charitable and altruistic
behaviour.  The role of government in promoting solidarity is
ambiguous, and there are two main patterns of action.  The first is the
attempt to introduce measures which in some sense express social
solidarity – typically the introduction of measures for social protection
or the relief of poverty.  In social security policy, solidarity originally
was taken to refer principally to mutually funded insurance policies.
It has come increasingly to refer to schemes which go beyond the
scope of insurance, like the Allocation de Solidarité Spécifique in France
(which extends benefits to unemployed people whose entitlements
from contributions are exhausted),298 or ‘solidarity contributions’ in
Switzerland (which require people to put money to the general fund
without gaining entitlements).299 Bertrand suggests that social
assistance:
... expresses a feeling of solidarity in respect of the poorest
people (les individus les plus désherités) in a society.300
This understanding is much more common in continental Europe,
where social Catholicism has been influential, than it is in English-
speaking countries.  Nevertheless, the 1944 White Paper on Social
Security made similar claims, arguing that:
The scheme as a whole will embrace, not certain
occupation and income groups, but the entire population.
Concrete expression is thus given to the solidarity and
unity of the nation, which in war have been its bulwarks
against aggression and in peace will be its guarantees of
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success in the fight against individual want and
mischance.301
Second, governments can attempt to promote solidarity by supporting
and encouraging solidaristic action in society.  Governments support
voluntary and charitable activity through a range of persuasive measures,
incentives (especially through tax) and subsidies.  The patterns of
intervention include regulation, by establishing the rules and settings
under which such independent agencies operate; provision, through
purchasing policies, financing, employment of different social services;
and planning, including placing resources, the development of
incentives, legal controls, and bargaining and negotiation in the field.
It has often been argued that, beyond this, governments effectively
incorporate the work of such schemes into their own plans of action.302
The pattern of interlocking services and activities is variously called
‘welfare corporatism’, ‘welfare pluralism’, or a ‘mixed economy of
welfare’.303 This cannot reasonably be avoided: governments cannot
plan effectively if they do not take the work of independent and non-
governmental organisations into account.  This strategic approach to
the development of solidarity has also been central to the development
of social policy in the European Union.  The European Union does
not have the structures, institutions or legal competence to provide
social protection directly, but it has established a strategy of promoting
solidarity and planning initiatives to fill the outstanding gaps, while
gradually extending competence in these areas.304
Some conservative critics of the welfare state have argued that state
intervention is liable to reduce solidarity, rather than to promote it.
Green argues that the state has driven out voluntary and charitable
provision, and that a mix of independent providers, if given the
opportunity to flourish, could provide welfare just as effectively as
state provision.305 The evidence that the state has ‘crowded out’
voluntary provision is tentative, at best.  The historical argument depends
on counterfactuals – what might have happened if the course of a
nation’s history had been different – and comparative evidence is
necessarily bound by cultural differences.  There may be more charitable
donations in countries where there are tax incentives to give such
donations, and there are more and larger mutualist associations
functioning in circumstances where the state does not provide a national
alternative, but neither point takes account of the wide constellation
of alternative solidaristic and not-for-profit arrangements.  There is
some evidence that more can be done beyond the state, because the




provided through a mix of mutualist, voluntary, charitable, occupational
and commercial organisations.  The role of the state is often understood
as supplementary to the solidaristic networks which exist elsewhere
in society.
Green’s argument has intriguing parallels with the case made by
Richard Titmuss.  Titmuss emphasised the importance of altruism and
reciprocal obligations in social relationships.  His example was blood
donation: he believed that social arrangements based on altruism and
moral obligation were not only morally superior to the systems of the
market, but produced better results.  Voluntary blood donation produced
more and better-quality blood than the market alternative.306 In
political terms, Titmuss’s and Green’s arguments are opposed, but they
have strong common elements.  Both suggest that the effect of dominant
arrangements – the market, in Titmuss’s view, and the state, in Green’s
– has been to mask the importance of voluntary and charitable effort.
Both suggest that the role and capacity of solidaristic social networks
is underestimated.  And both use, to establish their case, a combination
of moral and pragmatic arguments – stressing both the practical
strengths of voluntarism, and its moral virtues.  To that extent, both
approaches lend support to a policy of fostering, promoting and
encouraging solidarity through voluntary action.
The problem with this position is that voluntary action has little
chance of developing as a primary method of distribution; at best, it is
a complement to services.  Nowhere has an emphasis on voluntary
solidarity, the private market or a combination of the two, led to
adequate provision in its own right.  The state is consequently forced
to act as a provider of last resort.  Once the state has accepted this role,
it will act more effectively and efficiently if it expands its
responsibilities.307 In most systems, the role of the state has been
established only after the development of voluntary and mutualist effort;
and in many of those, the state has effectively replaced or supplanted
the activity, rather than complementing it.
An example:  the voluntary sector in the UK
The term ‘voluntary sector’ is used in several senses.  ‘Voluntary’, on the
one hand, is used to refer to all non-state activity.  ‘Voluntary hospitals’, in
the US, include semi-commercial, not-for-profit, mutualist and charitable
organisations, sometimes with combinations of different activity working
out of the same site.  On the other hand, the term is also used to refer
more specifically to not-for-profit activity where some element of labour
is unpaid.  The Women’s Royal Voluntary Service is ‘voluntary’ because it
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uses women’s unpaid, altruistic labour for its services; UK housing
associations are examples of ‘voluntary housing’ because their committees
are run by unpaid volunteers, although their staff are usually paid.  In effect,
there is the same kind of hotch-potch in ‘voluntary’ effort as there is in
‘solidarity’: the term covers a range of disparate activity undertaken for
different motivations.
The term ‘charity’ is also used widely in the UK.  This is less ambiguous,
because the term has a legal meaning: recent reforms have recast the idea
of charity around the concept of a ‘public benefit’, but for centuries a
charity in the UK has been an organisation founded to promote one of a
limited number of functions, including the advancement of education, the
relief of poverty, advancement of religion, or general benefit of the
community.  The new tests introduce further criteria, like the promotion
of sport and animal welfare.  Organisations working for political ends or
campaigns (like Amnesty International or the anti-vivisection movement),
organisations with no public benefit aims (liked closed religious orders),
and organisations working solely for the benefit of their members (like the
Freemasons or the Royal and Ancient Order of Buffaloes) have been barred.
However, many charities in the UK have subordinate commercial and
political wings, nominally functioning outside the scope of charity law.
The voluntary sector is highly diverse.  Voluntary and charitable work,
in the sense of working for the benefit of others, are typically concentrated
in health, social services, housing and community development,
environmental, cultural and international aid agencies.  Kendall and Knapp
estimate that the sector, narrowly defined, employs the equivalent of 390,000
people.  On a broader definition, taking into account the role of voluntary
action as a collective activity, the voluntary sector might be considered to
include independent educational institutions, business and trade associations
and sports clubs; the figure rises to nearly 950,000.308 These definitions
still do not include two very important other mechanisms through which
solidaristic support is delivered: mutualism, and not-for-profit organisations.
(In continental Europe, both roles may be taken by ASBLs, associations sans
but lucratif.)
The extension of solidarity
There are two main arguments for extending networks of solidarity.
The first is a general argument about obligations towards every human
being: people have human rights.  The main difficulty here is that
human rights, by their very nature, extend beyond the scope of existing




have the responsibility to respect those rights, there would be a rather
more extensive commitment to international aid than is currently
recognised.  It could be argued that human rights have to be expressed
through the action of specific governments: governments accept
responsibility for people who are within their territory, and who are
not the responsibility of another state, at the time when their needs
are expressed.  Although this rule generally applies in international
law to stateless persons, it is not generally accepted for others who are
not protected by their own governments, and hardly any governments
have accepted responsibility on this basis.  (Exceptionally, the UK
National Health Service did so from 1948 to 1981, offering free health
care to all visitors, including tourists.)
The main alternative model is based in a concept of national solidarity.
Governments recognise a responsibility to their own citizens.
Necessarily this falls somewhat short of a general human right, but
within the territorial confines of a government’s sphere of authority,
it would imply both a commitment to comprehensive coverage and a
continuing commitment to expatriate citizens.  Some governments
do accept the principle of comprehensive coverage, although
commonly this is done through supplementary residual services.  Many
governments accept responsibility for their own expatriate citizens,
either through the development of reciprocal agreements or (more
rarely) through the continued provision of benefits to citizens living
abroad.
There is no reason, however, to suppose that solidarity will necessarily
be extended.  The most obvious problem with the structure of solidarity,
as I have outlined it, is that it does not allow adequately for adaptation
to changing circumstances.  Where there are changes affecting the
participating membership, it is not clear that solidaristic arrangements
will alter along with them.  Where there are changes in underlying
conditions, such as changes in the structure of professional groups
which affect the contributory base, there is no intrinsic reason why
benefits should continue to be paid: no one has the obligation to meet
them.  Where people’s needs increase beyond the commitment of the
schemes they have participated in – for example, because of the growing
numbers of dependent older people – there is no guarantee that the
scope of provision will extend to meet those needs.
The general arguments for extending solidarity may be compatible
with the interests of people within the existing networks if the costs
of including more people do not outstrip the benefits of including
them.  The effect of expanding a network can be to reduce vulnerability
to particular events, and so to smooth risks.  There are, however, several
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reasons why people who are participating in a solidaristic network
might not wish to extend the network to include people who have
previously been excluded.  The first is the contributory base.  The
ability of people on lower incomes to contribute is limited.  Equally,
their employers are often less willing to contribute, because the
employment is low paid, because it is more likely to be temporary or
insecure, and of course because poorer people are less likely to have
stable employment relationships in the first place.  Expanding solidarity
to people who find it difficult to contribute reduces the financial
security of the network.  The second problem is the nature of the
need: people on lower incomes not only have a lower ability to
contribute, but in some respects – including health care and
employment insurance – their risks are greater.  (The exception is
pension entitlement, where people who are less able to contribute
may make up for it by their shorter life expectancy.) The third problem
is institutional: once a solidaristic organisation has been set up, there is
of necessity a complex series of rights and obligations governing its
action.  Government arrangements are characterised by legislation to
allow variations of aims and objectives.  Private enterprise is generally
able to adapt to new circumstances at the behest of managers.  If, for
example, a firm producing wire baskets wants to focus instead on
providing marketing services, it can do so.309 By contrast, voluntary,
not-for-profit organisations are much more restricted.  Charities which
have outlived their usefulness are allowed, through the doctrine of cy-
près, to change their mode of operation, but this is a regulated procedure,
necessary to avoid the abuse of charitable donations.  Mutualist
organisations are slightly more flexible; they are nominally owned by
the members, and can be varied with the explicit consent of the
membership.  The standard institutional response to a declining
mutualist base is not to extend new forms of membership, but to
close, either through merger with compatible organisations or through
distribution of the society’s assets.
The growth of new rights and obligations seems to require a sort of
contract, in which people are engaged (either actively or tacitly) in
the development of solidaristic agreements by consent.  Historically,
this has happened through a gradual process of expansion: from an
initial basis, membership of mutualist groups has expanded to
incorporate new members.  There are some cases of a scheme being
introduced through a large-scale agreement: one is the pioneering
extension of social protection in Germany to include provision for
the dependency needs of very old people.310 More typically, however,




is only through external intervention that the formal limits of solidarity
can be overcome.  Many governments have come to welfare late in
the day, and the main effect of action has been to push the boundaries
of solidarity outward, ensuring (often through the introduction of
some element of compulsion) the inclusion of people who might
otherwise not have been included.  There is nothing within the process
of mutualism that promises to produce a similar effect, and it is unlikely
that this would have happened without external intervention.
Promoting social solidarity
In previous parts of this book, I have considered the question of what
makes a free society, and what makes an equal society.  The idea of a
‘solidaristic society’, however, is simply tautologous: solidarity is not
usually thought of as a model for society, because patterns of solidarity
define what a society is.  A society is not just a group of people who
happen to live near each other.  People are linked by a complex series
of relationships, expressed through solidarity and obligation.  Everyone
has a relationship to other people – typically as a son or daughter, a
brother or sister.  These relationships come with obligations: the nature
of family relationships, and the effect of generalised reciprocity, means
that everyone has duties to others.  As each person grows and develops,
the circle of social relationships extends outwards.  People are socialised
– they learn how to behave in society and what to expect – but
beyond that, they form more relationships with other people.  Nearly
everyone has several relationships of this kind, and there are overlapping,
interconnected obligations.  The pattern of obligations can be seen as
a part of a ‘network’, but there is not a single network; there are many.
A society is made up of a series of interlocked networks.
Societies which promote solidarity can, however, be contrasted with
a different kind of social arrangement, the idea of an ‘atomised’ society.
People become like ‘atoms’, or very small particles, which are all distinct
from each other.  People are individuals; contact is limited to necessary
exchange and interaction; no one is in close relationships to other
people.  The principle can be found in criticisms of different societies.
One example comes from concerns about the dangers of totalitarian
regimes in the 1940s – Orwell’s Nineteen eighty-four describes a world
where personal relationships are seen as a threat to the power of the
state.  Another comes from recent criticisms of North American society,
which suggest that assertive individualism may endanger social bonding.
Putnam’s Bowling alone points to the decline of the civic culture in the
US, and paints a picture of a society where people are less likely to
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join other organisations, participate in social events or spend time
with families than previous generations were.311 Making society less
atomistic, and more solidaristic, implies that people are brought into
relationships of responsibility and obligation.  Solidarity is a principle,
rather than an ideal, but it is not difficult to imagine a society where
people are tied to each other by a sense of mutual obligation and
support.  The model is based on an idealised family, and extended
beyond the family to the community at large.
Community
‘Community’ is a very vague term, with as many interpretations as
‘society’ itself: in a well-known article, Hillery lists 94 different
definitions.312 Within those definitions, we can trace two main strands.
The first is based in interests or characteristics of a group.  Social
groups are not just collections of people.  They have three main features:
identity, membership and connecting relationships.  Identity means
that the group is recognisable as a social category: people of African
Caribbean descent are, people with red hair are not.  Membership
implies that it is possible not just to identify the group, but to identify
who is within the group and who is not.  Relationships are the most
important element.  We cannot talk about ‘people with schizophrenia’
or ‘women’ as a social group, because despite the common issues, and
common identity, they are not bound by social relationships.  When
people talk about the ‘business community’, by contrast, they usually
mean to imply that people in business are identifiable as a group, that
there will be networks of contact between the members, that they
have common interests and that because of those they will respond to
certain issues in similar ways.  The ‘Jewish community’ in the UK is
linked by identity, culture and networks of social relationships.
The second understanding of community is geographical, identifying
community with neighbourhood or area.  This is not genuinely
different from the first idea: it represents, rather, the belief that the
characteristics of social groups apply in geographical areas.  If this
meant only that people live in the same area as others, the attribution
of community would be questionable.  The term implies, beyond that,
that the effect of living in the same area is to bring people into social
relationships with each other.  This may or may not be true: some
areas have a strong sense of community, and a strong identity, while
others have transient populations and atomised social relationships.
‘Community action’ has become one of the characteristic modes of




work consists of action to foster social relationships within a
community: extending facilities (such as a playground or communal
garden), creating structures where people can meet and form social
relationships (a community centre or a support group for people with
young children), encouraging community events (a coffee morning
or a disco) and offering help and advice to people in a community
(typically welfare rights or energy advice).  Community education is
concerned with developing capacity, understood as the skills and
potential for collective action in a community.  It covers such activities
as advice work, adult education and the formation of community
groups.  Community organisation is concerned with political
development: it tries to develop to structures needed for political
mobilisation, participation in collective action, and voice in the
decisions which affect people.
The idea of community has been invested with a strong emotive
appeal.  People who talk about ‘community’ may be thinking
descriptively, but they may also be asserting something about the nature
of the relationships and bonds which are identifiable within a group –
discussions of the ‘gay community’ or the ‘disabled community’ are
illustrative, because the assertion ignores enormous diversity and
disjunction in the experience of both categories.  Social groups are
central to collective action, and the appeal to a collective identity can
help, in itself, to bring together the group which is capable of doing it.
At the same time, Iris Young argues that appeals to ‘community’ can
have the opposite effect.  In her view, community is often exclusive,
an excuse for ‘bigots and conservatives’ to shut out outsiders.  Further,
she suggests, it detracts from the work of radical groups:
Many radical political organisations founder on the desire
for community….  [It] often channels energy away from
the political goals of the group, and also produces a clique
atmosphere which keeps groups small and turns potential
members away.  Mutual identification as an implicit group
ideal can reproduce a homogeneity that usually conflicts
with the organization’s stated commitment to diversity.313
The problem of exclusion
Exclusion is the central problem associated with solidarity.  By
identifying the people we have responsibilities to, the principle of
solidarity also defines those to whom we do not have responsibilities.
There are economic arguments for inclusion, and some political
153
ones – such as the belief that lack of responsibility leads to social and
political disorder.  However, the case against exclusion is fundamentally
a moral one.  Quite apart from solidarity, there are many other moral
principles which argue that we do have responsibilities to other people,
even if we do not have an identifiable relationship to them.  The most
basic argument is humanitarian: people should not be left without
means of support, medical care or the necessities of life.  That means
that there has to be some kind of mechanism to deliver such necessities.
This argument is also expressed in the view that people have human
rights, universal rights which go beyond the rights of citizenship.
Exclusion can be defended.  No society can accept responsibility
for all the problems in the world, and without some criteria for inclusion
and exclusion it would not be possible to do anything.  Equally, at the
level of organised networks of solidarity, like social services, there are
practical limits to what any network can do.  There have to be rules,
and some system for determining who will be served, and who will
not be.  (There are social services which have no criteria at all for
distribution, like some soup kitchens, because the practicalities and
geography make it unlikely that they will be seriously compromised,
but they are unusual.) Commonly, criteria for selection are reinforced
by rules for exclusion.  In insurance-based systems, non-contributors
have no entitlement in principle to services – although it is striking
that many systems will allow for services to be delivered nevertheless,
either through the establishment of complementary or residual systems
or through modifications in the principle of insurance to allow for
solidaristic responses.
In many social protection systems, there are restrictions on claims
from strangers – usually migrants, because casual visitors can be
expected to be covered by reciprocal arrangements with other national
systems.  Integrating migrants into welfare systems – a central focus of
European Union policy – is partly motivated by a desire to deal with
people universally, but there are also sound arguments for doing so.
There is a case for pooled contributions and risks: pensions, in particular,
depend on contributions for the current generation of workers, and
the exclusion of any large class of workers undermines the contributory
base.  Further, exclusion can cause distortions in the labour market:
the exclusion of certain categories of people from protection can foster
a dual labour market, distinguishing those who are covered (and for
whom contributions must be made) from those who are not.  (From
the perspective of the migrant, the case is less clear: the argument for
joining mutualist schemes depends on an individual calculation.  Where




compulsion: joining a social security scheme becomes part of the
rules of joining the club.)
Solidarity and social welfare
In the context of social welfare, the idea of solidarity has come to have
several quite specific implications for the organisation and delivery of
welfare services.  The model developed most explicitly in France, and
from there it has spread, via the medium of the European Union, to a
number of other European countries.  People enter relationships of
solidarity when they are incorporated into networks of mutual support.
The French Code de sécurité sociale declares that ‘the organisation of
social security is founded on the principle of national solidarity’.314
In the period after the Second World War, French social policy aimed
to extend solidarity across all groups, leading to a ‘patchwork quilt’ of
different services.  Insurance is redistributive, in the sense that the
people who benefit are not those who pay, but it does not just involve
a simple transfer of income from rich to poor.  In French social policy,
the kind of redistribution associated with mutualism is usually referred
to as répartition, which we might for this purpose translate as re-
allocation rather than the more conventional ‘redistribution’.  Solidarity
consisted of sharing and pooling risks.  The underlying principle of
mutual responsibility made it necessary to consider supplementing
insurance with additional arrangements, to ensure the inclusion of
others to whom they accepted responsibilities.  When some mutualist
funds were unable to cover costs, and other funds were required to
stand in for them, the arrangements between funds were described as
‘solidaristic’.
The process of extending insurance was complete by 1974, but it
was clear that many people were still left out.  They were the people
who had not been able to work, and consequently were not able to
contribute.  René Lenoir’s book Les exclus pointed to the problem of
people who were excluded, in the sense of not being part of networks
of solidarity.315 French governments responded in two different ways.
The first was the extension of solidarity beyond the remit of insurance,
an issue which was discussed before.  The second part was the attempt
to ‘insert’ people who were excluded into society.  This began with
benefits in the 1970s for young people and people with disabilities,
but subsequently the principle became identified with a general attempt
to provide a basic safety net.  The Revenu Minimum d’Insertion combined
entitlement to a minimum income through a means-tested benefit
with the requirement to negotiate a personal ‘contract for insertion’
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with the benefit authorities.  This model has been profoundly influential
in Europe, spawning both direct imitations of the method (for example,
in Belgium, northern Spain and Italy) and a general set of policies
across Europe addressing the issues of social inclusion.  The European
Union has developed a series of policies intended to build on existing
networks of solidarity, to extend provision to increase coverage, and
to introduce specific measures to include the excluded.  This shows
the direct influence of the French model.
An example:  the ‘contract of insertion’
The Revenu Minimum d’Insertion is an interesting case study of inclusion,
because it attempts to translate a general principle into specific practice.
It has two key elements.  The first is a basic means-tested benefit, available
to people on low incomes.  The second is the ‘contract of insertion’ or
inclusion, made between claimants and the local commission of insertion
(CLI).  At the same time, the CLI makes contracts with other organisations
to create opportunities for insertion.
The pattern of contracts has been characterised generally in terms of
three main types of insertion: social, professional and economic.316 Social
insertion refers to the situation of people who are excluded by virtue of
social disadvantage, for example disability or single parenthood.  Professional
insertion is for people who require some kind of training or preparation
for work.  Economic insertion is for people who are unemployed but who
would be in a position to move directly to employment.  Contracts
represent a highly individualised approach to a range of problems, with the
main focus falling on long-term unemployment.  Action for insertion and
formation (AIF), for example, includes programmes of training and
counselling selected for individuals: according to Dugué and Maillard, ‘it
brings together all the provisions for overview, evaluation, motivation and
formation (training and education) appropriate to the needs of each
individual’.317
What the contracts which are made reveal about the work done as
‘insertion’ is ambiguous.  Part of the problem is that the concept of ‘insertion’
has been for many a justification for whatever happens to be done, rather
than a guiding principle.  Wuhl writes:
... this ‘insertion’ so precisely described seems equally intangible and
indeterminate.  Basically, it is the ‘how to do it’ which has been the object
of all attention, while the ‘why we should do it’ remains much more




The kind of work which is undertaken varies enormously between
different localities.  In one local authority I visited, insertion was all about
employment; in a second, it was anything but.  The descriptions of the
process of insertion given by the agencies which are involved in supporting
the contracts suggest that even within these categories there is a wide
range of different kinds of activity.  The emphasis may fall initially on
employment and training, but this is interpreted to include workshops and
occupational therapy in various settings (for example, art classes, car
maintenance or gardening), for a range of groups with particular needs;
the target groups include people with mental illnesses, ex-prisoners, people
with drug addictions, and so forth.319 By extension, day centres or classes
on domestic management are also included in programmes of insertion.
There are two important reservations to make about this.  The first is
that, where contracts are made, what they are about is not always very
clear.  Wuhl estimates that only 8% of all claimants actually finish with a
contract that contains some specific programme of action.320 It has been
suggested that contracts might be made for the sake of it.  Euzeby comments
that
... the objective is not really to respond to the needs of beneficiaries, but
rather to justify the existence of the contracts.321
This, Astier suggests, reflects the desire of the commissions responsible
for insertion to emphasise the conditional nature of the benefit.  Even in
cases where there is little hope of demanding anything effective from the
claimant, some form of words may be used to show that this is not simply
a free payment.322
The second reservation is that, even though the process of making
contracts is often justified in terms referring to social integration, the
emphasis in practice often falls on employment.  ‘Insertion’ is primarily
devoted to employment and training; this covers more than half of all the
contracts.  It is certainly seen in this light by many of the claimants:
The notion of insertion ...  is very badly understood by the beneficiaries.
The idea of insertion itself, however understood, is only in the minds of a
minority of people who sign contracts.  The others put the search for
work first as the main objective.  Anyway, I don’t want insertion, I can find
work....323
By contrast, the emphasis on social development which features so largely
in the literature – concerning subjects like health promotion or basic
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education – occupies only a limited proportion of contracts which are
made.
The Revenu Minimum d’Insertion mainly deals with the kinds of condition
which, in an institutional model, would be dealt with as far as possible
through the provision of universal provision for everyone.  The criticisms
which might be made of policy for ‘insertion’, then, are not unlike those
which have been made of other individualistic and residual approaches to
social policy: that the effect is to blame the poor for their poverty.  The
strong link with employment tends to suggest an identification of insertion
with a process like workfare in the US.324 Bichot writes:
The contract expresses the wish to maintain a direct link between work
and obtaining resources.  It is situated in a long tradition, illustrated by
the British workhouses and the French national workshops....  There is a
largish consensus in relation to this ancient idea, provided that it is kitted
out in the latest fashion.  It could have been taken up equally well by the
right as by the left.325
There are obligations on both sides.  The individual has to accept a pattern
of insertion; the community has to make inclusion possible.
The inclusive society
Solidarity is potentially a conservative principle, emphasising social
order.  It is also potentially exclusive.  The ideal which has been pursued
on the left is not simply a society with greater solidarity, but an inclusive
one.  A society which is inclusive should be able progressively to
extend its boundaries, developing and strengthening networks of
solidarity, building a sense of social responsibility and community,
drawing in people who are excluded, and fostering collective action.
In the 1960s, this ideal was commonly described in terms of
‘integration’: ‘by and large’, Boulding wrote, ‘it is an objective of social
policy to build the identity of a person around some community with
which he is associated’.326 Currently the emphasis mainly falls on
social inclusion.
The idea of social inclusion is treated very differently in different
societies.  Partly, this is true because the problems are understood
differently, but also because in the European Union, the commitment
to combating exclusion now incorporated in the treaties, and the
availability of European funding for specific projects, has encouraged




inclusion.  Silver notes three different paradigms.  The ‘solidarity’
paradigm emphasises social cohesion and exclusion through marginality
and social dysfunction.  The ‘specialisation’ paradigm understands
exclusion as the product of economic and social processes, including
the failures of markets and the concentrations of deprivation produced
through housing systems.  The ‘monopoly’ paradigm, associated with
Marxist views of capitalism, suggests that exclusion stems from the
actions of those who exclude others: the primary response is through
the extension of membership of the community and the promotion
of greater equality.327
These perspectives are informed less in truth by patterns of
sociological thought than by the existing practices of the countries
which have applied them.  Policies for ‘activation’ of labour, urban
regeneration and social work with marginal groups have all been
represented as forms of inclusion, but in every case they preceded the
idea of inclusion as a conceptual justification for the activity.  The
diversity of interpretation tends to muddy the water, but that should
not detract from the power of the core ideas.  The idea of social inclusion
appeals to both left and right as a means of extending a sense of shared
commitment and mutual responsibility.  For the right, this implies
social cohesion, stability and order.  For the left, inclusion implies full
membership of society and the ability to participate.  Principles of
social justice, normalisation and empowerment are commonly enlisted
as ways of reinforcing that general approach.
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Conclusion: radical politics
It commonly happens, where ideas are widely used, that they come to
have many meanings, not all of them consistent.  Liberty, equality and
fraternity can be understood in many ways, and much of this book
has been concerned with drawing out the implications of different
interpretations.  In this concluding section, I want to take a narrower,
more specific, focus on the concepts.  Any simplification runs the risk
of misrepresenting the situation, and there is always the danger that
selective consideration will hide as much as it reveals.  It seems to me,
though, that these ideas still have a special place in radical and left-
wing ideas, and I wanted to consider the relationship between the
concepts in that light.
For 200 years, the principles of the French Revolution have been
part of the discourse of radical politics.  Radical thought has followed
different directions since, and many of the ideas current in the
Revolution have been superseded by others.  There are strands of
socialist and radical thought concerned with a wide range of other
issues, such as culture, pacifism and environmentalism.  Another
significant strand, Marxism, was heavily influenced at first by the French
Revolution, but conventional Marxist analysis detached itself from
the political mainstream.  (Marx and Engels considered that liberty
was a bourgeois value328 and that thinking about equality beyond the
elimination of class differences was pointless.329 Marxism had little to
say about the values and ideas covered in this book, and I have had
little to say about Marxism in consequence.  I have reviewed the core
of Marxist ideas in another book.330) However, for the democratic
socialist parties which guided the development of Europe, particularly
after the Second World War, understanding the relationship of these
values is a core element in understanding their motivation and approach.
It is not putting it too strongly to say that liberty, equality and fraternity
– the values of the Revolution – came to define socialist thought.
Self writes:
The rallying cry of the French Revolution – equality, liberty
and fraternity – now constitute essential socialist values.  It
would be foolish to deny conflicts between interpretations
of these values....  However, the point is that the values




Their application is, however, conditioned by different understandings
of the terms, and I think it can be argued that the varying interpretations
underlie differences in the patterns of socialist thought.
Radical politics: three models
Political approaches are ‘radical’ when they propose fundamental social
change.  Many of the principled approaches I have considered in this
book are radical in that sense.  They begin from the common
proposition that the way things are is not the way they ought to be.
Beginning from a sense of moral principle implies that new structures
and relationships have to be created.  The test of whether this can be
said to be ‘fundamental’ depends on how far and how deep such reforms
go, but the very idea that change can be made on moral grounds is
controversial.
Where radicals consider liberty, equality or fraternity, the kind of
social policy they come to favour differs according the emphasis they
place on each.  The radicals of the political left tend to begin from
social or collective understandings of social problems (although that is
not necessarily the case) and on the face of the matter they might be
expected to have some important perspectives in common.  Liberty,
equality and fraternity are closely related, but they do lead in different
directions, with a different emphasis on values and approaches.  The
easiest way to illustrate this is by three extremes, or ideal types, although
it is important to recognise that in real life hardly anyone fits into an
idealised model.
Liberty: radical libertarians
The left-wing libertarian is committed to liberty first and foremost.
The object of social policy is liberation, which is achieved through
empowerment, the encouragement of diversity and participation
through democracy.  The aim for each person is the expression of that
person’s legitimate aspirations and choices, and so the realisation of
the person’s interests.  Social welfare is developmental, allowing people
to become what it is possible for them to become.  Many libertarians
would add to this list the removal of elements of society which make
people vulnerable, exploited and oppressed, but this is not essential to
the ideal type, because the same arguments motivate those who argue
for equality.  In this model, the arguments for equality and fraternity
are largely reducible to arguments for liberty.  A left-wing libertarian
justifies the struggle against inequality because inequality restricts liberty.
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Socialism’s fundamental purpose – indeed the purpose of
the equality which we seek – is the extension of liberty....
It is a commitment to organise society in a way which
ensures the greatest sum of freedom, the highest total
amount of real choice.332
Inequalities imply oppression, and oppression restricts people’s choice,
and prevents them from achieving their potential.  Solidarity is
important because the capacity to act can only be fully realised through
collective action.  Fraternity is a means to empower people and give
them capacities.
I am not sure that anyone precisely meets the specifications of the
model outlined here, but there are elements of this kind of libertarianism
in the work of Paolo Freire.  Freire, working in the context of a
developing country, favoured community education and action as a
means to liberation.  Freire is passionate about freedom.
This is the great humanistic and historical task of the
oppressed: to liberate themselves and their oppressors as
well….  Freedom is acquired by conquest, not by gift.  It
must be pursued constantly and responsibly.  Freedom is
not an ideal located outside of man; nor is it an idea which
becomes myth.  It is rather the indispensable condition for
the quest for human completion....  The pedagogy of the
oppressed ...  makes oppression and its causes objects of
reflection by the oppressed, and from that reflection will
come their necessary engagement in the struggle for their
liberation.333
I think it could reasonably be argued that Freire’s emphasis on collective
action might be seen as implying a primary commitment to solidarity,
rather than liberty.  However, the emphasis on education, capacity,
oppression and liberation is fundamental to his case.
Equality: radical egalitarianism
The radical egalitarian stands for the elimination of disadvantage, in
treatment, opportunity and outcome.  Egalitarians emphasise the
principles of fairness and social justice, arguing that everyone should
have access to the conditions of civilisation which otherwise are
available only to some.  The provision of welfare is both a method by




redistribution.  ‘Ethical socialists’ made the establishment of greater
equality central to their conception of the good society.
It is true here, as it is of the other models, that it is difficult to find
anyone who holds to this approach without simultaneously appealing
to other moral principles.  This is particularly true of egalitarian thought,
which is driven by a strong sense of moral priorities.  In different
ways, however, the traditional appeal of Marxism or the anarchism of
William Godwin might be seen as examples of this approach.  Both
approaches are fuelled by moral indignation at social disadvantage.
Marxism appealed to the argument that people were being exploited
by a dominant class.334 Godwin’s position is individualistic, and based
in the view that political institutions should serve the welfare of all
citizens without fear or favour.  He contrasts that position with the
existing hierarchy of privilege.335
As a principle, opposition to disadvantage is defensible in its own
right, and it does not require reference to other principles like liberty
or fraternity to be justifiable.  A proponent of equality can see greater
liberty as a desirable by-product of social justice, or as a subordinate
principle.  For Tawney, liberty was simply the principle of equality in
another guise:
... liberty is, in fact, equality in action, in the sense, not that
all men perform identical functions or wield the same
degree of power, but that all men are equally protected
against the abuse of power, and equally entitled to insist
that power shall be used, not for personal ends, but for the
general advantage.336
This might be seen as a restriction on liberty: in so far as equality
implies a redistribution of powers, the liberty of some people is achieved
at the expense of the liberty of others.  However, even for those for
whom liberty is of paramount importance, it is not difficult to justify
an argument for increasing the liberty of people who have none.
The justification for fraternity by egalitarians is more direct.  Because
equality is a social principle, it is difficult to distinguish it wholly from
mutual aid: both, in practice, imply a degree of generalised social
responsibility and redistribution.  Fraternity is both the means to
developing the conditions of civilisation for all, and a justification for
doing so.  Egalitarian arguments emphasise the importance of reducing
social divisions as a means of promoting integration.  ‘Social institutions’,
Tawney wrote,
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... should be planned, as far as is possible, to emphasise and
strengthen, not the class differences which divide, but the
common humanity which unites, them.337
Fraternity: radical collectivism
The radical collectivist begins with an emphasis on community,
solidarity and mutual aid.  Collective action is both a means to a
desired end and an end in itself.  As a means to an end, cooperation
and mutual aid make it possible for people to achieve things they
could not achieve otherwise.  As an end in itself, collective action
indicates respect for other people and recognition of mutual
responsibilities.  Henry Tam thinks it implies equality:
... an inclusive community would not tolerate any
hierarchical supremacy based on wealth, race, religion, sex,
or any form of group allegiance.338
Liberty and equality are not simply reducible to fraternity, but they
may be subordinate – as they were in Soviet Russia.  Liberty can be
enhanced through group action.  The form of freedom which is valued
is the power to act that comes through cooperation and social capital.
Greater equality may be seen as requisite for the reduction of sources
of conflict, and the development of fellow-feeling.  The form of equality
which is valued by the radical collectivist is not so much the elimination
of disadvantage as the establishment of social bonding through common
sentiments and patterns of behaviour – the kind of equality identified
in America by de Tocqueville.339
This kind of radical collectivism is well represented by Petr
Kropotkin, the Russian anarchist.  Kropotkin saw mutual aid and
collective action as the most effective way of meeting human needs.
Beyond this, he believed it was central to moral conduct and human
improvement.
That mutual aid is the real foundation of our ethical
conceptions seems evident enough....  The higher
conception of ‘no revenge for wrongs’, and of freely giving
more than one expects to receive from his neighbours, is
proclaimed as being the real principle of morality – a
principle superior to mere equivalence, equity, or justice,




to be guided in his acts ...  by the perception of oneness
with each human being.340
Radical thought: three ideal types
Another way of representing these models is outlined in Table 1.  The
concepts in the table, and the relationship to liberty, fraternity and
equality, have been discussed in the course of the book.  It is possible
to read down each column, ignoring the others; each makes sense as a
model in its own right.  But it is not necessary to do so – many of
those on the left would accept several principles from across the table,
and place different emphases on them.
The three models are not separate in practice; many socialists would
accept that all of these principles are valuable, and would seek to achieve
all simultaneously.  There tends to be the assumption that each element
necessarily leads to each other element; and one finds that people
who wholeheartedly advocate one model are able to justify the other
elements in terms of that model.  But people put different emphases
on different elements within the structure, so that outcomes which
appear to be compatible in fact tend in different directions.  Liberty
emphasises the developmental aspects of welfare; equality, the
redistributive impact; fraternity, the rights and obligations associated
with mutual aid.  The libertarian model values diversity; fraternity
favours citizenship and community; egalitarianism emphasises needs,
rights and justice.  In cases where the principles differ, the dominant
elements may come into conflict.
Table 1:  Three models of welfare
Symbolic principle Liberty Fraternity Equality
Associated principles Empowerment Solidarity Social justice
Characteristic moral Respect for Mutual Fairness
position persons responsibility
Ideal relationship of Development The gift Access to the
the person of capacity; relationship; ‘conditions of
and society normalisation inclusion civilisation’ for all
Ideal society Pluralism; Community Equality of persons
diversity
Political organisation Liberal Participative Citizenship
democracy democracy




There is no unified ‘right wing’, any more than there is a monolithic
left.  The differences on the ‘right’ between liberal individualists and
conservatives are profound, and often deeper than the apparent
differences between left and right.  Many of the objections considered
in this book to ideas of liberty, equality and fraternity are conservative
ones, based in a different understanding of society.  There are three
main patterns of opposition from the political right.
The first is exemplified by the arguments of Edmund Burke, who
argued for a resistance to general principles of all kinds.  This position
is partly founded in the complexity of social structures, which make it
difficult to determine what the likely impact of any policy might be.
It is partly because of distrust of the values which the left espouse:
some conservative scepticism is based in a cynical view of human
nature, and grand ideals are sometimes dismissed as the disguise for
people’s true motives.  More fundamentally, however, it is also because
general principles are not very reliable in specific cases.  Burke argues
that the apparent purity and simplicity of many basic principles is a
snare: their application leads inevitably to the disregard of other
important factors which need to be balanced against them.  He
proposes, instead, a pragmatic approach, where policies are tried and
tested in small ways before they can be applied more generally.341
The second pattern of opposition is the position of liberal
individualists like Hayek and Nozick.342 The thinkers of the ‘new
right’ are not necessarily opposed to liberty, equality or fraternity, but
they understand them from a distinct perspective.  They interpret society
individualistically rather than collectively.  Liberty is generally
interpreted in negative terms, as the absence of constraint, rather than
in positive terms as the power to act.  The main threat to it is paternalist
intervention by the state.  Equality is conceived narrowly in terms of
treatment of people as equals, without bias or prejudice.  It stands for
equality before the law, and sometimes for equality of opportunity in
the sense of the ability of the best to rise.  Fraternity is represented in
terms of social cohesion and the organic nature of society – a complex
series of overlapping social networks and solidarities.  It is brought
about through the complex mutual interaction of individuals, and as
such it is subordinate to the role of the individual.  There is some
ambiguity as to whether their arguments are truly opposed to radical
thought.  In their own way, they can be as moralistic and zealous for
change as the doctrines they criticise.  They have been referred to as




effect: Norman Barry describes the ‘new right’ as a fusion of liberal
and conservative thought.344 Hayek argues against well-intentioned
intervention in society, while Nozick criticises ‘patterned’ approaches
to distributive justice.
The third pattern of opposition comes from those who believe in
social order.  The arguments from the left depend on the view that
social relationships can be altered on normative grounds, and that
they should be.  Part of the conservative response has been that there
is much else in the structure of society which is valuable; against liberty,
equality and fraternity, there are good arguments for social order,
inequality and independence.  Conservatives may take the view that
social structure, moral obligation and social order require development
and protection rather than systemic change.  To Fitzjames Stephen,
liberty, equality and fraternity was:
... something more than a motto.  It is the creed of a religion.
I am not the advocate of Slavery, Caste and Hatred ...  [but]
when used collectively the words do not typify, however
vaguely, any state of society which a reasonable man ought
to regard with enthusiasm or self-devotion.345
Liberty, equality and fraternity are not, of course, the only values which
guide social policy, nor even the principal aims.  When the Pétain
government tried, during the Second World War, to re-orient French
life, they arranged for the slogan liberté, égalité, fraternité on municipal
buildings to be replaced by another: travail, famille, patrie, or ‘work,
family, country’.  Conflicts in social policy are usually based, not on
direct disagreement about specific principles, but between priorities
and approaches relating to a range of desired aims.  That, however,
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